United States v. Darryl Lee Williams

170 F. App'x 989
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 20, 2006
Docket05-2237
StatusUnpublished

This text of 170 F. App'x 989 (United States v. Darryl Lee Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Darryl Lee Williams, 170 F. App'x 989 (8th Cir. 2006).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Darryl Williams appeals the district court’s 1 denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion challenging the district court’s 1993 denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss the appeal.

In 1990, this court affirmed Williams’s conviction and sentence on drug charges. See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d *990 1377, 1380 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 953, 111 S.Ct. 1428, 113 L.Ed.2d 480 (1991). In August 1993, Williams filed a section 2255 motion, alleging that his sentence was improperly enhanced. The district court denied the motion in November 1993, and this court dismissed the appeal, see Williams v. United States, No. 94-1828, 1994 WL 567676 (8th Cir. June 8, 1994) (unpublished disposition). In January 2004, Williams filed the instant motion under Rule 60(b), arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his habeas motion. The district court denied the motion, and Williams appeals.

We find Williams’s motion was in reality a successive section 2255 motion, as he attempted to reargue the claims in the original motion by attacking the district court’s November 1993 ruling on substantive rather than procedural grounds. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, — U.S. -,-- -, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2647-48, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (Rule 60(b) motion should not be treated as successive habeas motion if it attacks district court’s previous resolution of claim on procedural grounds); United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (inmates may not bypass authorization requirement of § 2255 by purporting to invoke some other procedure). Thus, the district court’s dismissal was proper, see Boyd v. United States, 304 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir.2002) (if district court determines Rule 60(b) motion is actually second habeas petition, court has discretion to dismiss it for failure to obtain authorization, or transfer it to court of appeals), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 953, 123 S.Ct. 1642, 155 L.Ed.2d 499 (2003), and we deny a COA, see United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (COA is required to appeal denial of any motion that ultimately seeks habeas relief), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2953, 162 L.Ed.2d 879 (2005).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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Related

Alvarado-Herrera v. United States
538 U.S. 953 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Williams (Darryl Lee) v. United States
43 F.3d 675 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)
Willie E. Boyd v. United States
304 F.3d 813 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. George Lemark Patton
309 F.3d 1093 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. John Gregory Lambros
404 F.3d 1034 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Sprint Communications Co. v. Smith
545 U.S. 1135 (Supreme Court, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
170 F. App'x 989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-darryl-lee-williams-ca8-2006.