United States v. Daniel James Powell

632 F.2d 754
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 21, 1980
Docket79-1730
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 632 F.2d 754 (United States v. Daniel James Powell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Daniel James Powell, 632 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1980).

Opinion

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Daniel James Powell (“Powell”) appeals pretrial denial of his alternative motions either to dismiss a conspiracy indictment against him or to strike two overt acts from that indictment. The motions rested on Powell’s contention that a prior acquittal on a possession charge collaterally estopped the Government from retrying him. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss. The appeal from the denial of the motion to strike is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings

Powell was originally charged with conspiring with Judd Powell, Jr., his brother, and Mark Stanley to possess with intent to *756 distribute and to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. A second count alleged possession of 3,575 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Judd Powell and Stanley were also indicted on this count. After a jury trial, Powell was convicted on the conspiracy charge and acquitted on the possession charge. He appealed and this court reversed his conspiracy conviction because of prejudicial errors concerning the admission of evidence and the denial of a continuance. See United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1978).

On remand, Powell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment or to strike overt acts 11 and 12 1 from the conspiracy charge. The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy, Powell argued, precluded relitigation of facts previously determined in his favor as a result of the prior acquittal on the substantive count. The district court denied his motion. Powell appeals.

B. Facts

Judd Powell and Stanley pled guilty prior to trial. Cheryl Sullivan, a coconspirator convicted in an earlier trial, was the Government’s chief witness.

Sullivan testified as follows: Powell agreed to supply her and Stanley with marijuana to distribute. Powell supplied a truckload of marijuana to Stanley, which Stanley distributed. Thereafter, Stanley, Sullivan, and Powell agreed to smuggle and distribute large quantities of marijuana. Powell was to supply the marijuana, while Stanley and Sullivan were to warehouse it, distribute it, and maintain records of all transactions. Sullivan and Stanley located a house in Del Mar; Powell supplied funds for its purchase. The first shipment delivered to the Del Mar house consisted of approximately 1,100 lbs. of marijuana. It was distributed within two days. Powell then came to the house and picked up the proceeds. Stanley and Powell had further discussions concerning a future shipment. On or about September 8, 1973, approximately two tons of marijuana were delivered to the Del Mar house. After some 500 lbs. were sold, Powell picked up $20,875 and initialed the ledger kept by Sullivan. On September 11, 1973, agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration raided the Del Mar house, arrested Stanley and Sullivan, and seized approximately 3,500 lbs. of marijuana.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS CONSPIRACY COUNT

An order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is appealable as a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 655-63, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2037-2042, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020, 100 S.Ct. 677, 62 L.Ed.2d 652 (1980).

Powell argues that his acquittal of the possessory offense estops the Government from trying him for conspiracy. He relies upon Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), which incorporated collateral estoppel into the double jeopardy clause’s protection. Ashe forecloses the Government from retrying an issue which a jury has, upon inspection of all the circumstances of the prior proceeding, found in the defendant’s favor. In the instant case, therefore, if Powell could show his acquittal of possession inconsistent with conviction of conspiracy, we would have to *757 reverse the denial of his motion to dismiss. 2 On the facts of this case, however, we reject Powell’s argument.

A conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its target are “separate and distinct offenses.” Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1181, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 at 1371, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, if the Government’s case depends on facts found in defendant’s favor by an acquittal, collateral estoppel precludes the Government from attempting to reprove those facts and, hence, from retrying the defendant. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578-80, 68 S.Ct. 237, 239-240, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948).

The trial judge instructed the jury on Pinkerton accomplice liability, aiding and abetting, and constructive possession. Here, Powell contends that no rational jury could find that he conspired to possess the 3,500 pounds of marijuana seized on September 11 without also finding him liable for possession under one of the above theories. He therefore urges that a future jury could ground a conspiracy conviction only upon a finding that Powell possessed the 3,500 pounds of marijuana seized on September 11, which' issue is foreclosed by the acquittal on the substantive count. If true, collateral estoppel would bar his conspiracy prosecution at the outset. Ashe v. Swenson, supra. Additionally, Powell notes that this court, in reversing his conspiracy conviction, found “the only, seriously contested issue in the case” to be whether Powell had supplied the marijuana found in the garage. United States v. Powell, supra, 587 F.2d at 447.

If the only overt act underlying the conspiracy charge were the possession of the seized 3,500 pounds of marijuana, the foregoing argument would be compelling. 3 However, Powell was also named in overt acts 1-3, 5, and 7-10. 4

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632 F.2d 754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-daniel-james-powell-ca9-1980.