United States v. Daniel

576 F.3d 772, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17997, 2009 WL 2461386
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 13, 2009
Docket08-2672
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 576 F.3d 772 (United States v. Daniel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Daniel, 576 F.3d 772, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17997, 2009 WL 2461386 (7th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

WOOD, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we once again consider issues arising from an August 2006 police operation in Indiana designed to catch predators using internet chat rooms to persuade minors to engage in sexual activity. James Daniel was ensnared in the operation’s net when he struck up a chat with someone calling “herself’ Amanda_13. Unbeknownst to him, he was really communicating with a male officer claiming to be a 13-year-old girl. But the government failed to realize the extent of its own sting operation. During Daniel’s trial, the prosecution introduced two chat sequences found on Daniel’s computer that apparently involved minor girls. What the government did not notice until sentencing was that one of those “girls,” daisyl3_Indiana, was actually an officer from the same Indiana operation. And that was not all. To our surprise, the government was unaware until this panel told it at oral argument that the other screen name, blonddt, was also an officer from the Indiana operation. Daniel asserts that the government’s failure to disclose the identity behind these two screen names violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and thus entitles him to a new trial. Because the information was not material to Daniel’s trial, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

I

On August 7, 2006, Daniel initiated an online chat with AmandaJ3. AmandaN3 told Daniel that she was a 13-year-old female; in truth, Amanda_13 was Sergeant Richard Howard, an officer with the Porter County Sheriffs Department in Indiana. Daniel chatted with Amanda_13 several times; he frequently brought up sex during these exchanges. He persuaded Amanda_13 to meet him at Will Park in Valparaiso, Indiana, to have sex. Stressing the importance of using a condom, he promised Amanda_13 to bring one to the meeting. When Daniel arrived at the park at the agreed time, ready with a condom in his wallet, instead of a 13-year-old girl he found the police. A grand jury indicted Daniel for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2442(b), which forbids knowingly persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing an individual under the age of 18 to engage in criminal sexual activity.

After his arrest, Daniel consented to a police search of his computer. The computer examiner, Secret Service Agent James Kimes, found 192 files containing the history of Daniel’s online chats. In addition to the conversations with Amanda-13, Agent Kimes found chats with two other screen names claiming to be minor girls; daisyl3_Indiana and blonddt. Daniel discussed sex with both, even though daisyl3_Indiana said that she was a 13- *774 year-old girl and blonddt said that she was a 15-year-old girl. The government offered, and the court admitted, these conversations during Daniel’s trial under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) for the limited purpose of showing Daniel’s intent, motive, and absence of mistake.

Sometime before sentencing, the government realized that daisyl3_Indiana was not a minor, but a police officer. It informed Daniel, but Daniel neither requested a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 nor otherwise raised the issue to the district court. Insofar as it relates to daisyl3_Indiana, we therefore review Daniel’s allegation of a Brady violation for plain error. United States v. Price, 520 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir.2008). Under the plain error standard, the alleged Brady violation must be an obvious error that affected Daniel’s substantial rights and created “a substantial risk of convicting an innocent person.” United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir.2005).

Upon reviewing this case, we recognized the screen name blonddt from United States v. Davey, 550 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.2008), another case involving the August 2006 Indiana operation. Blonddt is also in reality an undercover officer, though neither the government nor Daniel spotted this until we pointed it out during oral argument. In our view, the facts about blonddt do not change Daniel’s argument. (This case, in other words, would have been the same if only one additional undercover name had been involved, whichever one it was.) We therefore also analyze the government’s failure to disclose the true identity of blonddt under the plain error standard.

II

To establish a Brady violation, Daniel must show “ ‘(1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.’ ” United States v. Grintjes, 237 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir.1996)). Suppressed evidence is material if “there is ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” United States v. Banks, 546 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

Daniel proposes three ways that the fact that he was really chatting with two different undercover police officers is material: first, he believes that it impeaches Agent Kimes’s testimony that the conversations were unrelated to the chats with Amanda-13; second, he argues that it shows entrapment; and third, he contends that this information was necessary in order to decide whether the chats were admissible under Rule 404(b).

None of these arguments has merit. First, nothing about the identity of the persons using these screen names tends to impeach Kimes’s testimony. The chats were related to the charges against Daniel only in the sense that they were part of the same undercover operation. They were unrelated in the more important sense that Daniel believed that he was chatting with three different minor girls. In addition, Kimes was not involved in the August 2006 operation; he was testifying on the basis of his examination of Daniel’s computer. All that Daniel could have shown, had the government informed him that daisyl3_Indiana and blonddt were names operated by police officers, was that Kimes did not know much about the undercover operation. But Kimes never said that he did know about it, and so this *775 information would not have impeached his testimony.

Second, the information does not advance Daniel’s entrapment argument, because the chats with blonddt and daisyl3_Indiana occurred after Daniel initiated the chats with AmandaM3.

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Bluebook (online)
576 F.3d 772, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17997, 2009 WL 2461386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-daniel-ca7-2009.