United States v. Cleveland
This text of 13 F. App'x 71 (United States v. Cleveland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Troy Cleveland appeals the district court’s dismissal of his first motion for relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.2000) as time barred under the limitations period imposed under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See § 2255 II6. However, Cleveland fails to demonstrate that he could not reasonably have moved for relief under § 2255 within that one-year period, and acknowledges that he was aware of the factual predicate for his claim well before his one year window for filing a § 2255 motion closed. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal because the district court properly dismissed Cleveland’s § 2255 motion as time barred under the AEDPA. See Weaver v. United States, 195 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir.1999); cf. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 284 (4th Cir.1999) (ruling that to the extent the Appellant’s motion “was more properly characterized as a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, th[at] motion was filed after the statute of limitations expired,” and therefore properly denied). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED.
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13 F. App'x 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cleveland-ca4-2001.