United States v. Corey Carter

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: August 15, 2024
• Docket: 23-4354
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4354

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COREY LAMONT CARTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:22-cr-00117-TDS-1)

Submitted: June 26, 2024 Decided: August 15, 2024

Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ira Knight, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Corey Lamont Carter pleaded guilty to destruction by fire of a building used in

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). At sentencing, the district court

designated Carter a de facto career offender based on two prior convictions not counted in

calculating the initial advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and established a career

offender Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The district court

sentenced Carter to 151 months’ imprisonment, stating the sentence would be appropriate

as a variance even if Carter were not a de facto career offender.

On appeal, Carter challenges this prison term, arguing that the district court erred

by designating him a de facto career offender because his current conviction of federal

arson under § 844(i) does not constitute a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Carter

also maintains that under the district court’s variance statement, the sentence is

substantively unreasonable because the de facto career offender analysis factored into the

district court’s reasoning. We affirm.

“As a general matter, in reviewing any sentence ‘whether inside, just outside, or

significantly outside the Guidelines range,’ we apply a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.’” United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). “We first review for procedural errors; if and only

if, we find no such procedural errors may we assess the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). In

evaluating the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we assess whether the district court

“improperly calculate[ed] the Guidelines range, fail[ed] to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

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§ 3553(a) factors, or fail[ed] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v.

Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).

“It is well established that we will not vacate a sentence if we determine that the

district court’s [potentially] improper calculation of the Guidelines advisory sentencing

range [is] harmless.” United States v. Mills, 917 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019). As the

Government suggests, we need not resolve Carter’s challenges to the district court’s de

facto career offender Guidelines ruling but may instead “proceed directly to an assumed

error harmlessness inquiry.” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir.

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentencing error is harmless if: “(1) the

district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue

the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the Guidelines issue had

been decided in the defendant’s favor.” Mills, 917 F.3d at 330 (cleaned up).

Here, the first prong of the inquiry is easily met. The district court stated after

imposing the 151-month sentence that it would have chosen that sentence had the de facto

career offender designation not applied and noted that it rejected a sentence less than 151

months because of the need to respect the law, the need for adequate deterrence, and the

need to protect the public. See id. (noting that “[t]he record in a case may show . . . that

the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the

Guidelines range” and concluding that court’s statement that particular prison term was

one it would have imposed even had another Guidelines range been applicable met the first

prong of the inquiry (cleaned up)). “We therefore proceed to the second prong of the

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inquiry, whether the district court’s sentence [is] substantively reasonable.” Id. at 331

(cleaned up).

In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a variant sentence, “we consider

whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose

such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”

United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Although “a district court’s explanation for the sentence must support the degree

of the variance, it need not find extraordinary circumstances to justify a deviation from the

Guidelines.” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

Because our review ultimately is for abuse of discretion, we accord “due deference to the

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the

variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In this posture, even if “we might reasonably conclude that a different

sentence is appropriate, that conclusion, standing alone, is an insufficient basis to vacate

the district court’s chosen sentence.” Id. (cleaned up).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Carter’s 151-month prison term does

not amount to an abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances. The district

court provided a sufficiently detailed explanation of the applicable § 3553(a) factors

motivating its chosen sentence, focusing primarily on the serious nature and circumstances

of Carter’s offense conduct, the parallel circumstances to a prior state court arson

conviction, the need to protect the public from the danger posed by Carter as evidenced by

his many prior convictions, and his failure to be deterred. The court explained that it chose

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the sentence to promote deterrence and to reflect the extraordinarily serious and disturbing

nature of Carter’s criminal conduct. In sum, the district court acted within its discretion in

determining that the applicable sentencing factors warranted a 151-month prison term,

regardless of any error in the application of the de facto career offender designation. See

United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that “it was well

within the [district] court’s discretion to accord more weight to the host of aggravating

factors and decide that the sentence imposed would serve the § 3553 factors, on the whole

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED