United States v. Cliserio Balmes-Cruz

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 15, 2018
Docket17-50027
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Cliserio Balmes-Cruz (United States v. Cliserio Balmes-Cruz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cliserio Balmes-Cruz, (9th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50027

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:16-cr-02283-LAB-1 v.

CLISERIO BALMES-CRUZ, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2018 Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,** District Judge.

Cliserio Balmes-Cruz (“Balmes-Cruz”) appeals his sentence for illegal

reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Balmes-Cruz pleaded

guilty under a “fast track” plea agreement. At sentencing, both Balmes-Cruz and

the Government recommended a four-level departure under the United States

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) and a sentence of four months in custody, or

time served. The district court denied the four-level fast track departure and

granted only a two-level departure, sentencing Balmes-Cruz to 12 months in

custody. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and

we affirm.

At sentencing, the district court stated that it was granting only a two-level

departure based in part on the court’s belief that Balmes-Cruz previously had been

“deported” 12 times and had a “prior immigration felony.” Balmes-Cruz argues

that the district court erroneously concluded that he had been deported 12 times,

when in fact he had been “voluntarily removed” 11 times and deported only once.

Balmes-Cruz also argues that the district court erroneously believed that he

previously had been convicted in 2007 of the same crime for which he was then

being sentenced, when in fact his 2007 felony conviction was for aiding and

abetting the transportation of an illegal alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and 18

U.S.C. § 2.

The district court explained that Balmes-Cruz was “entitled to something in

light of the fact that it has been eight years” since his deportation in 2008, but a

four-level proposed reduction was inappropriate in light of his “history of

deportations and a prior immigration felony.” The district court noted that

accepting the parties’ recommendation would result in a Guidelines range that was

2 17-50027 lower than the 15-month sentence that Balmes-Cruz received for his “last

immigration felony,” a result that the district court expressed would “incentivize[]

people to return to the United States.”

According to Balmes-Cruz, the district court relied on clearly erroneous

facts. Because he did not raise these objections before the district court at the time

of sentencing, we review the district court’s calculation of his sentence for plain

error. United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2015). The district

court did not plainly err.

Although Balmes-Cruz argues that voluntary removals are voluntary and

less expensive to the Government than deportation, in each prior case Balmes-Cruz

was found to be present in the United States illegally. At sentencing, the district

court incorrectly referenced Balmes-Cruz’s 12 prior “deportations,” rather than

his 11 prior voluntary removals and one prior deportation, but defense counsel and

the Government made the same mistake. This distinction is not material. The

district court expressed concern over Balmes-Cruz’s recidivist tendencies illegally

to return to the United States. This concern is not lessened by the fact that a

voluntary departure is less expensive to the Government than a deportation.

Further, Balmes-Cruz did have a prior immigration-related felony. Thus, the

district court did not base Balmes-Cruz’s sentence on clearly erroneous facts.

Balmes-Cruz also argues that the district court applied the wrong legal

3 17-50027 standard when it denied the parties’ joint recommendation for a four-level fast

track departure. As a general proposition, in analyzing challenges to a district

court’s upward or downward departures under the Guidelines, we do not evaluate

such departures for procedural correctness, but rather, as part of a sentence’s

substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Ellis, 641 F.3d 411, 421 (9th Cir.

2011). The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2009). We will

reverse a sentencing decision only if we have “a definite and firm conviction that

the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Ressam,

679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). We do not have such a conviction

in this case.1

AFFIRMED.

1 During oral argument and in post-argument correspondence, Balmes-Cruz contends that the district court manipulated the Guidelines calculation to achieve a particular Guidelines range. In United States v. Rosales-Gonzales, 801 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2015), which involved the same sentencing judge who sentenced Balmes- Cruz, we noted that although a “district court may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range, it may not manipulate the calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines in order to produce a Guidelines range that will allow it to impose the sentence it prefers.” Id. at 1181 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Balmes-Cruz did not raise this issue in his opening brief, we decline to consider it. See Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The usual rule is that arguments raised for the first time on appeal or omitted from the opening brief are deemed forfeited.”).

4 17-50027

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Related

United States v. Ellis
641 F.3d 411 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Ressam
679 F.3d 1069 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Crowe
563 F.3d 969 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
United States v. Guadalupe Rosales-Gonzales
801 F.3d 1177 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. James Lloyd
807 F.3d 1128 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Harrison Orr v. Plumb
884 F.3d 923 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)

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United States v. Cliserio Balmes-Cruz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cliserio-balmes-cruz-ca9-2018.