United States v. Conley

859 F. Supp. 864, 1994 WL 406639
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided July 7, 1994·No. Crim. No. 91-178·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant John F. “Duffy” Conley’s challenge to the July 19, [865]*8651990 searches of certain premises, ment No. 377, in part). (Doeu-

Defendant John F. “Duffy” Conley (“Duffy Conley”) has limited standing to challenge the warrants pursuant to which the July 1990 searches and seizures were undertaken. In prior proceedings, the Court ruled that Duffy Conley had Fourth Amendment interests that were implicated by seizures and searches of video poker machines from “locations” — bars, delicatessens, coffee shops, etc. — in which Duffy Conley had no reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Conley, 856 F.Supp. 1010, 1014-1022 (W.D.Pa.1994) (Document No. 801). Specifically, the Court held that Duffy Conley’s ownership of the video poker machines, which the Court assumed for purposes of its decision, was an interest protected from unreasonable seizures by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1019, 1020-1022. The Court indicated that although the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to seize property in an unprotected area, it does require probable cause to seize without a warrant. Id. at 1020. Further, the Court held that Duffy Conley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the inside compartments of the video poker machines, id. at 16, 19-22, 23-24, necessitating a valid warrant or warrant-exception before the compartments properly could be invaded by law enforcement personnel. See also United States v. Conley, 856 F.Supp. 1034, 1036 (W.D.Pa.1994) (Document No. 900). Duffy Conley’s “standing” is limited; to the extent that the searches and seizures did not involve his poker machines, they implicated no right secured to him under the Fourth Amendment.1

Although the Court indicated that no warrant was needed to seize video poker machines, the Court presumed that the Government would attempt to show probable cause to seize the machines through the warrants that were in fact issued for the locations. Conley, 856 F.Supp. at 1019 & n. 7 (W.D.Pa.1994) (Document No. 801). As in the past, the Government has relied solely on the warrants that were in fact issued for the locations searched in 1990.

All of the searches and seizures on July 19, 1990 were conducted pursuant to warrants issued on the basis of a single master affidavit. As the affiant on the master affidavit was FBI Special Agent Charles Duffy (“S.A. Duffy”), and there are other master affidavits in the record, the July 18, 1990 master affidavit will be referred to as the “Duffy affidavit.”

THE DUFFY AFFIDAVIT

The Duffy affidavit commences by stating its objective as follows: “The purpose of this Affidavit is to establish probable cause to believe that a number of business establishments operating in and around the City of Pittsburgh are presently operating video poker machines, in violation of the Gambling Device Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171, 1172, 1173, 1177 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.” Duffy affidavit, at 1. After describing his credentials and the sources of his evidence, S.A. Duffy turns to a discussion of several of the federal statutes invoked by the applications for search warrants.

The Duffy affidavit quotes 15 U.S.C. § 1172, which provides in pertinent part:

§ 1172 Transportation of gambling devices as unlawful; exceptions; authority of Federal Trade Commission
(a) General rule
It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in a State or possession of the United States from any place outside of such State or possession: ....

15 U.S.C. § 1172.2 The Duffy affidavit then quotes Section 1171, which defines “gambling [866]*866device” in the related statutory scheme, and describes the origins of “The Erie Cases.”

The Duffy affidavit relates the application for and issuance of warrants which resulted in the seizure of 294 video poker machines in Erie, Pennsylvania. The Duffy affidavit then discusses the two district court opinions that resulted from the civil forfeiture eases instituted against the seized video poker machines.3 The Duffy affidavit quotes extensively from the first of the opinions, authored by Judge Weber. The first quoted portion describes the operation of video poker machines meeting the definition of “gambling device” under Section 1171.4 The quoted portion describes the use of knock-off switches, which remove accumulated credits upon which pay-offs have been made. The Duffy affidavit then quotes Judge Weber’s holding as to what poker machines meet the definition of “gambling device” under Section 1171:

We, therefore, conclude that all subject video poker machines with knock-off switches and meters, or the provision in wiring, circuitry or programming to accommodate the addition of knock-off switches and meters, are gambling devices within the meaning of the Act.

Duffy affidavit, at 6 (quoting 294 Various Gambling Devices, 718 F.Supp. at 1246). The Duffy affidavit further states:

4. The Court also held that since video poker machines were gambling devices per se, it was not necessary to show actual payoffs on the machines.
.Evidence of actual payoffs, either directly by the machine or indirectly by a bartender who redeems credits for cash is not necessary to a determination that a machine is a gambling device.

Duffy affidavit, at 7 (quoting 294- Various Gambling Devices, 718 F.Supp. at 1242). The Duffy affidavit also quoted the second opinion, which was authored by Judge Cohill, and included a copy of the slip opinion. The Duffy affidavit stated that Judge Cohill “held that video poker machines are in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1171 if they are ‘designed and manufactured to facilitate gambling.’ ” Duffy affidavit, at 7 (quoting 294 Various Gambling Devices, 731 F.Supp. at 1248) (emphasis deleted by S.A. Duffy).

S.A. Duffy further recites that he is personally familiar with the operation of video poker machines. In describing how such machines operate, S.A. Duffy specifically referenced the knocking off of credits, stating, “The bartender or owner, having verified the number of free games pays the player, then removes (knocks off) the accumulated credits, returning the machine to zero credits.” Duffy affidavit, at 8.

The Duffy affidavit then states:

8.

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United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 864, 1994 WL 406639 (W.D. Pa. 1994).

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