United States v. Damond Wiley, Jr.

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-2744 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

DAMOND K. WILEY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:22-cr-30111 — Stephen P. McGlynn, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 29, 2026 — DECIDED AUGUST 6, 2026 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, LEE, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Damond K. Wiley, Jr., conditionally pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm as a felon. He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s de- nial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traf- fic stop as well as the denial of his later motion to reconsider the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion. He now renews those contentions in 2 No. 24-2744

this court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court. I BACKGROUND A Illinois State Police Troopers Renner and Schlau were on patrol on September 22, 2022, in East St. Louis, Illinois. They observed a blue BMW, driven by Mr. Wiley, turning onto a side street. The troopers followed the BMW as it turned down two more streets. The BMW then backed onto what appeared to be a driveway or a front lot of a property at 439 N. 21st Street. The property was “in a ramshackle state and [did] not have a roof.”1 The BMW pulled slightly forward, onto the street, then backed up again. While the BMW was backing up, the troopers’ cruiser came to a stop near the BMW. The cruiser’s emergency lights were illuminated. After the troopers’ cruiser came to a stop, the BMW ceased movement. At that point, the BMW was po- sitioned with its front wheels slightly on the street and its body totally blocking the sidewalk. 2 The BMW had dark tinted windows, a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-503. Immediately after the BMW stopped, Mr. Wiley exited the car from the front driver’s seat and closed the door. One of the troopers then told him to get back into the car. Mr. Wiley

1 R.34 at 5 n.1.

2 App. R.25, Ex. 1 at 00:59–01:09 (Dash Camera) [hereinafter Dash Cam-

era]. No. 24-2744 3

instead ran off, away from the street and behind houses along train tracks. Both troopers began to pursue him on foot, but Trooper Renner quickly stopped, returned to the BMW, and opened its front door. Then he walked to his patrol car and radioed for assistance. He also told at least one onlooker to stay away from the BMW. Trooper Renner then returned to the BMW, leaned inside, and retrieved a black .40 caliber pis- tol, which was in plain view on the driver’s seat. After he retrieved the gun, he heard that Trooper Schlau had apprehended Mr. Wiley. Trooper Renner returned to his patrol car again, and while doing so told an onlooker, “Do not touch this car, please.” 3 The onlooker’s response is inaudible, but Trooper Renner then said, “I didn’t know if you knew him.” 4 Trooper Renner then drove the patrol car a few houses down to assist Trooper Schlau. While Trooper Renner was looking in the BMW’s front seat and radioing for help, Trooper Schlau had continued the chase for Mr. Wiley. The two ran behind a few houses and along train tracks. Mr. Wiley then changed directions and turned back toward the street. Trooper Schlau, who had warned Mr. Wiley that he would tase him if he did not stop, then tased Mr. Wiley. Mr. Wiley fell, and Trooper Schlau at- tempted to detain him in a front lot a few houses away from the BMW. Trooper Renner arrived. Trooper Schlau then subdued Mr. Wiley after a few moments of noncompliance and hand- cuffed him. Trooper Renner then radioed for emergency

3 App. R.25, Ex. 2 at 01:38 (Trooper Renner Body Camera).

4 Id. at 01:40. 4 No. 24-2744

medical services because of Mr. Wiley’s wounds from the taser. While waiting for EMS to arrive, some of Mr. Wiley’s relatives approached the scene to speak with the troopers and Mr. Wiley. Trooper Renner told one family member that he had stopped Mr. Wiley because his car had illegal window tinting. 5 Once EMS arrived and began treating Mr. Wiley, he asked the troopers, “What did I do?” 6 Trooper Schlau told him he was “flying down this road,” and they were trying to catch up to him. 7 Mr. Wiley said that he had just “bought the car.”8 Trooper Schlau asked him why he had been driving so fast. Mr. Wiley said, “I’m trying to make sure nothing was wrong with the car.”9 Trooper Schlau told him that was why they stopped him. 10 About two minutes later, Mr. Wiley added, “I didn’t even make it up the street. I was just trying to see how fast it goes. See and make sure nothing’s wrong with it.” 11 He also said that he is “not to have police contact,” that he is “on papers” (probation), and that he is “on bond.” 12

5 Dash Camera, supra note 2, at 07:04.

6 App. R.25, Ex. 3 at 18:40 (Trooper Schlau Body Camera).

7 Id. at 18:44.

8 Id. at 18:48.

9 Id. at 18:54.

10 Id. at 18:56.

11 Id. at 21:09.

12 R.34 at 9. No. 24-2744 5

While Troopers Renner and Schlau were with Mr. Wiley, another Trooper, Wells, conducted a “probable cause search” of the BMW “[d]ue to the odor of raw cannabis emitting from inside the vehicle.” 13 He recovered 289.6 grams of cannabis and a black digital scale with cannabis residue. No weapons or contraband were found on Mr. Wiley’s person. Trooper Renner confirmed through a record check that Mr. Wiley was out on bond for armed violence, unlawful possession of a fire- arm by a felon, and manufacture and delivery of cannabis. He also had been convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in St. Clair County. After Mr. Wiley’s arrest, the BMW was towed from the scene, “consistent with ISP proto- col.” 14 An inventory search was conducted. After the troopers took Mr. Wiley to jail, Trooper Renner filled out a police report documenting the arrest. The report recites that the troopers first observed the BMW making a right turn without a turn signal. As Trooper Renner followed, the BMW “clearly accelerated at a high rate of speed and was traveling faster than the 35 mile per hour (mph) speed limit ….” 15 Then Trooper Renner saw the BMW make a left turn onto another street, not using a turn signal and failing to stop at a stop sign. As Trooper Renner followed, he saw the BMW backing into the yard of 439 N. 21st Street. Trooper Renner described the BMW as “backing into a yard in front of an abandoned home.” 16 Trooper Renner activated the emer- gency lights as he pulled up to the BMW. Although Trooper

13 R.37-4 at *7.

14 R.34 at 10.

15 R.37-4 at *6.

16 Id. 6 No. 24-2744

Renner told a family member that he pulled Mr. Wiley over for illegal window tinting, the window tint was not men- tioned in the report. However, in a “Prelog Questionnaire” for the Forensic Sciences Command of the Illinois State Police, a copy of which was attached to the arrest report, Trooper Ren- ner described the “case circumstances” as a “[t]raffic stop for illegal window tint and speeding ….” 17 B On September 24, 2022, the Government filed a complaint against Mr. Wiley in the Southern District of Illinois. It charged him with one count: possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On October 18, 2022, a grand jury indicted Mr. Wiley for the same offense. Then, on December 21, 2022, Mr. Wiley filed a motion to sup- press the evidence obtained during his arrest and the state- ments that he had made afterwards. 18 He also requested an evidentiary hearing on the ground that his motion established material factual disputes with the Government’s position. The district court denied the motion to suppress as well as for an evidentiary hearing. The district court decided that the troopers had ample justification to conduct the traffic stop be- cause they observed the vehicle’s dark tinted windows, speed, failure to stop at a sign, failure to signal, and Mr. Wiley parking the car in a “questionable position.” 19 Next, the district court decided that the troopers had prob- able cause to search the vehicle because of the abandonment

17 Id. at *12.

18 R.28.

19 R.34 at 5. No. 24-2744 7

doctrine. The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant from an unreasonable search if the place being searched is one where he has no legitimate expectation of privacy. In the district court’s view, Mr. Wiley abandoned the BMW when he ran away and left it partially blocking the sidewalk and partially in the street. He also left it outside a dilapidated structure. The district court added that, even if the BMW was not abandoned, the troopers had reasonable suspicion to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The court reasoned that the darkly tinted windows made it difficult to see into the car and to determine if anyone else was inside. It also was “impossible to know if the defendant would return ….”20 Trooper Renner opened the driver’s door and saw the gun in plain sight on the driver’s seat before he learned Mr. Wiley was in custody. The court wrote that it “cannot say that a rea- sonably prudent man in similar circumstances would not be concerned about his safety or that of others.”21 The district court decided that the troopers had probable cause to search the vehicle on the alternate ground that “a rea- sonably prudent person would believe that contraband or ev- idence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.”22 Mr. Wiley, while in custody, said he was not supposed to have police contact, was on probation, and was on bond. The troopers verified he was on probation for a gun offense.

20 Id. at 8.

21 Id. at 9.

22 Id. 8 No. 24-2744

Accordingly, they had probable cause to search the BMW without a warrant. Finally, the district court determined that the vehicle was towed from the scene “consistent with ISP protocol and an in- ventory search was conducted.” 23 Because Mr. Wiley had been lawfully arrested and the search of the BMW was “con- ducted as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcer- ating” him and “in accordance with established inventory procedures,” the search would fall into the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.24 After the district court denied Mr. Wiley’s motion to sup- press, Mr. Wiley filed a motion to reconsider the denial of an evidentiary hearing and, in the alternative, to supplement the pleadings. 25 It included four exhibits, including the police re- port and affidavits and property tax information from family members, to show that the property on which he had parked the car belonged to those relatives. Specifically, Mr. Wiley submitted sealed affidavits from family members to provide information about why he pulled the car into the driveway of that dilapidated house. Mr. Wiley submitted an affidavit from his relative stating that she owned the property at 439 N. 21st Street. She had given Mr. Wiley permission to park his car on the driveway of that property. And at the time of his arrest, Mr. Wiley was living with another relative across the street. The court denied the motion without a separate opinion. It stated that in its original order denying the motion to

23 Id. at 10.

24 Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1999)).

25 R.37. No. 24-2744 9

suppress, “the Court thoroughly considered and analyzed the same defense arguments that are being raised and argued in the motion to reconsider; therefore, any additional pleadings or argument would be an unnecessary impediment to judicial economy.” 26 Following the denial of his motions, Mr. Wiley condition- ally pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon, in vi- olation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 27 The court sentenced Mr. Wiley to 70 months’ imprisonment and three years of su- pervised release. 28 II DISCUSSION Mr. Wiley appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and his motion to reconsider that ruling.

26 R.40.

27 On the same day, he entered into a plea agreement in another case.

United States v. Wiley, No. 3-23-CR-30052, R.43 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2024). In that case, he pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of illegal pos- session of a machinegun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The charges in that case stem from a separate incident on May 20, 2022. Mr. Wiley re- quested that both cases be reassigned to Judge McGlynn for sentencing. United States v. Wiley, No. 3-23-CR-30052, R.47 at 1 (S.D. Ill. July 24, 2024). Judge McGlynn set identical sentences for both cases to run concurrently. 28 This appeal concerns only the firearm possession charge arising from

the events on September 22, 2022. While Mr. Wiley also filed an appeal in the other case, he voluntarily dismissed that appeal and no issues related to that case remain. 10 No. 24-2744

A Mr. Wiley first contends that the district court erred in de- ciding that the troopers had adequate justification to stop him. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we re- view findings of fact for clear error, and we review legal con- clusions de novo. 29 A factual finding is clearly erroneous only when we “cannot avoid or ignore a definite and firm convic- tion that a mistake has been made.” 30 Here, there was no sup- pression hearing, and the district court based its determina- tion on the Government’s opposition to Mr. Wiley’s motion as well as the dash camera and body camera footage of the troopers. Mr. Wiley contends that the videos do not support a rea- sonable belief that a traffic violation occurred. “Because traffic stops are typically brief detentions, more akin to Terry stops than formal arrests, they require only reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation—not probable cause.” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021). The level of suspicion re- quired is less than probable cause, but “a mere hunch will not suffice.” United States v. Yang, 39 F.4th 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2022). The officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Id. (citation modified). Reasonableness is an objective examination that looks at the totality of the circumstances to decide whether the officer reasonably suspected the individual had violated the law. The court should not consider the troopers’

29 United States v. Devalois, 128 F.4th 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting United

States v. Yang, 39 F.4th 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2022)). 30 Id. at 899 (quoting Yang, 39 F.4th at 899). No. 24-2744 11

“subjective motivations” for the stop. Cole, 21 F.4th at 428 n.1. What matters is whether “an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation ….” United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019). Whether Mr. Wiley actually committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant so long as “there was an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did.” Id. (cit- ing United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000)). In Cashman, we addressed whether a crack in a windshield provided probable cause for police to stop a vehicle. Wiscon- sin law required that a windshield not be “excessively cracked or damaged.” Cashman, 216 F.3d at 584 (citation mod- ified). A trooper saw the crack in the windshield, but the de- fendant contended that the crack was not “excessive” under the law. Id. at 587. The pertinent question was not whether the defendant actually committed a traffic offense by having a particularly long or severe windshield crack. Instead, the question was whether it was reasonable for the trooper to be- lieve the windshield was impermissibly cracked. Photo- graphs made clear the crack was “substantial,” and a trooper could therefore have concluded reasonably that it was “exces- sive.” Id. Mr. Wiley contends that the BMW was too far away from the troopers for the dash camera to record whether the win- dows were illegally tinted, whether the BMW was speeding, whether the BMW failed to display a turn signal, or whether the BMW failed to stop at a stop sign. The Government takes the position that whether the dash camera footage shows ac- tual traffic violations is irrelevant to whether the troopers rea- sonably thought Mr. Wiley committed a traffic violation. The dash camera footage does not make visible Mr. Wiley’s alleged failure to signal, his speeding, and his 12 No. 24-2744

failure to stop at a stop sign. However, the dash camera foot- age of the troopers’ vehicle does show the BMW’s darkly tinted windows. As in Cashman, the tint visible on the dash camera footage shows that it was reasonable for the troopers to believe that the tint was impermissible. Because excessively tinted windows violate the Illinois Vehicle Code, the troopers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Wiley committed a traffic vi- olation. Mr. Wiley’s assertions to the contrary are not convinc- ing. He claims that the BMW was too far away from the troop- ers to permit them to ascertain whether its windows were il- legally tinted. Even if the car was too far away in the first sec- onds of the dash camera footage, it was not too far away once the troopers pulled onto the same street as the BMW and saw it reversing into the lot in front of the roofless house. And Mr. Wiley understandably does not contend that the troopers needed reasonable suspicion to follow him. See United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 387–88 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983))). With respect to the other infractions, as the district court acknowledged, it was proper to rely on the officers’ experienced observations as to the speed of the vehi- cle and the driver’s failure to observe other established norms such as stopping at a stop sign and signaling a turn. Mr. Wiley further contends that the district court failed to resolve inconsistencies between the dash camera footage and the police report as well as those between Trooper Renner’s written report and his verbal statements during Mr. Wiley’s arrest. After Mr. Wiley was handcuffed, Trooper Renner told one of Mr. Wiley’s family members that he had stopped No. 24-2744 13

Mr. Wiley because his vehicle had illegal window tinting.31 However, the window tint was mentioned not in the first few pages of the police report but in an attachment to the report, which carried the same date as the report. The constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers in- volved. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In- stead, we ask whether “the facts available” to an officer before he makes a stop warranted that stop. District of Columbia v. R.W., 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1069, 1071 (2026) (per curiam); see also Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 381 (2020) (analyzing “whether the facts known to [an officer] at the time of the stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion”). The dash camera footage taken before the troopers told Mr. Wiley to get in the car makes the dark tint obvious, and Trooper Renner confirmed to Mr. Wiley’s family that he conducted the stop because of the tinted windows. That the later-drafted police report men- tions the tinted windows only in an attachment does not change the “facts known to” the troopers “at the time of the stop.” Glover, 589 U.S. at 381. Those facts justified a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Wiley was violating the Illinois Vehicle Code. B Mr. Wiley next contends that the district court erred by concluding that the warrantless search of his car did not vio- late the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the peo- ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

31 Dash Camera, supra note 2, at 07:05. 14 No. 24-2744

against unreasonable searches and seizures … and no War- rants shall issue, but upon probable cause ….” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. There are “a few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). One of these exceptions is for protec- tive searches. The protective search exception permits officers to search a person if they “point to specific and articulable facts” indi- cating that “criminal activity may be afoot and that the per- sons with whom [they are] dealing may be armed and pres- ently dangerous ….” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968). The Supreme Court has authorized police to perform limited searches of people, vehicles, and premises for the purpose of protecting themselves from harm. See id.; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1977); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). In Terry and Long, the Supreme Court permitted officers to “as- sure themselves that the persons with whom they were deal- ing were not armed with, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against them.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. If an officer has reasona- ble suspicion “that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene,” then the officer may conduct a “cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Id. at 334–35. The principles underly- ing the Supreme Court’s decision in Buie necessitate affirming the district court’s ruling here. Trooper Renner had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Wiley was engaged in criminal activity. After the troopers pulled up, Mr. Wiley exited his vehicle, closed the driver’s door, then No. 24-2744 15

stood and looked at the troopers. When they instructed him to get in the car, Mr. Wiley fled. Actions that are “consistent with” lawful behavior do not establish reasonable suspicion, United States v. Paniagua-Garcia, 813 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2016), but officers are entitled to act on the facts as they know them at the time that they act, Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 765 (7th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the higher standard of probable cause and noting that “[t]he fact that an officer later discovers additional evidence unknown to her at the time of the arrest, even if it tends to negate probable cause, is irrele- vant [because] we only care about what the officer knew at the time the decision was made”). Mr. Wiley lived just across the street from where he parked the BMW, but the officers did not know this fact at the time they observed him park in a dilapidated home’s lot across the street. More fundamentally, rather than proceed toward his residence, Mr. Wiley fled in the opposite direction, along train tracks and behind multiple houses. Mr. Wiley’s behavior contributed to Trooper Renner’s suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, justified further investigation. See Illinois v. Ward- low, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). Not only did Trooper Renner reasonably suspect that Mr. Wiley was engaged in criminal activity, but the officer also had reason to believe that the vehicle created a substan- tial risk to his safety as well as others. The vehicle’s tinted windows made it impossible for Trooper Renner to confirm that, once Mr. Wiley had exited the vehicle, no one else re- mained inside. See United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding the protective sweep of a vehicle under Buie where officers had the reasonable suspicion that the ve- hicle harbored an individual who could pose a danger to them). It was also impossible for him to know whether there 16 No. 24-2744

were weapons inside the BMW. Further, Mr. Wiley had fled the scene, and Trooper Renner was unaware whether Trooper Schlau had apprehended Mr. Wiley or whether Mr. Wiley would return to the BMW. See United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that an officer lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a basement under Buie where he was not aware of whether the suspect had been appre- hended at the time he entered the basement). The trooper was entitled to consider that Mr. Wiley’s return to the BMW re- mained one of his surest ways out of the situation in which he found himself. Trooper Renner permissibly opened Mr. Wiley’s car door to protect himself, Trooper Schlau, and bystanders nearby. Trooper Renner’s conduct reflected the concern for safety above all else. Indeed, dash camera and body camera footage shows that his search was brief and involved only opening the driver’s door and immediately identifying the gun, which was laying in plain view on the driver’s seat. This brief view of the interior of the car made it possible for Trooper Renner to confirm there were no other passengers. The district court properly denied Mr. Wiley’s motion to suppress because Trooper Renner permissibly conducted a protective search of the BMW. 32

32 Because we uphold the search under the protective search doctrine, we

do not address Mr. Wiley’s contentions that he did not abandon his vehi- cle and that the automobile exception, the search incident to arrest excep- tion, and the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant requirement do not apply. No. 24-2744 17

C Mr. Wiley also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle. We review the district court’s denial of a hearing on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018). Evidentiary hearings are “not required as a matter of course,” but “only when a substantial claim is presented and there are disputed issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the mo- tion.” Id. (citation modified). None of the issues Mr. Wiley raises would affect the outcome of his motion. The district court denied Mr. Wiley’s request for an evi- dentiary hearing because he had “not introduced any evi- dence that contradicts the photographs, audio, or video re- cordings submitted by the government.” 33 Mr. Wiley now as- serts that he was entitled to cross examine Trooper Renner about the reasons given by the troopers for the arrest at the scene and in the police report. He cited that inconsistency to challenge the determination of reasonable suspicion. 34

33 R.34 at 1.

34 Mr. Wiley also asserts that he identified a material factual dispute over

whether he lawfully parked his vehicle on a private driveway belonging to his relative. This claimed dispute relates both to whether he abandoned his vehicle when he ran from the troopers and whether law enforcement lawfully impounded the vehicle after he was arrested, thereby justifying the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception to the search war- rant requirement. Because we do not address the abandonment issue or the impoundment issue as they relate to Trooper Renner’s search of the BMW, we do not address them in the context of Mr. Wiley’s motion to reconsider. 18 No. 24-2744

As we already have discussed, however, the dash camera footage showed that the BMW’s windows were darkly tinted. The excessive tint alone provided the troopers with reasona- ble suspicion to stop Mr. Wiley. Whether the troopers told Mr. Wiley or wrote in their report that they stopped him for some other reason is irrelevant, because the dark tint was a fact known to the troopers at the time they stopped him. Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (analyzing “whether the facts known to [an officer] at the time of the stop gave rise to reasonable sus- picion”). Because an evidentiary hearing would not have changed the outcome of the motion to suppress, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying one, or in deny- ing Mr. Wiley’s motion to reconsider. Conclusion The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED