United States v. Corey Burgess

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: October 7, 2020
• Docket: 20-1543
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 20-1543 ___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Corey Burgess

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis ____________

Submitted: October 2, 2020 Filed: October 7, 2020 [Unpublished] ____________

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Corey Burgess appeals a 24-month prison sentence for violating the conditions of supervised release. Burgess’s counsel seeks permission to withdraw and challenges the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Burgess has also filed a pro se brief. We affirm. We conclude that the sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumptively reasonable). The record establishes that the district court1 sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(3), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923– 24 (8th Cir. 2006).

We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on a certified copy of the state-court conviction to prove the violation. See United States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 375–76 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on a certified copy of a conviction as proof that the defendant violated state law). Nor did the revocation proceedings violate due process. See id. at 376 (explaining that a defendant “has a limited due process right in connection with [a] revocation hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) (describing the procedural requirements for revocation proceedings). Finally, we decline to consider the ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim now. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims “are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings”). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant counsel permission to withdraw. ______________________________

1 The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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