NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0040n.06
No. 25-3445
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED Jan 22, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) DARRYL WRIGHT, OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Darryl Wright has a long criminal history, going back
to the age of nineteen. Over the years, he has been charged with or convicted of dozens of offenses,
including resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, lying to police, felonious assault, robbery, drug
possession, assault, drug trafficking, and aggravated menacing.
The instant case is his latest interaction with the criminal justice system. In the summer of
2022, investigators learned that Wright was trafficking in drugs. He would supply the drugs to
four other people, who would then sell those drugs to customers in Toledo, Ohio. Confidential
informants bought drugs from Wright and his co-conspirators approximately 25 times, with most
of the deals taking place at Wright’s house. Based on this information, officers obtained and
executed a search warrant for Wright’s residence, where they found firearms, ammunition, scales,
and cash. No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
The Government charged Wright with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute controlled substances, distribution of a controlled substance, and being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Wright pled guilty, and the parties agreed that Wright’s base offense level
would be 32. The district court then adopted the Government’s recommendation that his total
offense level was 36 and his criminal history score was III. That made the Guidelines range 235
to 293 months in prison. The district court sentenced Wright to 240 months in prison followed by
five years of supervised release. Wright timely appealed.
The Government argues that we should be reviewing most of Wright’s arguments for plain
error. “We need not decide whether plain error applies, however, because the district court did not
commit [] error here, plain or otherwise.” United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir.
2019).
Wright first challenges the drug premises enhancement. The Sentencing Guidelines
instruct courts to increase a defendant’s offense level by two points “[i]f the defendant maintained
a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(12). When the relevant premises “looks like a business—due to the presence of, say,
manufacturing equipment, cash, weapons, and customers or employees,” a court does not err in
applying the drug premises enhancement. United States v. Tripplet, 112 F.4th 428, 432–33 (6th
Cir. 2024).
Wright agrees that the district court relied “on the uncontested statement of a cooperating
source alleging narcotics being in the basement.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He also does not contest
that firearms, ammo, scales, and money were at his house, nor does he contest that officers
conducted nine controlled drug buys at his home in a three-month span. We have held that several
controlled buys at a residence in a short time span, along with cash and weapons present there,
2 No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
suggest that the premises is a drug house. Tripplet, 112 F.4th at 433. True, there were no drugs
found during the search of Wright’s home, but the police conducted several controlled buys there,
suggesting that drugs had been there at some point. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that
on the day of the search, Wright was just out of stock, waiting for a new shipment to arrive. We
see no reason to disturb the district court’s application of the drug premises enhancement.
Nor do we find any error, as Wright claims, in the district court’s application of the manager
enhancement. The Guidelines direct district courts to increase the defendant’s offense level by
three points if he “was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal
activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). This
enhancement applies if the defendant “exercised decisionmaking authority, recruited accomplices,
received a larger share of the profits, was instrumental in the planning phase of the criminal
venture, or exercised control or authority over at least one accomplice.” United States v. Minter,
80 F.4th 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2023) (emphases deleted); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. The manager
enhancement may also apply if the defendant helped coordinate drug deliveries. Minter, 80 F.4th
at 758.
Wright easily meets these criteria. He stored the drugs in his house, and most of the drug
buys took place at or near that residence. During these drug buys, couriers would retrieve the
money from the customer, go to Wright’s home, and bring the drugs to the customer. Wright
would also supply the drugs to the other participants. In this regard, he had control over most of
the conspiracy’s property, and a reasonable person could conclude that Wright was directing the
couriers on how to carry out the drug buys. That leads directly to the reasonable inference that
Wright oversaw his portion of the drug trafficking ring based on these facts.
3 No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
We find unpersuasive Wright’s argument that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a
sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant
sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United
States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). The mere fact that Wright’s sentence was
longer than that of his co-defendants does not matter. Although district courts are supposed to be
mindful of potential sentencing disparities, we care primarily about national disparities, not
disparities between co-defendants. United States v. Wright, 991 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2021).
And the mere fact that a court places more weight on one factor than another is not a basis for
reversal. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 571 (6th Cir. 2012).
The district court reasonably concluded that Wright’s almost constant criminal conduct in
his adult life warranted a longer sentence. Defendants who exhibit “recurrent antisocial
behavior . . . oftentimes injuring or causing physical harm or abuse to others” should fully expect
a longer sentence than those who do not. R. 126, Transcript, PageID 1118.
We similarly find no problems with the district court’s weighing of the factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). We are not in the business of micromanaging the district court’s balancing under
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0040n.06
No. 25-3445
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED Jan 22, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) DARRYL WRIGHT, OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Darryl Wright has a long criminal history, going back
to the age of nineteen. Over the years, he has been charged with or convicted of dozens of offenses,
including resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, lying to police, felonious assault, robbery, drug
possession, assault, drug trafficking, and aggravated menacing.
The instant case is his latest interaction with the criminal justice system. In the summer of
2022, investigators learned that Wright was trafficking in drugs. He would supply the drugs to
four other people, who would then sell those drugs to customers in Toledo, Ohio. Confidential
informants bought drugs from Wright and his co-conspirators approximately 25 times, with most
of the deals taking place at Wright’s house. Based on this information, officers obtained and
executed a search warrant for Wright’s residence, where they found firearms, ammunition, scales,
and cash. No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
The Government charged Wright with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute controlled substances, distribution of a controlled substance, and being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Wright pled guilty, and the parties agreed that Wright’s base offense level
would be 32. The district court then adopted the Government’s recommendation that his total
offense level was 36 and his criminal history score was III. That made the Guidelines range 235
to 293 months in prison. The district court sentenced Wright to 240 months in prison followed by
five years of supervised release. Wright timely appealed.
The Government argues that we should be reviewing most of Wright’s arguments for plain
error. “We need not decide whether plain error applies, however, because the district court did not
commit [] error here, plain or otherwise.” United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir.
2019).
Wright first challenges the drug premises enhancement. The Sentencing Guidelines
instruct courts to increase a defendant’s offense level by two points “[i]f the defendant maintained
a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(12). When the relevant premises “looks like a business—due to the presence of, say,
manufacturing equipment, cash, weapons, and customers or employees,” a court does not err in
applying the drug premises enhancement. United States v. Tripplet, 112 F.4th 428, 432–33 (6th
Cir. 2024).
Wright agrees that the district court relied “on the uncontested statement of a cooperating
source alleging narcotics being in the basement.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He also does not contest
that firearms, ammo, scales, and money were at his house, nor does he contest that officers
conducted nine controlled drug buys at his home in a three-month span. We have held that several
controlled buys at a residence in a short time span, along with cash and weapons present there,
2 No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
suggest that the premises is a drug house. Tripplet, 112 F.4th at 433. True, there were no drugs
found during the search of Wright’s home, but the police conducted several controlled buys there,
suggesting that drugs had been there at some point. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that
on the day of the search, Wright was just out of stock, waiting for a new shipment to arrive. We
see no reason to disturb the district court’s application of the drug premises enhancement.
Nor do we find any error, as Wright claims, in the district court’s application of the manager
enhancement. The Guidelines direct district courts to increase the defendant’s offense level by
three points if he “was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal
activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). This
enhancement applies if the defendant “exercised decisionmaking authority, recruited accomplices,
received a larger share of the profits, was instrumental in the planning phase of the criminal
venture, or exercised control or authority over at least one accomplice.” United States v. Minter,
80 F.4th 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2023) (emphases deleted); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. The manager
enhancement may also apply if the defendant helped coordinate drug deliveries. Minter, 80 F.4th
at 758.
Wright easily meets these criteria. He stored the drugs in his house, and most of the drug
buys took place at or near that residence. During these drug buys, couriers would retrieve the
money from the customer, go to Wright’s home, and bring the drugs to the customer. Wright
would also supply the drugs to the other participants. In this regard, he had control over most of
the conspiracy’s property, and a reasonable person could conclude that Wright was directing the
couriers on how to carry out the drug buys. That leads directly to the reasonable inference that
Wright oversaw his portion of the drug trafficking ring based on these facts.
3 No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
We find unpersuasive Wright’s argument that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a
sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant
sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United
States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). The mere fact that Wright’s sentence was
longer than that of his co-defendants does not matter. Although district courts are supposed to be
mindful of potential sentencing disparities, we care primarily about national disparities, not
disparities between co-defendants. United States v. Wright, 991 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2021).
And the mere fact that a court places more weight on one factor than another is not a basis for
reversal. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 571 (6th Cir. 2012).
The district court reasonably concluded that Wright’s almost constant criminal conduct in
his adult life warranted a longer sentence. Defendants who exhibit “recurrent antisocial
behavior . . . oftentimes injuring or causing physical harm or abuse to others” should fully expect
a longer sentence than those who do not. R. 126, Transcript, PageID 1118.
We similarly find no problems with the district court’s weighing of the factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). We are not in the business of micromanaging the district court’s balancing under
§ 3553(a), nor do we require the district courts to recite magic words when conducting that
balancing. United States v. Smith, 505 F.3d 463, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2007). Although the district
court did not quote the § 3553(a) factors directly, it stated that it had “considered them” but had
decided to emphasize only “the ones that” it thought were “most important.” R. 126, Transcript,
PageID 1120. When the district court asked if Wright wanted it to say “anything further . . . with
regard to the 3553(a) factors,” his counsel said no. Id. at PageID 1119. This colloquy further
assures us that the district court said enough.
4 No. 25-3445, United States v. Wright
Nor do we find any problems with the district court’s consideration of dismissed cases in
deciding how to sentence. Wright’s previous interactions with the criminal justice system, even
those that did not lead to a conviction, form part of Wright’s “background, character, and conduct,”
which Congress has instructed courts to “consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. The district court therefore had a right to consider the dismissed
cases. See United States v. Hill, 688 F.2d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Conway,
513 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2008).
Finally, Wright’s Eighth Amendment claim fails. A within-Guidelines-240-month
sentence for drug trafficking is not cruel and unusual, especially when the defendant has a long
history of criminal activity. United States v. Bonas, 434 F. App’x 422, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); United States v. Rolon, 511 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United
States v. Theramene, 517 F. App’x 789, 801–02 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Seeing no error in the district court’s rulings, we AFFIRM.