UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 23-426 (JEB) PHILLIP MARION CRAWFORD,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Phillip Crawford was a member of the crowd that stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6,
2021. While on the Capitol grounds, he scuffled with several law-enforcement officers,
including by throwing a rubber gas mask at one of them. Crawford was charged with multiple
criminal counts related to such conduct and pled guilty to several. After a bench trial on the
remaining counts, the Court found him guilty on all but Count VI (assault on officer), which it
held in abeyance pending further briefing on certain legal issues. Having now reviewed the
parties’ submissions, the Court will find Crawford guilty of that last charge at the sentencing
hearing scheduled for October 21, 2024.
I. Background
A grand jury indicted Defendant on December 6, 2023. See ECF No. 19. The
Government then filed an eleven-count Superseding Indictment on March 6, 2024, see ECF No.
34, which charges him with the following criminal acts: Civil Disorder, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(3) (Count I); Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Counts II, III, IV, and V); Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain
Officers Using a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b) (Count VI);
Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous
1 Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Count VII); Disorderly and
Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (Count VIII); Engaging in Physical Violence in a
Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1752(a)(4), (b)(1)(A) (Count IX); Disorderly Conduct in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40
U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D) (Count X); and Act of Physical Violence in the Capitol Grounds or
Buildings, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(F) (Count XI).
Crawford pled guilty to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and XI on May 17, 2024, and the Court
held a bench trial on the remaining counts on June 17–18. Upon Crawford’s oral motion for a
judgment of acquittal, the Court found him not guilty of the dangerous-weapon element of
Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX on the ground that the rubber gas mask he possessed and hurled
was not a deadly or dangerous weapon. The Court, however, allowed the lesser-included
charges of those counts to proceed. It then found Crawford guilty of Counts VII, VIII, IX, and
X. This left only Count VI, which charged Defendant with assaulting officers by throwing the
gas mask. Although the mask was not a dangerous weapon, the Court could still convict him of
a felony if it made other findings. Because certain legal questions were close, the Court held the
verdict on Count VI in abeyance and requested further briefing on three issues: 1) whether
Crawford’s act of throwing the gas mask involved “physical contact” with a law-enforcement
officer under § 111(a); 2) whether § 231(a)(3) civil disorder qualifies as “another felony” under
§ 111(a); and 3) whether Defendant must be physically present for the Court’s delivery of its
verdict on Count VI.
2 II. Analysis
To make out a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), the Government must prove either
that Crawford’s acts “involve[d] physical contact with the victim” or “the intent to commit
another felony.” As the parties agree, either ground is independently sufficient to constitute a
felony § 111(a) violation. See ECF No. 69 (Def. Reply) at 1, 3, 12–13; ECF No. 68 (Gov’t
Response) at 1–2. Because the Court finds that Crawford intended to commit another felony
when he threw the gas mask, it has no need to address whether this act resulted in physical
contact with the officer. In addition, because the Court will deliver its verdict right before
sentencing in October, it declines to resolve whether Crawford would otherwise have to be
physically present for that pronouncement.
In contending that Defendant had the “intent to commit another felony” when he threw
the gas mask, the Government invokes 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3), the civil-disorder statute. That
provision criminalizes the actions of one who “commits or attempts to commit any act to
obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in
the lawful performance of his official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil
disorder which in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or adversely affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any
federally protected function.”
As his assaultive behavior is precisely the conduct that would underlie a § 231(a)(3)
charge, Crawford argues that civil disorder cannot qualify as “another felony” under § 111(a).
That position cannot prevail, however, given the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in United States
v. Stevens, 105 F.4th 473 (D.C. Cir. 2024), which postdated the bench trial in this case. There,
our Circuit considered “whether the Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder offense constitutes ‘another
3 felony’ separate from the Section 111(a)(1) count.” Id. at 480–81. Noting the provisions’
“distinct requirements,” the Circuit “conclude[d] that it does.” Id. at 481. Bound by that
decision, this Court holds the same. If Crawford violated § 111(a) with the intent to commit civil
disorder under § 231(a)(3), he can be convicted of a felony violation of § 111(a).
Defendant attempts to distinguish Stevens, maintaining that the Circuit there was
addressing a sentencing issue, as opposed to the applicability of a criminal statute. According to
Crawford, because the primary question in Stevens was whether the district court had properly
applied a Sentencing Guideline to the defendant’s § 111(a) offenses, the Circuit’s predicate
holding that civil disorder constitutes “another felony” under § 111(a) does not control here. The
Court disagrees. Our Court of Appeals couched its holding in broad language, stating without
qualification that a “Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder offense constitutes ‘another felony’ separate
from the Section 111(a)(1) count.” Id. at 480–81. Crawford nonetheless argues, in essence, that
the Circuit assumed without deciding that the district court correctly found a felony violation of
§ 111(a) based on the defendant’s intent to commit civil disorder. But the Circuit gave no
indication that its holding in Stevens was so limited; instead, it independently assessed § 111(a).
See id. at 481.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 23-426 (JEB) PHILLIP MARION CRAWFORD,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Phillip Crawford was a member of the crowd that stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6,
2021. While on the Capitol grounds, he scuffled with several law-enforcement officers,
including by throwing a rubber gas mask at one of them. Crawford was charged with multiple
criminal counts related to such conduct and pled guilty to several. After a bench trial on the
remaining counts, the Court found him guilty on all but Count VI (assault on officer), which it
held in abeyance pending further briefing on certain legal issues. Having now reviewed the
parties’ submissions, the Court will find Crawford guilty of that last charge at the sentencing
hearing scheduled for October 21, 2024.
I. Background
A grand jury indicted Defendant on December 6, 2023. See ECF No. 19. The
Government then filed an eleven-count Superseding Indictment on March 6, 2024, see ECF No.
34, which charges him with the following criminal acts: Civil Disorder, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(3) (Count I); Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Counts II, III, IV, and V); Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain
Officers Using a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b) (Count VI);
Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous
1 Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Count VII); Disorderly and
Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (Count VIII); Engaging in Physical Violence in a
Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1752(a)(4), (b)(1)(A) (Count IX); Disorderly Conduct in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40
U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D) (Count X); and Act of Physical Violence in the Capitol Grounds or
Buildings, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(F) (Count XI).
Crawford pled guilty to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and XI on May 17, 2024, and the Court
held a bench trial on the remaining counts on June 17–18. Upon Crawford’s oral motion for a
judgment of acquittal, the Court found him not guilty of the dangerous-weapon element of
Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX on the ground that the rubber gas mask he possessed and hurled
was not a deadly or dangerous weapon. The Court, however, allowed the lesser-included
charges of those counts to proceed. It then found Crawford guilty of Counts VII, VIII, IX, and
X. This left only Count VI, which charged Defendant with assaulting officers by throwing the
gas mask. Although the mask was not a dangerous weapon, the Court could still convict him of
a felony if it made other findings. Because certain legal questions were close, the Court held the
verdict on Count VI in abeyance and requested further briefing on three issues: 1) whether
Crawford’s act of throwing the gas mask involved “physical contact” with a law-enforcement
officer under § 111(a); 2) whether § 231(a)(3) civil disorder qualifies as “another felony” under
§ 111(a); and 3) whether Defendant must be physically present for the Court’s delivery of its
verdict on Count VI.
2 II. Analysis
To make out a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), the Government must prove either
that Crawford’s acts “involve[d] physical contact with the victim” or “the intent to commit
another felony.” As the parties agree, either ground is independently sufficient to constitute a
felony § 111(a) violation. See ECF No. 69 (Def. Reply) at 1, 3, 12–13; ECF No. 68 (Gov’t
Response) at 1–2. Because the Court finds that Crawford intended to commit another felony
when he threw the gas mask, it has no need to address whether this act resulted in physical
contact with the officer. In addition, because the Court will deliver its verdict right before
sentencing in October, it declines to resolve whether Crawford would otherwise have to be
physically present for that pronouncement.
In contending that Defendant had the “intent to commit another felony” when he threw
the gas mask, the Government invokes 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3), the civil-disorder statute. That
provision criminalizes the actions of one who “commits or attempts to commit any act to
obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in
the lawful performance of his official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil
disorder which in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or adversely affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any
federally protected function.”
As his assaultive behavior is precisely the conduct that would underlie a § 231(a)(3)
charge, Crawford argues that civil disorder cannot qualify as “another felony” under § 111(a).
That position cannot prevail, however, given the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in United States
v. Stevens, 105 F.4th 473 (D.C. Cir. 2024), which postdated the bench trial in this case. There,
our Circuit considered “whether the Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder offense constitutes ‘another
3 felony’ separate from the Section 111(a)(1) count.” Id. at 480–81. Noting the provisions’
“distinct requirements,” the Circuit “conclude[d] that it does.” Id. at 481. Bound by that
decision, this Court holds the same. If Crawford violated § 111(a) with the intent to commit civil
disorder under § 231(a)(3), he can be convicted of a felony violation of § 111(a).
Defendant attempts to distinguish Stevens, maintaining that the Circuit there was
addressing a sentencing issue, as opposed to the applicability of a criminal statute. According to
Crawford, because the primary question in Stevens was whether the district court had properly
applied a Sentencing Guideline to the defendant’s § 111(a) offenses, the Circuit’s predicate
holding that civil disorder constitutes “another felony” under § 111(a) does not control here. The
Court disagrees. Our Court of Appeals couched its holding in broad language, stating without
qualification that a “Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder offense constitutes ‘another felony’ separate
from the Section 111(a)(1) count.” Id. at 480–81. Crawford nonetheless argues, in essence, that
the Circuit assumed without deciding that the district court correctly found a felony violation of
§ 111(a) based on the defendant’s intent to commit civil disorder. But the Circuit gave no
indication that its holding in Stevens was so limited; instead, it independently assessed § 111(a).
See id. at 481. Nor did the Circuit suggest that the phrase “intent to commit another felony” was
ambiguous enough to invoke the rule of lenity or too vague to encompass civil disorder under
§ 231(a)(3). Stevens, then, instructs that civil disorder under § 231(a)(3) constitutes “another
felony” for purposes of § 111(a).
Not ready to throw in the towel, Crawford next contends that, even if civil disorder does
qualify as “another felony,” the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of this element.
He makes two arguments to that end, but neither is persuasive.
4 Defendant first asserts that although he pled guilty to independently violating § 231(a)(3)
— i.e., Count I — he did not thereby admit that throwing the gas mask specifically constituted an
act of civil disorder. That is incorrect. As set out above, § 231(a)(3) criminalizes “commit[ting]
or attempt[ing] to commit any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman or law
enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties incident to
and during the commission of a civil disorder.” Crawford acknowledged in his plea that the
events of January 6 constituted a civil disorder and that “between approximately 4:10:42 p.m.
and 4:13:38,” he “committed acts to obstruct, impede, or interfere with a law enforcement officer
performing his official duties.” ECF No. 52 (Statement of Offense) at 1–2. Defendant also
concedes that, “at or about 4:13:30 p.m.,” he “threw a rubber and plastic gas mask toward a line
of police officers.” Def. Opp. at 2. The gas-mask throw thus occurred during the timeframe in
which Crawford admitted to multiple violations of § 231(a)(3). Because that toss constituted an
“act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with” law enforcement, see 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3),
Crawford has already admitted that he committed civil disorder by throwing the mask.
Defendant next makes the related argument that — even if a violation of § 231(a)(3) is
“another felony” under § 111(a), and even if throwing the gas mask constituted an act of civil
disorder — he cannot be convicted of a felony § 111(a) violation because he did not intend to
commit civil disorder when he threw the gas mask. In Crawford’s telling, he meant to throw the
gas mask as an act of “exasperation and frustration,” not to obstruct, impede, or interfere with a
law enforcement officer. See Def. Opp. at 2. Because a felony violation of § 111(a) requires
“intent to commit another felony” (emphasis added), Crawford reasons, he has not satisfied the
elements.
5 This is a factual question that must be resolved by the factfinder — here, the Court. It
concludes that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawford intended to
obstruct, impede, or interfere with law enforcement by throwing the gas mask. As discussed, he
has already admitted that he “committed acts to obstruct, impede, or interfere with a law
enforcement officer performing his official duties” “[b]etween approximately 4:10:42 p.m. and
4:13:38,” Statement of Offense at 2, a time that includes his throwing the gas mask. It strains
credulity to claim that Crawford temporarily lost his intent to obstruct law enforcement during
the split second in which he threw the gas mask at the officer. When he threw the mask, he
possessed the necessary “intent to commit another felony” to be convicted of a felony violation
of § 111(a).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will find Crawford guilty on Count VI at the
sentencing hearing scheduled for October 21, 2024.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: August 27, 2024