United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.

36 F. Supp. 488, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3901
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJanuary 18, 1941
DocketNo. 1099
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 36 F. Supp. 488 (United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 36 F. Supp. 488, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3901 (D. Del. 1941).

Opinion

NIELDS, District Judge.

Hearing on report of special master recommending approval of a plan of divestiture filed by the defendant corporations and on separate exceptions to the report filed by the United States, by the City of Detroit, and by Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Company (herein referred to as “Mokan”) ; and further, for a modification of the consent decree entered in this cause January 29, 1936.

October 30, 1935, the United States filed ' its amended and supplemental petition, superseding its original petition, charging Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation (herein referred to as “Columbia Gas”), Columbia Oil & Gasoline Corporation (herein referred to as “Columbia Oil”), and certain individuals with dominating and controlling the management and operation of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company (herein referred- to as “Panhandle Eastern”) with the purpose and effect of preventing competition, actual and potential, between Panhandle Eastern and Columbia Gas and of monopolizing and attempting to monopolize interstate .trade and commerce in natural gas in certain sections of the United States, in violation of the anti-trust laws.

The several defendants filed answers to the petition specifically denying the charges therein.

Columbia Gas is a holding company owning the stock of more than fifty operating public utility subsidiaries engaged in the production, transmission. and distribution of natural gas. Their field of operations extended from Muncie, Indiana, through the States of Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia and Pennsylvania, and to other points ,on the eastern seaboard. Together, they constituted the “Columbia System”. Their operations were concentrated in the State of Ohio where the petition alleges they enjoyed a virtual monopoly in natural, mixed and artificial gas. In 1930 Columbia Oil was organized by Columbia Gas to hold the oil and gasoline producing properties of the Columbia System segregated from its public service properties. In 1928 Mokan was organized for the purpose of producing and distributing natural gas in the States of Kansas and Ohio and intervening states. By 1930 Mokan had acquired substantial gas producing acreage in the Panhandle district of Texas and in Kansas. In December, 1929, Mokan organized Panhandle Eastern for the purpose of building and operating a natural gas pipe line from the sources of supply in Texas and Kansas to Indianapolis, with possible extensions to points in Michigan and Ohio.

Consent Decree.

January 29, 1936, pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Government and the defendants, a consent decree was entered by this court in this cause. The general obj.ect of the consent decree was to prevent Columbia Gas from exercising dominion or control, direct or indirect, over the affairs of Panhandle Eastern. To this end elaborate injunctive provisions were inserted in the decree. The decree provided, among other things, that voting stock of Panhandle Eastern then held or afterwards acquired by Columbia Oil was to be placed in the custody of a trustee named in the decree, who was to vote the stock for the election of the number of directors of Panhandle Eastern which the stock was entitled to elect (six out of a total of nine), such directors to include the trustee and the remainder to be selected by him from among persons recommended by Columbia Oil “in conference and with the advice of the trustee”, but excluding any past or present officer, director, agent, or employee of Columbia Gas; and the trustee was empowered “to remove and replace such directors with others of his own choosing upon his own motion, if in his judgment such action 'is necessary in the interest of Panhandle Eastern or for the effectuation of the purposes of this decree”. The decree named Gano Dunn as such trustee.

The decree enjoined the defendants from exercising dominion or control over Panhandle Eastern or interfering with its independence of action in the sale of gas, [491]*491and from owning securities of Panhandle Eastern, subject, however, to the following: The defendants were permitted to own stock of Columbia Gas and Columbia Oil and to be directors and officers thereof; Columbia Gas was permitted to own obligations (without voting rights) of Panhandle Eastern; and Columbia Oil was permitted to own or acquire voting stock or obligations of Panhandle Eastern subject to the trusteeship created by the decree.

The decree further contained provisions applicable to financing the proposed extension of the Panhandle Eastern pipe line to the City of Detroit, Michigan.

The decree further provided for a termination, with the approval of the Court, of the trust created thereunder, when:

(1) Columbia Gas has divested itself of all-control, direct or indirect, of Panhandle Eastern by (a) No longer owning voting stock of Columbia Oil, or (b) By Columbia Oil divesting itself of ownership of all stock of Panhandle Eastern, or

(2) “Under the circumstances then existing, the continuation of said trust is no longer essential or necessary in carrying out the purposes of this decree.”

In addition, the decree provided for a termination of its injunctive provisions, with the approval of the Court, when Columbia Gas no longer owned voting stock of Columbia Oil.

The consent decree was entered pursuant to a stipulation between the parties as above recited. That stipulation required performance by Columbia Gas and Columbia Oil of five or more essential requirements. It is unnecessary to discuss these requirements or to recite the steps taken under the consent decree and stipulation. The working arrangement provided by the consent decree has been carried out from the entry thereof. After the entry of the consent decree the stock of Panhandle Eastern owned by Columbia Oil was promptly lodged with Gano Dunn as trustee and has continued to be held and voted by him. The trustee has performed his duties as required by the consent decree.

. Supplemental Complaint.

January 12, 1939, the United States filed a supplemental complaint in this cause stating, among other things: “The course of events since the entry of said decree on January 29, 1936, has made it increasingly clear (1) that the only effective way to restore and maintain a position of free and independant action for Panhandle Eastern is to require Columbia Gas to divest itself of all stock of any class having existing or potential voting rights in Columbia Oil, or to require Columbia Oil to divest itself of ownership of all stock of Panhandle Eastern, as contemplated by the last paragraph of section III of said decree, and (2) that to accomplish the purpose of said decree, it is necessary to supplement said decree by a further order requiring the formulation and submission to this Court for approval of a suitable plan or plans to accomplish such divestiture.”

After referring to the restrictions found in Section II and the trust established with Gano Dunn in Section III of the consent decree, the supplemental complaint concludes by asking for relief in the alternative through an order of the Court as follows:

“Directing Columbia Gas to divest itself of all control, direct or indirect, legal or practical, of Panhandle Eastern, either by disposing of all interest which it may have in any stock of any class having present or potential voting rights in Columbia Oil, or by causing Columbia Oil to divest itself of ownership of all stock of Panhandle Eastern; and, to that end:

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Related

United States v. United States Gypsum Company
124 F. Supp. 573 (District of Columbia, 1954)
Young v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.
129 F.2d 216 (Third Circuit, 1942)
Young v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.
37 F. Supp. 22 (D. Delaware, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
36 F. Supp. 488, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3901, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-columbia-gas-electric-corp-ded-1941.