United States v. Damon Woodard

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-14242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-14242 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14242 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

DAMON WOODARD, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cr-60065-WPD-1 ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Damon Woodard, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the de- nial of his motion for postconviction relief. The district court USCA11 Case: 24-14242 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 24-14242

construed the motion as an unauthorized successive motion to va- cate, set aside, or correct his sentence and dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). The government moves for summary affirmance. Because “the po- sition of [the United States] is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), we grant the government’s motion and affirm. We review de novo the dismissal of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence for lack of jurisdiction. United States v. Taylor, 152 F.4th 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2025). “Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to seek post-conviction relief from a sentence im- posed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or if it is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011); see also McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A prisoner must obtain permission from our Court to file a second or successive motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Without that permission, the district court lacks jurisdiction to con- sider a second or successive motion. Armstrong v. United States, 986 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary affirmance is appropriate because there is no sub- stantial question that the district court lacked jurisdiction to con- sider Woodard’s motion. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Despite labeling his filing as an “Informative Motion Request- ing . . . Certain Relief,” Woodard challenged his 2018 conviction USCA11 Case: 24-14242 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 3

24-14242 Opinion of the Court 3

for brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. He argued that the district court violated his due process rights and lacked jurisdiction to convict him because the offense to which he pleaded guilty was not included in his indictment. Yet Woodard had to challenge the validity of his conviction in a motion to vacate. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081. And because Woodard had previ- ously filed a motion to vacate that the district court denied on the merits, he had to obtain our permission to file a successive motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). He failed to obtain that permission, so the dis- trict court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his succes- sive motion. Armstrong, 986 F.3d at 1347. We GRANT the motion for summary affirmance and AFFIRM the dismissal of Woodard’s motion.