USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10660 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-00684-TWT-AJB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CORRY THOMPSON, a.k.a. Larry Scott, a.k.a. Corey Thompson, a.k.a. Bobby Cook,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(February 17, 2021)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 2 of 6
Corry Thompson appeals the district court’s order reducing his sentence.
The district court reduced Thompson’s sentence on counts for crack cocaine
offenses pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act,1 but found that it lacked authority
to reduce the sentence on his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts. 2 Thompson timely
appealed. Because we agree that the district court had no authority to reduce
Thompson’s § 924(c) sentence, we affirm.
Thompson was found guilty of several drug and firearm convictions on April
25, 2005. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, plus a 360-month
consecutive sentence for his violation of § 924(c). On October 22, 2019,
Thompson filed a motion for a reduced sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act.
He requested a “full sentencing hearing” and argued that the “sentencing package
doctrine” required the court to reassess his sentence on all counts and apply the law
as it stands today. The government agreed that Thompson was eligible for relief
under § 404 of the First Step Act, but otherwise disagreed with Thompson’s
arguments. Accordingly, the district court granted Thompson’s motion and reduced
his sentence for the drug counts from life to 180 months, consecutive to the 360
months for the two § 924(c) counts.
1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (First Step Act). 2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or in furtherance of such a crime. 2 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 3 of 6
Thompson concedes that § 403 of the First Step Act does not apply
retroactively. Yet he alleges that the court imposed a new sentence when it granted
him relief under § 404. Thus, the court was permitted to apply the law as it
currently stands—specifically § 403 of the First Step Act which reduced the
enhanced penalty on § 924(c) convictions.
I.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on an eligible
movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. United States v.
Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). But where the issue presented
involves a legal question, our review is de novo. United States v. Pringle, 350 F.3d
1172, 1178–79 (11th Cir. 2003). We also review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation. United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010, amended 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1) and 960(b) to reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and
powder cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(Fair Sentencing Act); see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–70 (2012)
(detailing the history that led to the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act,
including the Sentencing Commission’s criticisms that the disparity between crack
cocaine and powder cocaine offenses was disproportional and reflected race-based
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 4 of 6
differences). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantity of crack
cocaine necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280
grams and the quantity necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5
grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not retroactive to defendants
who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. United States
v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the statutory
penalties enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive for covered offenses.
See First Step Act, § 404. Under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, a court “that
imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The statute defines “covered
offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for
which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . , that was
committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). Only “crack-cocaine offenses for
which [21 U.S.C.] sections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) provide the penalties”
qualify as “covered offenses.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1300–01. The First Step Act
further states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to
reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” First Step Act, § 404(c).
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 5 of 6
Prior to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contained a “stacking”
provision where, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction under § 924(c), a
defendant was to be “sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Section 403(a) of the First Step Act amended
this language so that the 25-year mandatory minimum on a second § 924(c)
violation only applies if the first § 924(c) conviction has become final. First Step
Act § 403(a). But § 403(b) explained that the amendments only apply “if a
sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the] date of enactment” of the
First Step Act: December 21, 2018. Id. § 403(b).
II.
Thompson received a discretionary reduction; he was not entitled to a de
novo resentencing. We held in United States v. Denson that there are limited
situations in which a district court can modify a sentence under the First Step Act.
963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020). Specifically, a district court can only reduce
a defendant’s sentence for a “covered offense.” Id. Moreover, the First Step Act
does not authorize a district court to conduct a plenary or de novo resentencing
where it could: (1) reconsider sentencing guideline calculations unaffected by
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10660 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-00684-TWT-AJB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CORRY THOMPSON, a.k.a. Larry Scott, a.k.a. Corey Thompson, a.k.a. Bobby Cook,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(February 17, 2021)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 2 of 6
Corry Thompson appeals the district court’s order reducing his sentence.
The district court reduced Thompson’s sentence on counts for crack cocaine
offenses pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act,1 but found that it lacked authority
to reduce the sentence on his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts. 2 Thompson timely
appealed. Because we agree that the district court had no authority to reduce
Thompson’s § 924(c) sentence, we affirm.
Thompson was found guilty of several drug and firearm convictions on April
25, 2005. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, plus a 360-month
consecutive sentence for his violation of § 924(c). On October 22, 2019,
Thompson filed a motion for a reduced sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act.
He requested a “full sentencing hearing” and argued that the “sentencing package
doctrine” required the court to reassess his sentence on all counts and apply the law
as it stands today. The government agreed that Thompson was eligible for relief
under § 404 of the First Step Act, but otherwise disagreed with Thompson’s
arguments. Accordingly, the district court granted Thompson’s motion and reduced
his sentence for the drug counts from life to 180 months, consecutive to the 360
months for the two § 924(c) counts.
1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (First Step Act). 2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or in furtherance of such a crime. 2 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 3 of 6
Thompson concedes that § 403 of the First Step Act does not apply
retroactively. Yet he alleges that the court imposed a new sentence when it granted
him relief under § 404. Thus, the court was permitted to apply the law as it
currently stands—specifically § 403 of the First Step Act which reduced the
enhanced penalty on § 924(c) convictions.
I.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on an eligible
movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. United States v.
Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). But where the issue presented
involves a legal question, our review is de novo. United States v. Pringle, 350 F.3d
1172, 1178–79 (11th Cir. 2003). We also review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation. United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010, amended 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1) and 960(b) to reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and
powder cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(Fair Sentencing Act); see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–70 (2012)
(detailing the history that led to the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act,
including the Sentencing Commission’s criticisms that the disparity between crack
cocaine and powder cocaine offenses was disproportional and reflected race-based
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 4 of 6
differences). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantity of crack
cocaine necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280
grams and the quantity necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5
grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not retroactive to defendants
who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. United States
v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the statutory
penalties enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive for covered offenses.
See First Step Act, § 404. Under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, a court “that
imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The statute defines “covered
offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for
which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . , that was
committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). Only “crack-cocaine offenses for
which [21 U.S.C.] sections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) provide the penalties”
qualify as “covered offenses.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1300–01. The First Step Act
further states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to
reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” First Step Act, § 404(c).
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 5 of 6
Prior to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contained a “stacking”
provision where, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction under § 924(c), a
defendant was to be “sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Section 403(a) of the First Step Act amended
this language so that the 25-year mandatory minimum on a second § 924(c)
violation only applies if the first § 924(c) conviction has become final. First Step
Act § 403(a). But § 403(b) explained that the amendments only apply “if a
sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the] date of enactment” of the
First Step Act: December 21, 2018. Id. § 403(b).
II.
Thompson received a discretionary reduction; he was not entitled to a de
novo resentencing. We held in United States v. Denson that there are limited
situations in which a district court can modify a sentence under the First Step Act.
963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020). Specifically, a district court can only reduce
a defendant’s sentence for a “covered offense.” Id. Moreover, the First Step Act
does not authorize a district court to conduct a plenary or de novo resentencing
where it could: (1) reconsider sentencing guideline calculations unaffected by
Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act; (2) reduce the defendant’s sentence
“based on changes in the law beyond those mandated by sections 2 and 3;” or (3)
“change the defendant’s sentence on counts that are not ‘covered offenses.’” Id.
5 USCA11 Case: 20-10660 Date Filed: 02/17/2021 Page: 6 of 6
Accordingly, a full resentencing was not authorized here. And because the plain
language of § 403 of the First Step Act prohibits retroactive application, the district
court did not err when it determined that it lacked the authority to reduce
Thompson’s sentence on his § 924(c) conviction.
Furthermore, the sentencing package doctrine does not apply. The doctrine
is a judicial practice that permits a district court to resentence a defendant on all
counts of conviction where: (1) the defendant was sentenced on multiple counts,
such that the overall sentence is a package of interrelated sanctions for all of the
offenses; (2) one of the defendant’s convictions is subsequently vacated; and (3)
the district court needs to “reconstruct the sentence package” so that that the
overall sentence comports with the Sentencing Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors,
and the court’s opinion of a proper sentence for the remaining convictions. See
United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, the
sentences were not so intertwined—the § 924(c) sentence was based on a statutory
requirement. Therefore the package theory is not applicable. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s determination.
AFFIRMED.