United States v. Cody

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2025
• Docket: 24-3847
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3847 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:22-cr-00195-DCN-1 v. MEMORANDUM* KEISHA MICHELLE CODY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Keisha Cody appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the

60-month sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for felony injury

to a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 13 and 1153. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Cody claims the district court procedurally erred by using the statutory

maximum, rather than the Guidelines range, as its starting point, and by

inadequately explaining its reasons for the substantial upward variance from the

Guidelines. Reviewing for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608

F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), we conclude there is none. As Cody concedes, the

court correctly calculated the Guidelines range. It then discussed the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, along with the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of Cody’s case, and concluded that the “egregious conduct and the

indifference to life of this little boy demands more than a guideline sentence.” This

record reflects that the court met its sentencing obligations. See United States v.

Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Cody also claims her sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court’s reasons for imposing a sentence twice as long as the high end of the

Guidelines range were illogical and unsupported, and the court relied on factors

that were already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. We conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). The court’s reasons for the sentence are supported by the record as a

whole, and the above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of

the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at

51; see also United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2013)

2 24-3847 (it is not impermissible “double counting” for a sentencing court to vary upwards

from the Guidelines range after concluding the Guidelines do not sufficiently

account for the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3847