USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4583
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARIEL ALTAVIOUS LYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cr-00256-MOC-DSC-3)
Submitted: March 15, 2024 Decided: March 20, 2024
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Julia K. Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Dariel Altavious Lyles pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Lyles to a below-Sentencing-
Guidelines-range term of 120 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. 1
Lyles timely appealed, and his counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether Lyles’ sentence was reasonable. Although notified of his right to
do so, Lyles did not file a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government declined to file a
response. Upon reviewing the record, 2 we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing whether the inconsistency between the court’s oral pronouncement at
sentencing of one of the discretionary conditions of supervised release and the written
judgment constituted reversible error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291
(4th Cir. 2020). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, we affirm.
We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
[Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United
1 Because Lyles received the benefit of the safety valve reduction, the district court was able to sentence him below the otherwise-operative statutory mandatory minimum of five years’ supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 2 Lyles’ written plea agreement included an appellate waiver. But because the Government did not move to enforce the waiver, we conducted a full review pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In conducting this review, we must first ensure that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, “consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate
sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the sentence is free of
significant procedural error, we then review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth
in § 3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401
(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “On appeal, such a presumption can
only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Lyles’ advisory Guidelines range, heard
argument from counsel, provided Lyles an opportunity to allocute, considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the chosen sentence.
And because Lyles has not demonstrated that his sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors, he has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
afforded his below-Guidelines sentence. See id. We therefore conclude that Lyles’
sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
Next, we review Lyles’ sentence for Rogers error. In Rogers, we held that the
district court must orally announce all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release at
the sentencing hearing. 961 F.3d at 296. “Discretionary conditions that appear for the first
time in a subsequent written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been
sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for resentencing is required.” United States v.
Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021). We “review the consistency of the
defendant’s oral sentence and the written judgment de novo.” United States v. Cisson, 33
F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
In his supplemental brief, Lyles argues that the district court committed Rogers error
because the description of the first non-mandatory supervised release condition in the
written judgment materially differs from the court’s oral pronouncement of that condition
at sentencing. At sentencing, the district court ordered that, upon his release from custody,
Lyles was to report to the probation office in the federal judicial “district to which [he] is
released.” (J.A. 111). 3 The judgment, however, instructed Lyles to report to the probation
office in the “district where he[] is authorized to reside.” (J.A. 118). Lyles asserts that this
facial discrepancy constitutes Rogers error.
To be sure, a material discrepancy between a discretionary condition as pronounced
and as detailed in a written judgment may constitute Rogers error. See Cisson, 33 F.4th
at 191, 194 & n.6. However, Lyles has failed to demonstrate that the oral and written
judgments are reversibly inconsistent under Rogers. The district court at sentencing not
3 “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
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USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4583
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARIEL ALTAVIOUS LYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cr-00256-MOC-DSC-3)
Submitted: March 15, 2024 Decided: March 20, 2024
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Julia K. Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Dariel Altavious Lyles pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Lyles to a below-Sentencing-
Guidelines-range term of 120 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. 1
Lyles timely appealed, and his counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether Lyles’ sentence was reasonable. Although notified of his right to
do so, Lyles did not file a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government declined to file a
response. Upon reviewing the record, 2 we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing whether the inconsistency between the court’s oral pronouncement at
sentencing of one of the discretionary conditions of supervised release and the written
judgment constituted reversible error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291
(4th Cir. 2020). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, we affirm.
We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
[Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United
1 Because Lyles received the benefit of the safety valve reduction, the district court was able to sentence him below the otherwise-operative statutory mandatory minimum of five years’ supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 2 Lyles’ written plea agreement included an appellate waiver. But because the Government did not move to enforce the waiver, we conducted a full review pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In conducting this review, we must first ensure that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, “consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate
sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the sentence is free of
significant procedural error, we then review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth
in § 3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401
(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “On appeal, such a presumption can
only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Lyles’ advisory Guidelines range, heard
argument from counsel, provided Lyles an opportunity to allocute, considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the chosen sentence.
And because Lyles has not demonstrated that his sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors, he has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
afforded his below-Guidelines sentence. See id. We therefore conclude that Lyles’
sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
Next, we review Lyles’ sentence for Rogers error. In Rogers, we held that the
district court must orally announce all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release at
the sentencing hearing. 961 F.3d at 296. “Discretionary conditions that appear for the first
time in a subsequent written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been
sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for resentencing is required.” United States v.
Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021). We “review the consistency of the
defendant’s oral sentence and the written judgment de novo.” United States v. Cisson, 33
F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
In his supplemental brief, Lyles argues that the district court committed Rogers error
because the description of the first non-mandatory supervised release condition in the
written judgment materially differs from the court’s oral pronouncement of that condition
at sentencing. At sentencing, the district court ordered that, upon his release from custody,
Lyles was to report to the probation office in the federal judicial “district to which [he] is
released.” (J.A. 111). 3 The judgment, however, instructed Lyles to report to the probation
office in the “district where he[] is authorized to reside.” (J.A. 118). Lyles asserts that this
facial discrepancy constitutes Rogers error.
To be sure, a material discrepancy between a discretionary condition as pronounced
and as detailed in a written judgment may constitute Rogers error. See Cisson, 33 F.4th
at 191, 194 & n.6. However, Lyles has failed to demonstrate that the oral and written
judgments are reversibly inconsistent under Rogers. The district court at sentencing not
3 “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4583 Doc: 37 Filed: 03/20/2024 Pg: 5 of 5
only ordered Lyles to report to the district to which he is released, but also orally
pronounced through incorporation the standard conditions listed in the Western District of
North Carolina’s standing order—which included the condition that Lyles report to the
probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside. Thus, the orally announced
sentence was ambiguous as to the reporting requirement. And “where the precise contours
of an oral sentence are ambiguous, we may look to the written judgment to clarify the
district court’s intent.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. We are therefore satisfied that the written
judgment’s inclusion of the reporting condition listed in the district’s standing order “may
be construed fairly as a clarification of an otherwise vague oral pronouncement,”
confirming the court’s intent to require Lyles to report to the probation office in the district
where he is authorized to reside. Id.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Lyles, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Lyles requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw
from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Lyles.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED