United States v. Clotilda Calderon Rojas

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Clotilda Calderon Rojas

458 F.2d 1355, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9840

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 1, 1972

Docket71-2250

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 458 F.2d 1355 (United States v. Clotilda Calderon Rojas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Clotilda Calderon Rojas, 458 F.2d 1355, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9840 (9th Cir. 1972).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was tried and convicted in the district court, sitting without a jury, for misapplication of bank funds (18 U.S.C. § 656).

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient, in that it “did not exclude every hypothesis but guilt.” As this court held in Sablan v. Peo. of Guam, 434 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1970), “[T]he proper test is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except that of guilt, but rather, ‘whether the [trier of fact] could reasonably arrive at [its] conclusion’.” See United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1969). Although appellant’s testimony conflicted with that of prosecution witnesses, there was substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt. It was for the trial judge, as finder of fact, to assess the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. Rule 23, F.R.Crim.P.; Fernandez-Delgado v. United States, 368 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1966).

Nor did the trial court err in admitting into evidence testimony concerning a damaging admission made by appellant. The admission was made to a bank official, not a law enforcement officer, and the trial court specifically found, after hearing the parties, that the statement was voluntary.

Lastly, appellant argues that her admission was not corroborated. She is mistaken.

The judgment is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant was tried and convicted in the district court, sitting without a jury, for misapplication of bank funds (18 U.S.C. § 656).

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient, in that it “did not exclude every hypothesis but guilt.” As this court held in Sablan v. Peo. of Guam, 434 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1970), “[T]he proper test is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except that of guilt, but rather, ‘whether the [trier of fact] could reasonably arrive at [its] conclusion’.” See United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1969). Although appellant’s testimony conflicted with that of prosecution witnesses, there was substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt. It was for the trial judge, as finder of fact, to assess the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. Rule 23, F.R.Crim.P.; Fernandez-Delgado v. United States, 368 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1966).

Nor did the trial court err in admitting into evidence testimony concerning a damaging admission made by appellant. The admission was made to a bank official, not a law enforcement officer, and the trial court specifically found, after hearing the parties, that the statement was voluntary.

Lastly, appellant argues that her admission was not corroborated. She is mistaken.

The judgment is affirmed.

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458 F.2d 1355, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-clotilda-calderon-rojas-ca9-1972.

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