United States v. Daniela Ledesma-Saldivar

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 15, 2023
• Docket: 20-50351
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50351

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:20-mj-20174-WVG-CAB-1 v.

DANIELA LEDESMA-SALDIVAR, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 11, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District Judge.

Daniela Ledesma-Saldivar appeals her conviction of misdemeanor improper

attempted entry by an alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Ledesma-Saldivar first argues that the Government failed to satisfy its

obligations under the corpus delicti rule. Under this rule, a “confession standing

alone is not necessarily sufficient to support [a] conviction” because “to serve as a

basis for conviction, the government must also adduce some independent

corroborating evidence.” United States v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 922 (9th

Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.

2000)). The government “need not introduce independent evidence of every element

of the crime.” United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1992). It

must “support independently only the gravamen of the offense—the existence of the

injury that forms the core of the offense and a link to a criminal actor—with tangible

evidence.” Id.

Ledesma-Saldivar argues that the core of § 1325(a)(1) includes the specific

method of entry, so the Government must provide some independent corroborating

evidence that she entered the U.S. outside a port of entry. Assuming arguendo that

the corpus delicti rule applies and the core of § 1325(a)(1) includes the method of

entry, the Government provided sufficient corroborating evidence. The Government

showed that Ledesma-Saldivar was apprehended in a remote and rugged area near

the border, without any outdoor gear, traveling toward the nearest port of entry. This

evidence corroborates Ledesma-Saldivar’s confession that “she walked through the

2 mountains around Tijuana, Mexico, to the United States” and verifies the

trustworthiness of her admission. See Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 923–24.

2. Ledesma-Saldivar next contends that the district court erred by denying

her motion to suppress her confession, arguing that the Government did not meet its

burden to show that Ledesma-Saldivar was advised of her rights under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). “The adequacy of a Miranda warning is a legal

question reviewable de novo, although ‘the factual findings underlying the adequacy

challenge, such as what a defendant was told, are subject to clearly erroneous

review.’” United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939 F.2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1991) (per

curiam) (quoting United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The district court’s finding that Ledesma-Saldivar was advised of her

Miranda rights was not clearly erroneous. The agent testified that he “read her the

Miranda rights,” going “line by line” on the I-214 Form, the form indicated that she

understood her rights, she signed the form, and she specifically initialed the section

stating that she understood her rights and would speak without an attorney present.

See United States v. Loucious, 847 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The police can

always be certain that Miranda has been satisfied if they simply read the defendant

his rights from a prepared card.” (cleaned up)).

3. Lastly, Ledesma-Saldivar argues that the Government failed to show

that she was the person apprehended by border officials because the arresting agent

3 testified during trial that the person he apprehended was “Danieli,” not “Daniela”

(Ledesma-Saldivar’s first name). She also challenges both in-court identifications

because she was wearing a mask in the courtroom and the agents could not see her

entire face. This is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, so we must determine

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a

rational trier of fact could have identified Ledesma-Saldivar as the arrested

individual beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 551

(9th Cir. 2011).

The Government presented evidence that (1) the interrogating agent testified

that he confirmed during the post-arrest interview that the suspect’s name was

Daniela; (2) another agent’s database search used the name Daniela; and (3) the

arresting agent and the interrogating agent both identified Ledesma-Saldivar in the

courtroom as the suspect they encountered. See United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367,

369 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The testimony of one witness, if solidly believed, is sufficient

to prove the identity of a perpetrator of crime.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Smith,

563 F.2d 1361, 1362–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a witness’s in-court

identification of a suspect who was wearing “a scarf covering the bottom half of his

face” during the robbery). Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government, we hold that a rational factfinder could identify Ledesma-Saldivar

beyond a reasonable doubt as the person arrested. See Lindsey, 634 F.3d at 551.

4 AFFIRMED.