United States v. Cole

25 F. Cas. 493, 5 McLean 513
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Ohio
DecidedOctober 15, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 25 F. Cas. 493 (United States v. Cole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cole, 25 F. Cas. 493, 5 McLean 513 (circtdoh 1853).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT. Before the-jury were called, a motion was made by the defendants' counsel to quash the iu-dictment. The main ground upon which the motion to quash was urged was. that the act under which the indictment was found, applied, exclusively to offenses committed on the high seas, and not on our rivers and lakes. It was also urged that the act was unconstitutional, if it was intended to apply to our internal commerce. These points were argued elaborately, on both sides, and. with ability.

In deciding the motion, McLEAN, Circuit Justice, said, that the court would proceed to give its impression upon the ease, which had been so ably argued. The law under which the prosecution was commenced, is embodied in the 22d section of the act of the 3d of March. 1823. It provides, "that if any person or persons shall, on the high seas, or within the United States, willfully and corruptly conspire, combine and confederate, with any other person or persons, such other person or persons being either within or without the United States, to cast away, bum, or otherwise destroy, any ship or vessel, or procure the same to be done, with intent to injure any person or body politic, that hath underwritten, or shall thereafterwards underwrite, any policy of [494]*494insurance thereon, or on goods on board thereof, or with intent to injure any person or body politic, that hath lent or advanced, or thereafter shall lend or advance any money on such vessel, on bottomry or respon-dentia,-’ &c.

'Che first position of the counsel who concluded the argument on the motion was, that the act was unconstitutional and void. He contends that the object of the law was, to protect insurance companies, and that congress has no power to pass such an act.

This act does not purport to be for the protection and regulation of insurance offices. It is clear that congress can exercise no power over contracts of insurance. It has been decided that when a policy of insurance was on a ship on a sea voyage, as the policy operated upon the water, and not on the- land, that it was a marine contract. This is contrary to the English doctrine, as it requires the contract to be made on the water to give it the character of a marine .contract. The courts of common law. in England, have been strongly opposed to the admiralty jurisdiction. And the rule is well settled there, that it cannot be exercised within the body of a county. It can be exercised over no water where the tide does not ebb and flow. The supreme court of the United States have adopted a more reasonable doctrine, long established by the civil law, that a maritime jurisdiction may be exercised over navigable waters. Navigableness is the true test, and not the flowing of the tides. It is known that in England there are few if any rivers navigable higher than the flowing of the tide, and this is generally the case with the rivers in the Atlantic states. This, was, no doubt, the cause why the English rule was first followed by our courts in this country. There seemed to be no good reason why the same rule should not be applied in both countries, as the navigable waters of both were made navigable by the tide. It was a convenient term, at first used to describe the extent of navigable waters in England. We have adopted the fact rather than the definition of it. Wherever commercial crafts may float between two or more states, the maritime jurisdiction extends. But independently of this view; under the constitution, congress has the same power to regulate commerce among the several states, as with foreign nations. As regards the present case, no distinction need be stated, if any exist, between the regulation of our foreign and domestic commerce.

Is the scope of the act in question to protect policies of insurance? What is clearly the object of the law? The conspiracy charged is against a vessel and her cargo, upon a river under the protection of the commercial power of the Union. The protection of commerce is the object of this law; the protection of insurance policies is merely incidental. Congress might have punished the burning of the vessel, but it was not thought proper to do so; it has leveled its enactment at the incipient stages of the offense. The law in its object is preventive; by inflicting the penalty on the determination to commit the crime. It does not go behind the overt act to the motive, as the laws of omniscience; but it strikes at the first manifestation of the intent. Whether the conspiracy is formed on the high seas, or within the United States, is of no importance. The offense is so far consummated as to come within the act when the conspiracy is formed. It was wise to strike at the flrst step, as it gives time for reflection and repentance. The words of the section apply as forcibly to vessels on our rivers and lakes, as on the high seas. The mischief is as great in the one case as in the other. But the opportunities and motives to commit the offense against our internal commerce are much greater than against our foreign commerce. Under such circumstances can any court hesitate to consider the law according to the express language used, as punishing the offense, whether committed on our internal or foreign commerce. The invoices are alleged in the indictment to have been false, and if they were really so, it is argued there could be no conviction, as the conspiracy charged is to destroy the cargo.

Can the defendants claim an exemption from the penalty of the statute, by committing a double fraud? A fraud in having false bills of lading, and another fraud in conspiring to destroy the cargo. False invoices or bills of lading would establish the fraud charged. If a party is not liable under the act of congress when the shipment is fictitious, he would be protected from punishment by his own fraud. This is inadmissible in any code of morals, and especially is it against the law. We have not time to read the indictment through,, but our impression is, on hearing it read, that it is sufficient. The defendants can avail themselves of any fatal defect in the indictment at a future stage of the proceeding. The motion to quash the indictment is overruled.

The jurors being called, Messrs. Morton and Stanbery. on the part of the government, demanded the exercise of their peremptory challenge after the defendants had challenged.

Judge Walker had never heard of the violation of the rule that the government should challenge first, and then the defendants exercise their right, except in two instances.

THE COURT decided that the challenge should be exercised alternately.

Counsel for the government had no objection to the jury if the defendants had not. They waived the first challenge.

Judge Walker proposed to propound the following question to each of the jurors: “Have you. by conversation with others, or by the reading of newspapers, acquired such a bias as will prevent you returning an im[495]*495partial verdict according to the law and the •evidence?”

THE COITItT allowed the question to be put.

Mr. Yan Slyke answered that he had t'orni-•ed an opinion unfavorable to the defendants; and for that he was excused for cause. The other eleven replied in the negative!

Judge Walker challenged a juror peremptorily. Dr. Moeller was called to fill the vacancy. and begged to be excused because he had formed an acquaintance with Kissane, as physician to the jail. Further discussion took place between counsel. Juror was interrogated by THE COURT. He replied that his •sympathies had been somewhat excited for Kissane—had had conversations with him with respect to this ease on one or two oeca-sions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
25 F. Cas. 493, 5 McLean 513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cole-circtdoh-1853.