Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14240 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00131-JB-B-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARRICK DONELL BELCHER, a.k.a. Little Larry,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
(February 11, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Darrick Donell Belcher appeals the district court’s modification of the terms
of his supervised release to include sex-offender treatment, three internet and
computer restrictions, and sex-offender registration. Because we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s additional terms, we affirm.
I.
Belcher pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. He was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and 6 years’ supervised release.
After Belcher was released from prison and began serving his supervised-
release term on that conviction, the Probation Office petitioned for modification of
the terms of Belcher’s supervised release to include five new special conditions: (1)
that he “shall participate in sex offender treatment . . . as directed by the probation
office”; (2) that he not possess or use a computer with access to any online computer
service at any location (including employment) without the permission of the
probation office; (3) that he consent to periodic, unannounced examinations of any
internet-capable device; (4) that he cooperate with the probation office’s computer
and internet monitoring program, which included allowing access to all internet-
capable devices for installation of monitoring software, a requirement that he inform
others using his device that it is subject to monitoring, possible limitations on the
number of internet-capable devices he may possess, and random examinations of his
2 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 3 of 6
devices; and (5) that he register as a sex offender in compliance with the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). It did so because of
Belcher’s 2004 conviction for second-degree sexual abuse against a 12-year-old.
At a hearing on the Probation Office’s petition, the government stated that the
requested special conditions had become “standard routine practice from the United
States Probation Office” in cases involving prior sexual offenses, although the
government clarified that these conditions were not standard practice when Belcher
was sentenced.
After hearing argument from both parties, the court stated that it would impose
the requested conditions because of the need to balance the potential risk posed by
Belcher’s prior sex offense. It stated that the conditions would not prevent Belcher
from using internet-capable devices but would require monitoring and coordination
with the probation office. In addition, the court opined that the conditions would
improve the odds of Belcher’s successful transition back into the community and
decrease his risk to the public. The court also noted that it had considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the terms were standard for someone with a prior sex
offense.
II.
We review a special condition of supervised release for an abuse of discretion,
so long as the objection was properly preserved for appeal. United States v. Dodge,
3 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 4 of 6
597 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010). Abstract or general objections about the
conditions of supervised release are not enough to properly preserve an objection for
appeal and are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224,
1238 (11th Cir. 2015). A condition of supervised release may be reversed for plain
error only if we conclude (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. Id. For an error to
be plain, the appellant must point to some controlling authority that directly supports
his argument. See id. at 1238-39. On appeal, the defendant abandons issues not
“plainly and prominently” raised in his initial brief, even if he properly preserved
them in the district court. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2003).
The district court may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised
release at any time prior to the expiration of the term of supervised release. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). A district court may impose special conditions of supervised
release, so long as they are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for adequate
deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide any needed training or treatment. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D). The conditions must also
involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for achieving
4 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 5 of 6
those purposes and be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3583(d)(2), (3). In addition, the conditions imposed
do not have to be based on the present offense, as long as they are reasonably related
to the factors noted above. See United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1135, 1139-
41 (11th Cir. 2009).
We have previously upheld internet and computer restrictions as conditions
of supervised release for sex offenders. We upheld a one-year ban on all internet
access as a condition of supervised release where the defendant had previously
violated the conditions of supervised release by communicating with other convicted
sex offenders via the internet, and his underlying conviction for possession of child
pornography involved images obtained from the internet. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 2010).
But we have also upheld restrictions on internet and computer access for sex
offenders even when the defendant did not use the internet to commit the offense.
See Moran, 573 F.3d at 1135-36, 1140-41. In Moran, we found that the internet
“serves as a dangerous forum in which an offender can freely access child
pornography and communicate with potential victims” and that the restriction
requiring a probation officer’s permission to access the internet was not unduly
restrictive. See id. at 1140-41. Moreover, we upheld the internet restriction in
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Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14240 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00131-JB-B-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARRICK DONELL BELCHER, a.k.a. Little Larry,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
(February 11, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Darrick Donell Belcher appeals the district court’s modification of the terms
of his supervised release to include sex-offender treatment, three internet and
computer restrictions, and sex-offender registration. Because we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s additional terms, we affirm.
I.
Belcher pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. He was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and 6 years’ supervised release.
After Belcher was released from prison and began serving his supervised-
release term on that conviction, the Probation Office petitioned for modification of
the terms of Belcher’s supervised release to include five new special conditions: (1)
that he “shall participate in sex offender treatment . . . as directed by the probation
office”; (2) that he not possess or use a computer with access to any online computer
service at any location (including employment) without the permission of the
probation office; (3) that he consent to periodic, unannounced examinations of any
internet-capable device; (4) that he cooperate with the probation office’s computer
and internet monitoring program, which included allowing access to all internet-
capable devices for installation of monitoring software, a requirement that he inform
others using his device that it is subject to monitoring, possible limitations on the
number of internet-capable devices he may possess, and random examinations of his
2 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 3 of 6
devices; and (5) that he register as a sex offender in compliance with the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). It did so because of
Belcher’s 2004 conviction for second-degree sexual abuse against a 12-year-old.
At a hearing on the Probation Office’s petition, the government stated that the
requested special conditions had become “standard routine practice from the United
States Probation Office” in cases involving prior sexual offenses, although the
government clarified that these conditions were not standard practice when Belcher
was sentenced.
After hearing argument from both parties, the court stated that it would impose
the requested conditions because of the need to balance the potential risk posed by
Belcher’s prior sex offense. It stated that the conditions would not prevent Belcher
from using internet-capable devices but would require monitoring and coordination
with the probation office. In addition, the court opined that the conditions would
improve the odds of Belcher’s successful transition back into the community and
decrease his risk to the public. The court also noted that it had considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the terms were standard for someone with a prior sex
offense.
II.
We review a special condition of supervised release for an abuse of discretion,
so long as the objection was properly preserved for appeal. United States v. Dodge,
3 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 4 of 6
597 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010). Abstract or general objections about the
conditions of supervised release are not enough to properly preserve an objection for
appeal and are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224,
1238 (11th Cir. 2015). A condition of supervised release may be reversed for plain
error only if we conclude (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. Id. For an error to
be plain, the appellant must point to some controlling authority that directly supports
his argument. See id. at 1238-39. On appeal, the defendant abandons issues not
“plainly and prominently” raised in his initial brief, even if he properly preserved
them in the district court. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2003).
The district court may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised
release at any time prior to the expiration of the term of supervised release. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). A district court may impose special conditions of supervised
release, so long as they are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for adequate
deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide any needed training or treatment. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D). The conditions must also
involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for achieving
4 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 5 of 6
those purposes and be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3583(d)(2), (3). In addition, the conditions imposed
do not have to be based on the present offense, as long as they are reasonably related
to the factors noted above. See United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1135, 1139-
41 (11th Cir. 2009).
We have previously upheld internet and computer restrictions as conditions
of supervised release for sex offenders. We upheld a one-year ban on all internet
access as a condition of supervised release where the defendant had previously
violated the conditions of supervised release by communicating with other convicted
sex offenders via the internet, and his underlying conviction for possession of child
pornography involved images obtained from the internet. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 2010).
But we have also upheld restrictions on internet and computer access for sex
offenders even when the defendant did not use the internet to commit the offense.
See Moran, 573 F.3d at 1135-36, 1140-41. In Moran, we found that the internet
“serves as a dangerous forum in which an offender can freely access child
pornography and communicate with potential victims” and that the restriction
requiring a probation officer’s permission to access the internet was not unduly
restrictive. See id. at 1140-41. Moreover, we upheld the internet restriction in
Moran based on the defendant’s previous no-contest plea to committing a lewd and
5 Case: 18-14240 Date Filed: 02/11/2020 Page: 6 of 6
lascivious act on a child under the age of 16, even though that conduct was unrelated
to his present term of supervised release for his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm
conviction. See id. at 1135, 1140-41.
Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of the
five modified special conditions of supervised release. Belcher made only general
objections to the first modified special condition, regarding sex-offender treatment,
so we review for plain error. And since Belcher has not pointed to any on-point
controlling authority showing that the district court erred, we affirm.
While Belcher has preserved his objections to modified special conditions two
through four, the internet and computer restrictions, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing those conditions. Belcher previously committed a sex
offense, and the special conditions are reasonably related to the court’s stated basis
for imposing them: protecting the public. And significantly, while accounting for
this § 3553(a) factor, the conditions still allow Belcher to use the internet for
legitimate reasons with probation office permission and monitoring. Finally,
Belcher does not challenge the fifth modified special condition, requiring sex-
offender registration, and he has abandoned any argument against it.
AFFIRMED.