UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Case No. 1:25-mj-276
BRIAN J. COLE, JR.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Brian J. Cole, Jr. stands charged with two criminal offenses under federal law.
Both charges stem from an accusation that Mr. Cole built, transported, and tried to detonate two
improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”)—so-called “pipe bombs”—near the headquarters of the
Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and the Republican National Committee (“RNC”), in
the heart of Washington, D.C., on the evening of January 5, 2021.
The case is before the Court on the government’s motion for pretrial detention. On the
specific circumstances presented here, the Court’s analysis begins with a rebuttable presumption
that Mr. Cole’s preventive detention is required under the governing statute. Even assuming Mr.
Cole successfully rebuts that starting presumption, the Court concludes that the government carried
its ultimate burden to demonstrate that there are no conditions of release the Court could impose
to reasonably assure the safety of the community. So the Court GRANTS the government’s motion
and orders that Mr. Cole shall remain detained while this case proceeds.
BACKGROUND
The underlying circumstances here are widely known, at least in broad strokes. On January
6, 2021, law enforcement discovered two IEDs near the DNC and RNC headquarters in
Washington, D.C., both in close proximity to the U.S. Capitol. January 6, 2021, of course, was the date Congress convened to certify the results of the 2020 election, and U.S. lawmakers were
assembled nearby to carry out that constitutional duty. Neither device detonated, and the U.S.
Capitol Police were able to carry out a “render safe procedure” on the IEDs without incident. But
all the same, the surrounding events triggered serious alarm, particularly given the timing and
broader context within which they occurred. And so, the government commenced what would
become a lengthy investigation to identify and hold accountable the suspected perpetrator(s).
Fast forward nearly five years. On December 3, 2025, law enforcement criminally charged
Mr. Cole with planting the IEDs. Specifically, the criminal complaint against him encompasses
two offenses: (1) transportation of an explosive device in interstate commerce with the intent to
kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle,
or other real or personal property, under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d); and (2) malicious destruction or
attempted malicious destruction by means of fire and explosive materials, under 18 U.S.C. §
844(i). (See ECF No. 1, Compl.) According to the government’s proffer in support of detention,
its investigation pointed to Mr. Cole for at least the following reasons:
• The government assessed that the IEDs were placed at approximately 7:54 and 8:16 PM at the DNC and RNC headquarters, respectively. The government’s analysis of Mr. Cole’s cellphone records showed that his phone interacted with five different cell towers in the vicinity of those two locations during that same window on January 5, 2021. (ECF No. 17 at 4–7.)
• A license plate reader recorded Mr. Cole’s vehicle and tag in the area around 7:10 PM that evening, exiting I-395 South at South Capitol Street. (Id. at 2.)
• The government reviewed Mr. Cole’s financial records, including credit card and bank account statements, which showed that he purchased nearly all the distinct components used to construct the two IEDs from retail locations in Northern Virginia on various dates throughout 2019 and 2020. The government’s detention memorandum catalogues in detail these component parts and their purchase dates in chart format. (See id. at 10.) 1
1 As discussed later, the government’s proffer also indicates that Mr. Cole purchased more of these same component parts for many months after the events in question, up to and including in August 2022.
2 On December 4, 2025, law enforcement arrested Mr. Cole at his home in Woodbridge,
Virginia. In conjunction with the arrest, law enforcement executed various search warrants,
including on Mr. Cole’s residence and his vehicle. Inside the residence, in a closet that was
accessible only through Mr. Cole’s bedroom, law enforcement recovered several of the same parts
that had been used in the explosive devices recovered outside the DNC and RNC headquarters in
January 2021, including metal pipes, iron and galvanized end caps, wire, and more. And inside
Mr. Cole’s vehicle, law enforcement recovered more of these same parts, including metal pipes,
iron and galvanized end caps, and a nine-volt (9v) battery. Law enforcement also seized a cellular
device from Mr. Cole’s person during the arrest; the government’s forensic review of the device
revealed that it was “wiped”—i.e., subject to a “factory reset”—943 times between December
2020 and December 2025, occurring at least weekly since July 2022.
Following his arrest, Mr. Cole was transported to the FBI’s Washington Field Office,
where he reportedly executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed
by law enforcement. According to the government’s characterization of the video-recorded
interview—a characterization the defense did not contest as part of the detention proceedings,
whether in its written submissions or during the detention hearing—the following transpired.
Mr. Cole initially denied any involvement with the underlying offenses. He acknowledged
that he drove into D.C. on the evening of January 5, 2021, but claimed he was simply attending a
protest “in support of [then-President] Trump” about the outcome of the 2020 election. Reportedly,
after several hours, though, Mr. Cole admitted he was the suspect depicted in the surveillance
videos. At that point, the government represents, the interviewing agents advised Mr. Cole that
they could continue the interview or stop it. Mr. Cole asked for time to process things, and the
3 agents stepped out for about twenty minutes. When they returned, Mr. Cole reportedly agreed to
continue the interview and executed a written waiver to delay his presentment in court.
Mr. Cole, according to the government’s proffer, then walked the interviewing agents
through his construction, transportation, and placement of the explosive devices on the evening of
January 5, 2021. He described how he manufactured the devices, including the black powder
inside. He told the agents he assembled the devices in the hours before he drove them into
Washington, D.C. from Virginia that same evening. Mr. Cole explained that after parking his
vehicle near the relevant area on Capitol Hill, he put one of the devices in his backpack and walked
toward the DNC headquarters, where he set the timer to its maximum duration (60 minutes) and
placed it under a public bench near the building. At that point, Mr. Cole stated that he returned to
his car, placed the second device in his backpack, and walked to the RNC headquarters where he
likewise set that timer for 60 minutes and left the device next to a trash bin outside the building.
(Mr. Cole explained he had used Google Maps to look up these locations in advance.) Afterward,
Mr. Cole returned to his vehicle, left the city, picked up food at a restaurant, and went home.
Mr. Cole explained to the interviewing agents—again, at least according to the
government’s characterization of the post-arrest interview—that he was not really thinking about
how people would react when the bombs detonated, but he hoped there would be news about it.
He said that when he learned the devices did not detonate, he was “pretty relieved,” reportedly
stating that he planted the devices at night because he did not want to kill people. When the agents
asked about Mr. Cole’s motive, he said that “something just snapped” after “watching everything,
just everything getting worse.” He described wanting to do something “to the parties” because
“they were in charge,” and stated that “[he did not] like either party.” During the interview, Mr.
4 Cole apparently denied that his actions were directed at Congress or the election certification
proceedings scheduled to take place on January 6, 2021.
On December 5, 2025, Mr. Cole had his initial court appearance. During that hearing, the
government moved for his pretrial detention, and the presiding judge scheduled a hearing on the
matter for December 15—an agreed date between the parties. About a week later, the parties filed
a consent motion to continue the detention hearing by about two weeks to December 30, which
the court granted. (ECF Nos. 9, 11.) Both sides filed briefs in advance. (ECF Nos. 17, 23.) The
undersigned presided over the detention hearing and took the matter under advisement in lieu of
ruling from the bench. This written ruling now follows. 2
DISCUSSION
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, et seq., if a judicial officer finds
after conducting a hearing that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the
community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the [defendant] before trial.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). For purposes of that assessment, the Court’s default must generally tilt toward
release, as “detention prior to trial … is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2021). But
through the Bail Reform Act, Congress identified certain categories of offenses that trigger a
rebuttable presumption in favor of pretrial detention, not release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2), (e)(3).
Where such a presumption is implicated, it imposes a “burden of production on the defendant to
2 On December 29, 2025—the afternoon before the detention hearing—the government asked the Court to accept an indictment against Mr. Cole that had been returned by a D.C. Superior Court grand jury earlier that day. The indictment charges Mr. Cole with the same two counts as the complaint (18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d) and 844(i)). For reasons explained on the record and in a separate order (Min. Order, Dec. 30, 2025), the Court deferred a decision on whether to accept that indictment and requested briefing on the issue.
5 offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory presumption[.]” United States v. Boykins,
316 F. Supp. 3d 434, 436 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Taylor, 289 F.
Supp. 3d 55, 63 (D.D.C. 2018)). “While the burden of production may not be heavy,” United States
v. Lee, 195 F. Supp. 3d 120, 125 (D.D.C. 2016), it requires that the defendant proffer “some
credible evidence contrary to the statutory presumption,” United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364,
371 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “If the defendant meets his burden of production, the presumption does not
disappear entirely but remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court.”
United States v. Thomas, 456 F. Supp. 3d 69, 71 (D.D.C. 2020); United States v. Gamble, 810 F.
App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he statutory presumption does not disappear like a ‘bursting
bubble’ once a defendant offers some evidence that he is not a danger to the community[.]”). In
any case, the presumption “does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains with the
government.” Boykins, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (emphasis added). This means the government
retains the ultimate burden to establish some basis for pretrial detention, either by demonstrating
that the defendant poses an unmitigable risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence, United
States v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2019), or an unmitigable risk of danger to
the community by clear and convincing evidence, Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1279.
Applying these principles here, the Court concludes that this case implicates a rebuttable
presumption of detention. And even assuming Mr. Cole rebutted that presumption, the government
has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions of release that can
reasonably assure the safety of the community. 3
3 During the hearing, the government confirmed that it does not presently seek Mr. Cole’s detention under a risk-of-flight theory, so the Court’s discussion focuses on a dangerousness analysis.
6 I. Rebuttable Presumption of Detention
The Bail Reform Act triggers a rebuttable presumption “that no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety of the community if ... there is probable cause to
believe that the person committed” one of a list of crimes enumerated by statute, including a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B). On
this basis, the government says a rebuttable presumption of detention applies here. The defense
says otherwise, insisting the government has not established probable cause to believe that Mr.
Cole committed an offense under Section 844(i). The Court agrees with the government.
As an initial matter, the defense argued in its brief that the only way the government can
show probable cause for these purposes is through an indictment returned by the grand jury. (See
ECF No. 23 at 6 (“Where there is no indictment, like here, no pretrial detention hearing can begin
with such a presumption.”).) That is wrong. The two cases cited by the defense did not hold that a
grand jury indictment was the only path to a finding of probable cause in this context. Instead, they
considered and rejected a theory that some “independent finding of probable cause,” above and
beyond a grand jury indictment, was necessary. United States v. Williams, 903 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985)
(similar). In other words, the defense’s cases stand for the proposition that a grand jury indictment
is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish probable cause for purposes of triggering a rebuttable
presumption of detention under Section 3142(e). And longstanding caselaw in this District is
consistent with that understanding. Apart from an indictment, “the facts found by the judicial
officer at the detention hearing [can] determine whether the statutory presumption is implicated[.]”
United States v. Bess, 678 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1988); see also, e.g., United States v. Johnston,
2017 WL 4326390, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017) (reasoning that “the government’s proffer”
7 in the detention-hearing proceedings “provide[d] the requisite probable cause” to trigger the
“rebuttable presumption of detention,” despite the absence of an indictment). 4 During the hearing
in this case, defense counsel retreated from this sweeping theory, pivoting to argue that an
indictment is the preferred method for showing probable cause, even if not required.
In any case, the facts proffered to the Court in connection with the detention hearing,
including the government’s description of Mr. Cole’s own reported statements to law enforcement
during his post-arrest interview, provide an ample basis to conclude, at least for present purposes,
that there is probable cause to believe Mr. Cole violated 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)—i.e., that he
maliciously attempted to damage or destroy, by means of fire and explosive materials, real or
personal property affecting interstate commerce (namely, the DNC and RNC headquarters). So the
Court concludes that a rebuttable presumption of detention applies. 5
From there, the defense points to several considerations that it says should serve to rebut
any presumption. Mr. Cole has no criminal history, for instance, and he is a high-school graduate
who has held steady employment in the area since his teenage years. More, Mr. Cole has
considerable family and community support. The Court assumes these points meet the modest
burden of production to rebut the statutory presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 240 F.
Supp. 3d 128, 133 (D.D.C. 2017) (assuming same based on somewhat similar facts).
4 In fact, there is at least some authority in this District for the proposition that a judge can find probable cause that a defendant committed a presumption-triggering offense that is uncharged altogether, whether by complaint or indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 206 F. Supp. 3d 106, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2016). The Court need not go that far here because the government has at least charged Mr. Cole by complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). But the Court raises the point to further demonstrate the fallacy of an indictment-only theory as applied to the Bail Reform Act’s rebuttable-presumption framework. 5 Finally, the Court is mindful that a Superior Court grand jury did return an indictment on the 844(i) charge against Mr. Cole. The Court has not yet accepted that indictment for reasons explained elsewhere, so it does not rely on the indictment for present purposes. But even still, the Court notes that the indictment is consistent with the Court’s independent probable cause determination at this juncture.
8 But as noted, that does not mean the presumption disappears entirely. Instead, it remains
“a factor to be considered among those weighed” in the normal course under Section 3142(g).
United States v. Klein, 539 F. Supp. 3d 145, 152 (D.D.C. 2021). This is so because the presumption
is “not simply an evidentiary tool designed for the courts” but serves as a reflection of “Congress’s
substantive judgment that particular classes of offenders should ordinarily be detained prior to
trial[.]” United States v. Lee, 195 F. Supp. 3d 120, 125 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting United States v.
Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945–46 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also United States v. Ali, 793 F. Supp. 2d 386,
391 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that, even when rebutted, the “presumption is incorporated into the
other factors considered by this Court in determining whether to grant a conditional release and is
given substantial weight”); United States v. Cherry, 221 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2016) (same).
The Court therefore proceeds to analyze the relevant factors set forth in Section 3142(g) to
determine whether pretrial detention is warranted here.
II. Section 3142(g) Factors
In evaluating “whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure … the
safety of any other person and the community,” the Court must consider: (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense[s] charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence against the person”; (3)
“the history and characteristics of the person”; and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses
Start with the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses. As the government fairly
describes this case, Mr. Cole “is charged with transporting two explosive devices into Washington,
D.C. and planting them at the headquarters of the two major political parties of the United States.”
(ECF No. 17 at 18.) The charged offenses are undeniably serious as a general matter. To simply
9 describe them is to demonstrate as much. More, the U.S. Code prescribes significant penalties for
these specific criminal offenses. If convicted, Mr. Cole faces up to ten years of imprisonment on
the first charge under Section 844(d) and up to twenty years of imprisonment on the second charge
under Section 844(i), with a five-year mandatory minimum. 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d), 844(i). These
lengthy periods of potential imprisonment reflect Congress’s views about the seriousness of the
charges. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d 154, 167 (D.D.C. 2021) (“These
substantial terms of imprisonment reflect Congress’ appreciation for the severity of these
offenses.”); United States v. Wills, 311 F. Supp. 3d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that a five-
year mandatory minimum “reflect[ed] Congress’ judgment as to the seriousness of the offense”).
Further, the statute specifically directs the Court to consider “whether the offense … involves a …
firearm, explosive, or destructive device,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1), as is true here.
Further, the specific circumstances by which the offenses are alleged to have been carried
out—including the timing and broader context—further amplify their severity. After all, Mr. Cole
is charged with placing the two IEDs in the immediate vicinity of the U.S. Capitol the night before
U.S. lawmakers were set to gather to certify the results of the 2020 election. Although Mr. Cole,
during his post-arrest interview, apparently disclaimed any intent to interfere with that process, the
resulting fear and alarm followed all the same—and how could it not? Even still, the defense strives
to minimize the offenses because the IEDs never detonated, such that nobody was injured and no
property was damaged. The Court finds that point decidedly unpersuasive. As the government
appropriately observes (see ECF No. 17 at 20), “it was luck, not lack of effort,” that caused the
devices not to detonate. See also Klein, 539 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (rejecting similar claim that the
defendant’s actions did not precipitate “specific acts of violence or the death or injury of any
person,” as “more a product of fortune than fate”). After all, Mr. Cole reportedly stated that he
10 planted the devices—one of them underneath a public bench, no less—hoping they would detonate
and that there would be news about it. Mercifully, that did not happen. But if the plan had
succeeded, the results could have been devasting: creating a greater sense of terror on the eve of a
high-security Congressional proceeding, causing serious property damage in the heart of
Washington, D.C., grievously injuring DNC or RNC staff and other innocent bystanders, or worse.
Simply put, the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses here are gravely serious,
so this factor points strongly toward pretrial detention.
B. Weight of the Evidence
Next up, the weight of the evidence. This factor puts the Court in the somewhat awkward
position of assessing the evidence before trial, but the statute requires its consideration. For all the
reasons laid out in the government’s detention memorandum, the weight of the evidence against
Mr. Cole is significant. Among other things, the government’s proffer places Mr. Cole’s vehicle
in the general vicinity of the DNC and RNC headquarters during the timeframe at issue, shows
that Mr. Cole’s cell phone interacted with five different cell towers in the relevant locations during
the key timeframe, and catalogues in detail how Mr. Cole’s credit card and financial records reflect
his purchase of many distinctive component parts found in those explosive devices. And that is all
before the Court even gets to the statements Mr. Cole made to law enforcement during his post-
arrest interview with the FBI—reportedly admitting that he was responsible for the explosive
devices, describing how he built and transported them, and more. All in all, the government’s
proffered evidence is compelling, so this factor likewise points toward detention.
In response, the defense principally argues that the government is approaching this factor
through the wrong lens: that courts should not assess the weight of the evidence “in terms of the
defendant’s guilt,” but rather only as to “the defendant’s dangerousness.” (ECF No. 23 at 9.) In
11 support, the defense cites United States v. Hunt, 240 F. Supp. 3d 128. But Hunt did not endorse
that view. Instead, Hunt evaluated the weight of the evidence against the defendant on the
underlying charges (i.e., evidence of guilt), before observing that “[c]ourts in other circuits
consider only the weight of the evidence of the defendant’s dangerousness,” and finding even that
alternative perspective tilted in favor of detention on the facts there. Id. at 134. Courts in this
District recognize that the weight-of-the-evidence factor necessarily encompasses consideration
of the defendant’s guilt for the charged offense(s). United States v. Taylor, 289 F. Supp. 3d 55, 66
(D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Ausby, 2019 WL 2452988, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. June 11, 2019). The
defense’s narrower view is misplaced.
C. Individual History and Characteristics
Turn then to Mr. Cole’s history and characteristics. This factor requires the Court to assess,
among other considerations, “the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A). The defense rightly highlights
several points that tilt in Mr. Cole’s favor here. For one thing, Mr. Cole has no prior criminal
history, let alone any history of failing to comply with court orders or conditions of probation or
supervised release. He has longstanding ties to the community and a network of family support.
Mr. Cole graduated high school and has remained steadily employed in his family’s business for
many years. Finally, the defense reports that Mr. Cole is diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder
and obsessive-compulsive disorder. These facts, the Court agrees, typically point against the need
for pretrial detention and instead suggest that conditions of release could reasonably mitigate any
prospective risk of danger that Mr. Cole might pose.
12 The government acknowledges, at least implicitly, that this factor—at least more than the
others—favors Mr. Cole. But it urges the Court to pay close attention to Mr. Cole’s conduct after
the date of the underlying offense. Specifically, the government highlights that Mr. Cole reportedly
continued to purchase some of the same component parts used in the IEDs across more than a
dozen different transactions during 2021 and up through August 2022. (See ECF No. 17 at 11.)
Relatedly, the government points to Mr. Cole’s reported statement that he again created—or at
least attempted to create—a black powder substance, albeit ostensibly for a science experiment.
Further, the government stresses that Mr. Cole reportedly wiped his phone “nearly one thousand
times” during the “years-long national investigation into his actions,” which the government paints
as an effort to obfuscate his actions and evade responsibility. These points, certainly taken together,
do cut against the other facets of Mr. Cole’s history and characteristics highlighted by the defense
and summarized above. In the Court’s view, however, they are more appropriately considered in
connection with the fourth factor under Section 3142(g), which the Court discusses next. As to this
third factor, though, the Court believes that it points on balance more toward release than detention.
D. Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Release
That leaves the final factor: “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by [Mr. Cole’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4).
Start with the law. The D.C. Circuit has made clear that “to order a defendant preventatively
detained, a court must identify an articulable threat posed by the defendant to an individual or the
community.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283; see also id. at 1285 (Katsas, J., concurring) (describing
the analysis as a “forward-looking assessment”). In other words, the inquiry is fundamentally a
prospective one—focused on the risk of future danger—though a defendant’s prior conduct can
13 inform that prospective assessment. See id. at 1283 (“Whether the defendant poses a threat of
dealing drugs, for instance, may depend on the defendant’s past experience dealing[.]”).
In terms of Mr. Cole’s past conduct, his alleged construction and placement of explosive
devices intended to detonate outside the DNC and RNC headquarters, on the eve of the January 6
electoral college certification at the nearby U.S. Capitol, demonstrates a startling and significant
capacity for dangerousness. In this way, the government’s focus on the conduct giving rise to the
charges is important to the Court’s assessment. But the Court cannot make a dangerousness
determination based on past conduct alone—it simply informs the Court’s prospective view.
In looking ahead, the defense urges the Court to focus on the fact that the underlying
offense conduct here occurred nearly five years ago (almost to the day), without any claim or
proffered evidence from the government that Mr. Cole engaged in any similar conduct—or
seemingly any dangerous or violent conduct at all—over the past several years. The Court finds
that argument reasonably persuasive, at least as far as it goes. And if there were truly no proffered
evidence about comparable or otherwise dangerous conduct across the past five years, the Court
might consider this a more suitable case for release on strict conditions.
But there is more. Because as the government’s proffer shows, after January 5, 2021, Mr.
Cole reportedly purchased many of the same parts used in the explosive devices—including metal
pipes, end caps, wire, steel wool, a timer, and more. (ECF No. 17 at 11 (chart).) These purchases
spanned at least a dozen different transactions between January 21, 2021, and August 13, 2022.
This evidence undercuts the suggestion that Mr. Cole’s alleged conduct was some anomalous event
that occurred only once many years ago. Instead, for at least the better part of two years afterward,
Mr. Cole reportedly engaged in the same activity leading up to the offense conduct, amassing the
same sorts of parts he used to construct the two explosive devices giving rise to these charges.
14 More, and relatedly, Mr. Cole apparently told the FBI that at some point after January 5, 2021, he
again created (or attempted to create) another batch of powder, although he claimed it was
unrelated to bombmaking. This ongoing alleged activity—which is at least consistent with
continued “bombmaking” activity, as described by the government—tempers the notion that the
five-year span between the underlying offense conduct and today mitigates any future risk.
Even still, the Court considered that Mr. Cole’s additional purchases of component parts is
only shown to have taken place through August 2022, ending nearly two and a half years ago now.
That itself is a material passage of time. So again, if there were no evidence about other concerning
conduct between August 2022 and today, the Court might take a different view.
But there is still more. Because when law enforcement arrested Mr. Cole in early December
2025 and executed search warrants, the government recovered many of the same component parts
just described in his possession, some in Mr. Cole’s residence and others in his vehicle. Although
several were found alongside receipts dating back years (seemingly to some of the earlier 2021
and 2022 purchases listed in the government’s brief), the fact remains that Mr. Cole was still in
possession of those materials as recently as last month. And importantly, these items were not in
some offsite storage unit or distant stash house. They were recovered in a closet in Mr. Cole’s
home and inside his car—two locations essentially within arm’s reach of Mr. Cole’s daily routine.
His ongoing retention of and access to the same components used to construct the explosive
devices recovered outside the DNC and RNC headquarters in January 2021 raise substantial red
flags in the Court’s mind about a prospective risk to public and community safety.
Both points just discussed—Mr. Cole’s continuing purchases of parts to construct the
explosive devices, and his continuing possession of parts as recently as last month—are especially
troubling to the Court considering that he reportedly told law enforcement that he was “relieved”
15 that the devices did not detonate on January 5, 2021. If true, then that fortunate outcome should
have been a stark wake-up call for Mr. Cole. But based on the information presented to the Court,
it was not. To the contrary, that very same month—in late January 2021—Mr. Cole reportedly
purchased more of the same kinds of parts he allegedly used to construct the explosive devices
recovered outside the DNC and RNC buildings, including a metal pipe, steel wool, alligator clips,
and a timer. And he seemingly remained in possession of those types of items throughout the last
five years, until as recently as last month, including in his home and in his car.
Of course, the Court evaluates those concerns alongside conditions of release it could
fashion to mitigate them. And the defense, to its credit, is not simply asking the Court to release
Mr. Cole on his personal recognizance. The defense is proposing that Mr. Cole be released
pursuant to a set of strict conditions, including home detention, GPS monitoring, the appointment
of a third-party custodian, and more. But the Court can—and should—appropriately consider
“whether it believes the defendant will actually abide by its conditions.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at
1280–81. And based on the record before it, the Court has concrete concerns on that front.
For one thing, as the government characterizes Mr. Cole’s post-arrest interview, he
reportedly told the FBI that he carried out the underlying offenses here because “something just
snapped.” (ECF No. 17 at 16.) The sudden and abrupt motivation behind Mr. Cole’s alleged actions
presents concerns about how quickly the same abrupt and impulsive conduct might recur. More,
Mr. Cole reportedly told the FBI that he assembled the IEDs “in the hours before he drove to
Washington, D.C. on January 5, 2021” (id. at 15), suggesting he can prepare dangerous explosive
devices in short order, over a matter of hours, not necessarily days or weeks. Given the
precipitousness with which Mr. Cole reportedly acted, and the speed with which he was able to
construct the so-called “pipe bombs,” the Court lacks confidence that even the most rigorous set
16 of release conditions can reasonably guard against the risk of future danger. More, the Court shares
the government’s concerns about Mr. Cole’s efforts to hide and obfuscate his activities—efforts
that would hamper the ability of even the most well-intentioned custodian to effectively monitor
him. For instance, beginning in 2022, Mr. Cole reportedly carried out repeated “wipes” or “factory
resets” of his cellular device, occurring at least once per week and sometimes multiple times per
day. The defense has proffered that Mr. Cole suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder, and the
Court recognizes that this behavior could stem from symptoms related to that condition. But Mr.
Cole’s alleged behavior is at least equally suggestive of efforts to conceal and destroy information
about his personal communications and online activity. That is troubling and portends real
challenges in monitoring his conduct in a home-detention setting.
Although home incarceration and a GPS monitor would provide some check against Mr.
Cole’s ability to carry out any menacing or dangerous conduct in the community, the Court is
simply not satisfied these conditions rise to the necessary level for the reasons explained. This is
particularly true based on the severity of the potential danger Mr. Cole is alleged to pose, given
his alleged persistent acquisition and retention of so-called “bombmaking parts,” and given his
reported penchant and capacity to create explosive devices and deploy them in public settings.
On this last point, the defense argues, in reliance on Munchel, that “[t]he circumstances
giving rise to the charged offense in this case are incredibly unlikely to manifest themselves again.”
(ECF No. 23 at 14.) Presumably this refers to the fact that Mr. Cole is charged with planting the
explosive devices amid Congress’s electoral certification on January 6. The Court agrees it must
“consider[] the specific circumstances that made [the offense conduct] possible,” Munchel, 991
F.3d at 1284, but it disagrees that this factor helps Mr. Cole here. To start, Munchel made this point
in connection with the “unique opportunity” afforded those defendants “to obstruct democracy on
17 January 6,” largely because the presence of the large crowd gathered at the Capitol “was critical
to their ability to obstruct the vote and cause danger to the community.” Id. (emphasizing that
those defendants “did not vandalize any property or commit violence”). Based on the charges here,
Mr. Cole is very differently situated. His alleged actions were not facilitated by the presence of a
large crowd gathered for some distinct purpose, as in Munchel. Instead, Mr. Cole is accused of
acting alone on the streets of Washington, D.C., choosing targets accessible to the general public
at any time, day or night. (Plus, Mr. Cole reportedly disclaimed to law enforcement that his actions
were directed at Congress or related to the Congressional proceedings on January 6). Unlike
Munchel, then, the Court sees no basis to conclude that the underlying circumstances here were
materially “unique” for purposes of its prospective dangerousness analysis.
* * *
Finally, the Court ends this analysis where it began: returning to the presumption of
detention that applies here. Because even assuming Mr. Cole came forward with sufficient
evidence to rebut that presumption, Congress’s substantive judgment in favor of preventive
detention in this case remains a factor in the Court’s analysis, and one that should receive
“substantial weight.” Ali, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 391. That factor, along with the other considerations
discussed above, leads to a conclusion that there are no conditions of release the Court can fashion
to reasonably assure the safety of others and the community in this case.
18 CONCLUSION
The Court is keenly aware that pretrial detention must be “the carefully limited exception,”
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, due in no small part to the fact that Mr. Cole, like all defendants, is
entitled to a presumption of innocence at this juncture. And the Court understands its “grave
constitutional obligation to ensure that the facts and circumstances of each case warrant this
exceptional treatment.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1285. But based on the Court’s careful consideration
of the relevant factors that govern its determination, this case fits that bill.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion for pretrial detention and
orders that Mr. Cole shall remain detained pending trial.
Dated: January 2, 2026 MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge