United States v. Coll y Cuchi

13 P.R. Fed. 78
District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided April 17, 1923·No. No. 3141·Published

Opinion

Odliw, District Judge

(orally), delivered the following opinion:

It seems to me proper before entering upon a discussion of this very unpleasant case that a few preliminary observations are in order. In the first place it must be observed that Felix Torres is not on trial. He is not a party to this proceeding in any way. He may be a man worthy of belief or he may be a man unworthy of belief, but that is by no means conclusive of this case. It seems clear to me that it is just as improper to tamper with a witness who may prove to be worthless as to tamper with a witness who may prove to be of unquestionable veracity. If Torres is a perjurer he, of course, deserves [80]*80punishment, but this punishment must come through lawful means. He is not to be entrapped.

Another observation that seems to be pertinent is that the action of the district attorney, Major Wells, in this matter, is not in question. He is responsible directly to the Attorney General of the Hnited States.

I have no fault to find with the law which was read to me so earnestly by Mr. Dexter, in his opening address in connection with the remarkable case [Sharon v. Hilt] in the state of California, many years ago, reported in 24 Fed. 126, in which Judge Sawyer held that although the party involved in that proceeding might be held guilty of contempt, the conditions surrounding the case were not such as to impress him with the necessity or wisdom of proceeding by indictment. The law as laid down by Judge Sawyer in that decision is in exact harmony with the procedure which has been had in the case now before this court for decision. It was in the powers of the authorities representing the government of the Hnited States to direct a procedure either by indictment or by contempt.

When the report of the grand jury reached me, in the absence of Governor Reily from this Island, and it appeared to me that he might be involved in these proceedings, I thought it advisable, and I still believe that I acted correctly, in withholding that report from the public, and in turning it over to the district attorney, who saw fit to submit the same to Washington, and he acted under instructions from Washington, as it was his duty to do, in instigating this present proceeding for contempt of court. Therefore, the plea made by Mr. Dexter, it seems to me, has really no force because not only in instances of this kind has the Hnited States the option, but it must also [81]*81be observed tbat tbe statute creating a criminal offense is somewhat narrower than the rules which control courts in matters of contempt, in order to protect their own powers. In other words, as Judge Grubb points out very clearly in the important case [United States v. Huff] which I have already cited in 206 Fed. page 100, there may be acts of misbehavior obstructive to the proper administration of justice not committed in the actual presence of the court, but so near the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration of justice, and this phrase applies to all acts of misbehavior whoso natural tendency and effect is to interfere with the administration of justice, wherever these acts may be committed. In other words, and referring again particularly to the language of this same judge, on page Ill, where he says that courts comprise not only judges and the jurors, but also comprise witnesses, clerks, examiners and marshals. They are, in a sense, present, whenever any of their officers are engaged in the performance of their functions, and whether the court is in formal session for the trial of cases or not. Any attempt whatever made to induce a witness .to refuse to testify or to testify falsely, or a juror to depart from his duty, or a judge to decide unlawfully, is likewise an obstruction to the administration of justice. In other words, there can be a contempt of court without any threat of a witness, there may be a contempt of court by misrepresenting things to a witness, by misleading him, by causing his mind to dwell upon matters nonexistent, or to impress upon him conditions which are untrue, in the hope that he may be influenced thereby, and such an act, while it may not fall within § 268 of the Judicial Code, in forming the basis of an indictment, it would, unquestionably, in my [82]*82mind, be a contempt of court. I think that a careful reading of the decision of Judge Grubb in 206 Fed. and the opinion of Judge Walter Smith in [Merchants’ Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade] 120 C. C. A. 582, 201 Fed. 20, state that principle beyond any question.

Then the matter of argument that Felix Torres should be entirely discredited because of the giving of immunity to him by the district attorney. That is a matter wholly within the discretion of the district attorney. Tie may have acted wisely or he might have acted unwisely in granting that immunity to Felix Torres, but that he had a right to do so, exercising his own judgment, believing that the interests of the United States would be subserved thereby instead of being injured thereby, is a matter this court cannot question. It rests wholly with him and with his responsibility to the officer who is his direct superior. There has been nothing in this case, so far as I have been able to observe, to show that such discretion was used unwisely. That question cannot be determined until Felix Torres comes before this court 'as a witness in the main case. But as I remarked during the trial, I would not convict any man of contempt of court on the testimony of Felix Torres alone, as I remarked before, the conditions with which he was surrounded, the fact that he himself had been indicted, the fact that although that indictment had not been actually dismissed he had been used as a witness before the grand jury and had been promised immunity, might have had such an influence upon him as to make his testimony, if by itself, insufficient upon which to base a judgment of conviction against other parties.

Then I wish to make a few remarks about the witness Juan [83]*83Quiñones, for twenty-four years a valuable officer of the Insular police. There may be great force in Judge Sweet’s argument that the chief of police was under no obligation to pay any attention to what Juan Quiñones told him, and that it being a quasi military force, suggestions on the part of Juan Quiñones were out of order until called for. Judge Sweet may be correct. I do not pose as a military expert, but I do say this, that if I had been chief of police under the circumstances surrounding Colonel Bennett at the time these detectives were Called for by Dr. Victor Coll y Cuchi, and if Juan Quiñones had given me a tip or a wink to go carefully, I would have thanked him for it, and I wish publicly to express my thanks to Juan Quiñones for his efforts to have this thing stopped, which efforts, if they had been successful, would have prevented this disagreeable case ever coming before this court. If I were a member of the legislature of Porto Bico, I would introduce a bill this afternoon, to increase the salary of Juan Quiñones, but inasmuch as I do not" possess that authority, I desire publicly to express my thanks to Juan Quiñones for his efforts to stop this case, which he endeavored to do. I think Juan Quiñones showed more sense, more careful consideration for this court than all the others who have been connected with this case.

Then I wish to dwell upon another matter, most unpleasant, before I reach the decision as to the individual defendants in this proceeding.

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United States v. Coll y Cuchi, 13 P.R. Fed. 78 (prd 1923).

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