United States v. Commercial Creamery Co.

43 F. Supp. 714, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3069
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 12, 1942
DocketC — 7382
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 43 F. Supp. 714 (United States v. Commercial Creamery Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Commercial Creamery Co., 43 F. Supp. 714, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3069 (E.D. Wash. 1942).

Opinion

SCHWELLENBACH, District Judge.

By information defendant is charged with introducing into interstate commerce in Spokane, Washington, for shipment to Portland, Oregon, two shipments of frozen eggs which consisted in whole or in part of a decomposed substance in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The pertinent portions of the statute, grouped together for continuity purposes, read as follows, Title 21 U.S.C.A.:

Section 331:

“The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited:
“(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food * * * that is adulterated * * * »

Section 333:

“(a) Any person who violates any of the provisions of section 331 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Section 342:

“A food shall be deemed to be adulterated—
“(a) * * * (3) If it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food.”

To the information a plea of n'ot guilty was entered. By stipulation, a jury was waived and the case presented to the Court. By stipulation, the interstate character of the shipments and their identity was admitted by defendant.

Defendant contends that the failure to afford to the defendant an opportunity to present its views as provided in the act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 335, prevents this prosecution. This contention is without foundation. The notice and hearing required in section 335 is administrative and not jurisdictional. United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 32 S.Ct. 81, 56 L.Ed. 198; United States v. American Laboratories, D.C., 222 F. 104.

Defendant contends that the statute is too indefinite and that neither it nor the regulations promulgated under it establish standards sufficiently definite to enable the defendant to know of the crime with which it is charged and that any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the statute must be construed in favor of the defendant. It is true that this is a criminal proceeding in which the burden of proving the allegations of the information beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the Government and the defendant is entitled to its recognized presumption of innocence. United States v. Mayfield, D.C., 177 F. 765; Von Bremen v. United States, 2 Cir., 192 F. 904; United States v. American Laboratories, supra; United States v. Newton Tea & Spice Co., D.C., 275 F. 394. But the rule of strict construction as to the statute itself has little or no application to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act designed, as it is, to prevent injury to the public health. A. O. Andersen & Co. v. United States, 9 Cir., 284 F. 542; United States v. 48 Dozen Packages, More or Less, of Gauze Bandage Labeled in Part Sterilized, 2 Cir., 94 F.2d 641; United States v. Research Laboratories, Inc., 9 Cir., 126 F.2d 42, decided Feb. 24, 1942. Furthermore, the statute is not indefinite or ambiguous. It makes illegal the introduction into interstate commerce of food which “consists in whole or iw part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance.” (Emphasis mine.) This statute is all inclusive and prevents the shipment in interstate commerce of any food which contains any decomposed matter. Defendant urges that such a construction of the statute would result in unreasonable regulation and would prevent the shipment in *716 interstate commerce of many foods not harmful to public health. If such a contention is sound, the argument in support thereof should be made to the Congress and not to the Courts. The act was passed by Congress, under its authority to exclude from interstate commerce impure and adulterated foods and to prevent the facilities of commerce being used to enable such articles to be transported to the people who consume them and it is in the light of the purpose and of the power exerted by Congress that this act must be considered and construed. Hipolite Egg Company v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 S.Ct. 364, 55 L.Ed. 364. Congress may itself determine the means appropriate to this purpose and, so long as they do no violence to other provisions of the Constitution, it is, itself, the judge of the means to be employed in exercising the powers conferred upon it in this respect. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 S.Ct. 431, 57 L.Ed. 754, 47 L.R.A..N.S., 984, Ann.Cas.l915A, 39. “Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed upon interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare. * * * The distinction on which the decision [Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E, 724] was rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious property — a distinction which w.as novel when made and unsupported by any provision of the Constitution — has long since been abandoned.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 457, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430.

Plaintiffs testimony in this case consists of evidence submitted by three witnesses, all employees of the Food and Drug Administration. They were the inspector and assistant inspector at Portland, Oregon, who made the seizure, and the chief inspector at Seattle, who verified their findings. Their method of inspection consisted exclusively of the use of the organoleptic (affecting an organ or organs, especially those of touch, taste and smell. Funk and Wagnell’s New Standard Dictionary, 1940 edition) test. In this case, they used the sense of smell. In each instance, the witness testified that his training in the use of this test consisted of a three weeks course in California. While there they had made up for them “authentic packs” of various food substances using which they were taught to differentiate between the odor emanating from each. It will be noted that such packs were designated “authentic” rather than proven. For example, in making up an “authentic” egg pack, the eggs used were not submitted to any chemical or bacteriological test but were taken from what the witnesses described as “known” sources of either good or bad eggs and the odors were described to them as those which would come from either good or bad egg packs. The samples upon which plaintiff relies in this case were not subjected to either bacteriological ,or chemical tests nor was the method of inspection of the source used.

Defendant’s testimony included an explanation of the care used by it in the preparation of these shipments. It was uncontradicted that the eggs were carefully selected and examined by skilled candlers.

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Bluebook (online)
43 F. Supp. 714, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-commercial-creamery-co-waed-1942.