United States v. Collins

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D August 25, 2003 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40561

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES DANIEL CARMICHAEL,

Defendant-Appellant, _________________________________

Consolidated with No. 02-21023

GABRIEL BRANDON COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas

Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Gabriel Collins and James Carmichael both pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery charges and are currently serving

terms of confinement in federal prison facilities. Both have

appealed their sentences because, pursuant to the DNA Analysis

Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“the DNA Act”), the sentences

require the collection of a DNA sample as a mandatory condition of

supervised release, a provision appellants urge is

unconstitutional. They further contend that an implied provision

of their sentence was the requirement, pursuant to the DNA Act,

that Bureau of Prison staff take DNA samples during their

incarceration, also violative of their constitutional rights. For

the following reasons we dismiss the appeal for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and for unripeness.

I

In 1994, Congress authorized the Federal Bureau of

Investigation to create a national index of DNA samples taken from

convicted offenders, crime scenes, and unidentified human remains

which could be used by criminal justice agencies for law

enforcement identification, in judicial proceedings, and for

criminal defense purposes.1 As a result, the FBI established the

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which allows state and local

forensics laboratories to exchange and compare electronic DNA

profiles in order to match crime scene evidence to convicted

1 H.R. REP. No. 106-900, at 8 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 210304, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a), (b)(3).

-2- offenders on file in the system.2 By 2000, all fifty states had

enacted statutes requiring convicted offenders to provide DNA

samples for analysis and entry into CODIS.3 Samples taken from

federal offenders were not included in CODIS, however, “because the

language of the 1994 act only authorized the creation of the CODIS

system, and not the taking of samples from persons convicted of

Federal crimes.”4

To fill the gap left by the absence of federal offenders’ DNA

samples in CODIS, the FBI requested in 1998 that Congress “enact

statutory authority to allow the taking of DNA samples from persons

committing Federal crimes of violence, robbery, and burglary, or

similar crimes in the District of Columbia or while in the

military, and authorizing them to be included in CODIS.”5 In

response to the perceived need for inclusion of federal offender

samples in CODIS, in 2000 Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog

Elimination Act, which granted authority for collection of these

samples and also provided for federal grants to the states to

assist in reducing the backlog of biological samples waiting to be

analyzed in the state systems.6

2 H.R. REP. No. 106-900, at 8 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 9, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324-25. 6 Id.

-3- Two provisions of the Act relating to collection of federal

offenders’ DNA are at issue in this appeal. The first provides

that “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall collect a DNA

sample from each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons

[BOP] who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal

offense ... or a qualifying military offense ....”7 Qualifying

offenses include “murder; voluntary manslaughter; other homicide

offenses; offenses relating to sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or

other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual

activity; kidnapping; burglary; and any attempt or conspiracy to

commit those crimes.”8 BOP policies provide that offenders in its

custody are to be screened by local Community Corrections

Management Offices to determine whether they are qualified

offenders under the DNA Act.9 Once an inmate arrives at his

designated correction facility, the facility’s Health Services

staff will arrange to collect a DNA sample during the routine

physical examination.10

The Act also amended statutes relating to a district court’s

7 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1); see also 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(a) (Department of Justice’s implementing regulations). 8 H.R. REP. No. 106-900, at 19 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2334. 9 Memorandum from Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, et al., to all Chief Executive Officers (Feb. 12, 2002). 10 Id.

-4- sentencing of federal offenders to probation or supervised release,

requiring district courts to impose as a mandatory condition that

the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample.11 The

amended supervised release provision reads, “[t]he court shall

order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the

defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the

defendant, if the collection of such a sample is authorized

pursuant to ... the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.”12

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has

instructed probation officers that they should not require an

offender on probation or supervised release to submit a sample if

the BOP obtained one during the offender’s incarceration.13 The DNA

Act makes the failure to cooperate in the taking of a sample a

11 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(9), 3583(d); H.R. REP. No. 106-900, at 21 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2337 (“Section 7 of the bill amends section 3563 of title 18 of the United States Code to require Federal courts to order, as a condition of any imposed term of probation, that defendants cooperate in the collection of DNA samples authorized under the bill. It also amends section 3583 of title 18, United States Code, to require Federal courts to order, as a condition of any imposed term of supervised release, that defendants cooperate in the collection of DNA samples authorized under the bill.”). 12 § 3583(d); see also § 3563(a)(9) (“The [sentencing] court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence of probation ... that the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to ... the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.”). 13 Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to all Chief Probation Officers (Dec. 14, 2001).

-5- misdemeanor offense.14

II

On November 8, 2001, James Carmichael robbed a bank in

Brownsville, Texas. Armed with a .357 handgun which he pointed at

a customer, he made off with approximately $17,000 in cash. When

apprehended several hours later, he admitted having robbed the

bank, and a search turned up the gun and the money. Carmichael was

indicted on counts of aiding and abetting bank robbery and using a

firearm during the commission of a bank robbery; he pleaded guilty

to both charges. The district court sentenced Carmichael to 117

months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, and

ordered Collins to submit to DNA sampling in accordance with the

DNA Act.

On November 20, 2001, Gabriel Collins and an accomplice robbed

a bank in Katy, Texas. They passed a note to the teller stating

that they were armed and took $5,955 in cash. However, the cash

was rigged with a dye pack and bait bills, and the police

eventually tracked down Collins when he used dye-stained bills to

pay for auto repairs. Collins confessed to the robbery and pleaded

guilty to the single count of aiding and abetting bank robbery.

The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’

imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, and required that

pursuant to the DNA Act the probation officer be allowed to collect

14 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5); see also 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(c).

-6- DNA from Collins as a mandatory condition of supervised release.

Both Carmichael and Collins now appeal their sentences,

alleging that they should not be required to provide a DNA sample,

either in prison or on supervised release, because the DNA Act is

unconstitutional. Their actions were consolidated into this single

appeal.

III

Carmichael and Collins challenge the constitutionality of the

DNA Act on two grounds. First, they argue that the Act is an

unconstitutional exercise of congressional power; and, second, that

the Act is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, both as to

prisoners and as to criminals on supervised release. The

Government asserts that the appellants’ constitutional claim

relating to the DNA Act’s provision requiring collection of their

DNA while they are incarcerated relates to “conditions of

confinement,” which cannot be appealed on direct review but rather

must be brought in a separate civil action. It further contends

that the defendants’ claim regarding the portion of the Act

requiring collection of the DNA while they are on supervised

release is unripe for review, since the Act requires collection of

the appellants’ DNA samples while they are incarcerated so in all

likelihood they will not be asked to submit a sample while on

supervised release. We find the Government’s arguments persuasive.

A

Collins and Carmichael brought this direct appeal of their

-7- sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which authorizes, among other

things, appeal of a sentence imposed “in violation of law.”15 The

Government contends that the DNA’s mandate that the BOP collect DNA

samples from qualified federal offenders is not part of the

district court’s sentence. Rather, that portion of the Act

operates independently from appellants’ sentences. Because the DNA

Act is simply one of the myriad regulations of prison life, asserts

the Government, it amounts to a condition of confinement, which

Collins and Carmichael can challenge only in a separate civil

action filed after exhausting their administrative remedies.16

Like the Government, we conclude that neither the text of the

Act nor the legislative history suggests that district courts, at

sentencing, are to play any part in the collection of DNA samples

by BOP officials. The statute orders “[t]he Director of the Bureau

of Prisons” to “collect a DNA sample from each individual in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of

a qualifying Federal offense.”17 This provision demonstrates that

15 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). 16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (describing appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Prison Litigation Reform Act) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see also Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 3:01-CV-1619-G, 2002 WL 139559 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002) (civil action for injunctive relief brought by prisoners to prevent the BOP from taking DNA samples). 17 § 14135a(a)(1).

-8- the BOP not only has power to take the samples, but is vested with

the authority to determine who is eligible for DNA sampling. The

legislative history reinforces this interpretation by explaining

that the Act “direct[s] the Bureau of Prisons (BoP) to collect a

DNA sample from each person in federal custody who has been

convicted of certain felonies or sexual offenses.”18 That the Act

took prison sampling out of the sentencing court’s hands is

reinforced by its provisions relating to supervised release and

probation, which in contrast “require Federal courts to order, as

a condition of any imposed term of [probation or supervised

release], that defendants cooperate in the collection of DNA

samples authorized under the bill.”19

Collins and Carmichael argue that the DNA sampling requirement

is no different than statutes requiring restitution, criminal

forfeiture, or special assessments, which constitute part of a

criminal sentence. However, each of these statutes provide that

the district court “may” or “shall order” imposition of the

sanction,20 while the portion of the DNA Act relating to collection

18 H.R. REP. No. 106-900, at 14 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2329 (emphasis added). 19 Id. at 21, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2337; see also id. at 14, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2329 (“The bill would direct the Judiciary to collect a DNA sample from each person under federally supervised release who has been convicted of certain felonies or sexual offenses.” (emphasis added)). 20 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (“The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of [certain offenses], may order, in addition to or, in

-9- of DNA samples during incarceration lacks reference to any role a

district court is to play in that process. We also reject their

contention that suits challenging conditions of confinement relate

only to complaints such as cell overcrowding and inadequate medical

care. Rather, the Supreme Court has instructed that suits

challenging conditions of confinement include prisoner petitions

alleging not only “continuous conditions,” but “isolated episodes

of unconstitutional conduct.”21 Stated another way, suits attacking

conditions of confinement implicate “all inmate suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular

episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong.”22 Accordingly, we hold that the DNA Act’s provision for the

BOP’s collection of federal offenders’ DNA during incarceration is

the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense ....”); 18 U.S.C. § 3554 (“The court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of [certain offenses,] shall order ... that the defendant forfeit property to the United States ....”); 18 U.S.C. § 1467 (“The court shall order forfeiture of property ... if – (1) the trier of fact determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such property is subject to forfeiture ....”); 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (“The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the United States ....”). 21 McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991); see also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2000) (“... [T]he unanimous Court interpreted the ... ‘conditions of confinement’ language – one half of the definition of ‘prison conditions’ in § 3626(g)(2) – to include all inmate petitions, not only those regarding ‘continuous conditions,’ but ‘isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct,’ such as the petitioner’s claim of excessive force ....” (quoting McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139)), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). 22 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

-10- not part of appellants’ sentence, but is rather a prison condition

that must be challenged through a separate civil action after

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

B

The Government concedes that the DNA Act’s provisions relating

to collection of DNA samples during an offender’s probationary or

supervised release period are part of the appellants’ sentences,

because they require a sentencing court to impose DNA collection as

a mandatory condition of probation or supervised release. However,

the Government asserts that we must dismiss the remainder of the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because appellants’ constitutional

claim regarding the DNA Act’s provisions for collection of the DNA

during supervised release is not yet ripe. Only if the BOP fails

to execute its statutorily-imposed duty to collect the sample will

appellants be required to submit to sampling during supervised

release. The Government posits that this renders the possibility

of DNA sampling during supervised release speculative, and in this

case ripeness considerations mitigate against premature

adjudication since we are called upon by the defense to render an

act of Congress unconstitutional.

“Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because

the injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are

appropriate for judicial review.”23 A claim is not ripe for review

23 United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000).

-11- if “it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”24 The Government

asserts that not only is it possible that the supervised release

condition appellants complain of will never come to fruition, but

it is likely, because unless the BOP “flouts the multiple layers of

legal obligations placed upon it,” by the time the appellants are

released it will already have collected a DNA sample from them in

accordance with the Act. We agree. This scenario is distinct from

those cases pointed to by appellants in which we have taken up

objections to supervised release conditions on direct appeal of the

sentence, because those related to conditions not contingent on

future events.25 Here it is a matter of conjecture whether either

Collins or Carmichael will be forced to submit to DNA sampling

during supervised release. We therefore dismiss the remainder of

this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

24 Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 See United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2002) (addressing whether the district court’s oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions varied from its written pronouncement, and whether the probation officer could determine the defendant’s ability to pay for the court-ordered drug treatment and other programs); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164-66 (5th Cir. 2001) (addressing the defendant’s challenge to special conditions requiring him to avoid contact with minors, prohibiting him from engaging in any occupation or volunteer service that would expose him to minors, and instructing him to avoid places, establishments, and areas frequented by minors); United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 519 (1992) (evaluating a condition imposing an occupational restriction).

-12- APPEAL DISMISSED.

-13-