United States v. Darrell Duane Henry

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Darrell Duane Henry

487 F.2d 912, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 6937

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 20, 1973

Docket73-2255

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 487 F.2d 912 (United States v. Darrell Duane Henry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Darrell Duane Henry, 487 F.2d 912, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 6937 (9th Cir. 1973).

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Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Henry was convicted on two counts of sale of heroin and conspiracy to sell heroin. The sole issue on appeal is whether the destruction of the heroin prior to appellant’s trial necessitates reversal of his conviction.

Ronald' Mattos was indicted for sale and possession of heroin and pleaded guilty. The Government discussed with Mattos the possibility of testifying against appellant, his supplier, but Mat-tos refused to do so. The. heroin was then destroyed by the Government. Mattos later experienced a change of heart and agreed to testify against appellant.

In the absence of bad faith or connivance on the part of the Government, destruction of evidence prior to trial does not necessitate reversal of a conviction. United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 972, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973); Munich v. United States, 363 F.2d 859 (9th C'ir. 1966), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 974, 87 S.Ct. 1167, 18 L. Ed.2d 135 (1967). In this case the government acted in good faith when it destroyed the evidence in question. . It then had no reason to believe that the evidence would be needed in the present case, and there are obvious reasons for promptly getting rid of the • contraband once the ease in which it has been used as evidence has been completed. While this is not a case like United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969), where the missing evidence was only collateral, we apply the same rule where the evidence was not of a type on which a defense is usually made and the expert on whom *913 the issue hangs was available for cross-examination. Since Appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating improper motive on the part of the Government in this case, and suggests no reason to suppose he was prejudiced, the judgment is affirmed. Cf. United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 972, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Henry was convicted on two counts of sale of heroin and conspiracy to sell heroin. The sole issue on appeal is whether the destruction of the heroin prior to appellant’s trial necessitates reversal of his conviction.

Ronald' Mattos was indicted for sale and possession of heroin and pleaded guilty. The Government discussed with Mattos the possibility of testifying against appellant, his supplier, but Mat-tos refused to do so. The. heroin was then destroyed by the Government. Mattos later experienced a change of heart and agreed to testify against appellant.

In the absence of bad faith or connivance on the part of the Government, destruction of evidence prior to trial does not necessitate reversal of a conviction. United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 972, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973); Munich v. United States, 363 F.2d 859 (9th C'ir. 1966), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 974, 87 S.Ct. 1167, 18 L. Ed.2d 135 (1967). In this case the government acted in good faith when it destroyed the evidence in question. . It then had no reason to believe that the evidence would be needed in the present case, and there are obvious reasons for promptly getting rid of the • contraband once the ease in which it has been used as evidence has been completed. While this is not a case like United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969), where the missing evidence was only collateral, we apply the same rule where the evidence was not of a type on which a defense is usually made and the expert on whom *913 the issue hangs was available for cross-examination. Since Appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating improper motive on the part of the Government in this case, and suggests no reason to suppose he was prejudiced, the judgment is affirmed. Cf. United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 972, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973).

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