United States v. Daniel Williams

561 F. App'x 604
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 7, 2014
Docket13-50068
StatusUnpublished

This text of 561 F. App'x 604 (United States v. Daniel Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Daniel Williams, 561 F. App'x 604 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Williams appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, for making a false statement to a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We reject Williams’s argument that the district court erred in declining to admit law enforcement agents’ testimony concerning statements made by some of Williams’s co-defendants. As the proponent of this evidence, Williams bore the burden of establishing that the evidence was admissible. City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir.1995). In particular, Williams bore the burden of establishing that this evidence fell within a recognized hearsay exception. See United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.1978). On the record before the district court, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that Williams had not met this burden.

We decline to resolve Williams’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. We resolve such claims on direct appeal only if “the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit review and determination of the issue” or the defendant’s legal representation at trial was “so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.1992)). Neither of these criteria are *605 satisfied here. The record here is not sufficiently developed to resolve this issue: on the present record, it is clear what Williams’s trial counsel did, but it is not clear “why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir.1988)). Likewise, Williams’s trial counsel was not “obviously” ineffective: Williams’s trial counsel cross-examined witnesses, gave opening and closing statements, filed motions in limine, and even obtained an acquittal for his client on one charge. Under these circumstances, counsel was not “obviously” ineffective. Cf. United States v. Lillard, 354 F.3d 850, 856-57 (9th Cir.2008).

Nothing in this disposition shall prejudice Williams’s ability to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Related

United States v. Robert Joseph Satterfield
572 F.2d 687 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)
United States v. Edward D. Pope
841 F.2d 954 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Willard Cortez Robinson
967 F.2d 287 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Deborah Jean Ross
206 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Lonnie Lillard
354 F.3d 850 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co.
46 F.3d 929 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
561 F. App'x 604, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-daniel-williams-ca9-2014.