United States v. Clay

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 2, 2003
• Docket: 02-1362
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Clay No. 02-1362 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0352P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0352p.06 Patricia C. Uetz, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION _________________ _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Corey Clay was arrested as part of a drug investigation in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiff-Appellee, - He was charged in a two-count indictment with possession of - - No. 02-1362 a controlled substance and for being a felon in possession of v. - a firearm. During his trial, Clay twice moved to dismiss the > charges pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal , Procedure. These motions were denied. COREY CLAY, - Defendant-Appellant. - After Clay was convicted by a jury on both counts, the N district court sentenced him to 63 months of imprisonment Appeal from the United States District Court and two years of supervised release. Clay contends on appeal for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor. that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt, No. 01-90014—Marianne O. Battani, District Judge. (2) the district court erred in apprising the jury pool of his prior drug conviction, and (3) he should not have received a Argued: September 12, 2003 sentencing enhancement. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Decided and Filed: October 2, 2003 I. BACKGROUND Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges. On March 3, 2001, three police officers were investigating the possibility of drug dealing at an uninhabited apartment in _________________ Detroit, Michigan. They walked up to the open front door, where they observed suspicious activity inside. The officers COUNSEL noticed two individuals in the apartment. One of the individuals, later identified as Clay, ran toward the back of ARGUED: Natasha D. Thompson, FEDERAL PUBLIC the apartment and tossed a plastic bag on the floor. DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Patricia C. Uetz, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES While one officer apprehended Clay, another officer ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. retrieved the bag, which contained an off-white lumpy ON BRIEF: Rita Chastang, FEDERAL PUBLIC material that one of the officers later identified as crack DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. cocaine. The third officer searched Clay and found a firearm

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and $575 on his person. A laboratory report showed that the which the court again denied. A guilty verdict was returned material weighed 1.1 grams and contained cocaine. on both counts. Clay was indicted on one count of possession of “a The United States Probation Office calculated the controlled substance, to wit: approximately 1.6 grams of a Sentencing Guidelines range to be 63 to 78 months. This mixture of substance containing crack cocaine, also known as included a four-level increase in the base offense level cocaine base,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and on one because Clay “possessed the firearm in connection with count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation another felony offense, namely, possession of cocaine base.” of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (No explanation is found in the record Clay filed an objection to the Presentence Report and a regarding the discrepancy between the 1.1 grams stated in the motion for reconsideration of his Rule 29 motion. laboratory report and the 1.6 grams alleged in the indictment.) The government soon thereafter formally notified Clay that, At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied the upon conviction under § 844(a), it would rely upon a prior motion for reconsideration and found that the four-level conviction “as a basis for a sentence to increased punishment enhancement was applicable. Clay was sentenced to under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).” The reference to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 63 months on Count § 841(b)(1)(A) was apparently mistaken, however, because One and 24 months on Count Two. The court also sentenced the amount of illegal drugs allegedly possessed was less than Clay to two years of supervised release. required to sustain a charge under that section. The prior conviction identified in the information was later used as the II. ANALYSIS basis for an enhanced sentence in connection with the § 844(a) offense. A. Rule 29 motions

Clay’s trial commenced in November of 2001. Prior to jury “A Rule 29 motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the selection, the parties stipulated that he was a convicted felon evidence. [W]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is for purposes of the count relating to being a felon in challenged on appeal, the standard of review is whether, after possession of a firearm. The district court therefore ruled that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the it would not allow any reference to the previous conviction prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the during trial. Nonetheless, when the court read the essential elements of the crime . . . .” United States v. Jones, superseding indictment to the prospective jurors, it 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis and alteration in inadvertently disclosed to the jury pool that Clay had been original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]his court previously convicted of a narcotics offense. Clay’s counsel may conclude a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence objected, but did not request a new jury pool. The district even though the circumstantial evidence does not remove court overruled the objection. every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A jury was selected and the trial proceeded. At the end of the government’s proof, Clay moved for the case to be Clay argues that his Rule 29 motions should have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of granted because the government did not prove, as it alleged in Criminal Procedure. The district court denied the motion. the indictment, that Clay possessed “1.6 grams of a mixture Clay made another Rule 29 motion at the close of his proof, or substance containing crack cocaine, also known as cocaine No. 02-1362 United States v. Clay 5 6 United States v. Clay No. 02-1362

base . . . .” Instead, Clay points out that the City of Detroit’s (noting that such an error “does not warrant the use of the laboratory report, which was stipulated to by Clay and the harmless-error rule”). Although the government admits that government and was entered into evidence, concluded that the district court in the present case erred in reading the entire “[t]he material weighed 1.10 grams and contained indictment, it denies that the error was “structural” and COCAINE.” (Emphasis in the original.) The government instead maintains that it was harmless. responds by arguing that the evidence adduced at trial reflected the fact that the bag contained crack cocaine and This court has applied a harmless-error analysis in similar that, in any event, the penalty imposed was no greater than the situations. See Myers v. United States, 198 F.3d 615, 619 (6th maximum allowable period of incarceration for the possession Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court’s reading to the jury of 1.1 grams of powder cocaine. It also notes that the City of the nature of the defendant’s prior offenses was harmless Detroit’s laboratory reports do not distinguish between error); United States v. McFerren, No. 96-5458, 1998 WL powder cocaine and crack cocaine, calling both simply 180514, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 1998) (per curiam) (applying “cocaine.” the harmless-error standard to the defendant’s claim that the district court erred when it read to the jury the indictment that No distinction is made between crack and powder cocaine contained references to his prior convictions); see also United in 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) either. Instead, this section states that States v. Turner, 565 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1977) (per “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or curiam) (“[O]nce the trial court had been informed of the intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . . .” Thus, stipulation of counsel, he should have read the indictment to whether Clay possessed crack or powder cocaine, we the jury without reference to the nature of the felony conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier conviction. However, we do not feel that this error was of fact to find that Clay violated 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). The unduly prejudicial in light of the substantial evidence of district court, therefore, did not err in denying Clay’s Rule 29 Turner’s guilt.”). motions. We conclude that Myers is more applicable to the present B. Reading of indictment to jury pool case than Monger. The district court’s inadvertent mistake in disclosing the nature of Clay’s prior conviction to the jury Clay also contends that the panel should reverse his pool was not an error of the same magnitude as failing to conviction because the district court read the entire indictment instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. In addition, the to the jury pool, which included a reference to his prior drug evidence against Clay was so overwhelming that it is more conviction. According to Clay, this constituted a “structural probable than not that the error did not materially affect the error” warranting reversal. See United States v. Monger, 185 verdict. See United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1262 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “structural errors, (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is well settled that an error which is not . . . [which] infect[] the entire trial process, and necessarily of constitutional dimension is harmless unless it is more render[] a trial fundamentally unfair . . . require [the court] to probable than not that the error materially affected the reverse” a criminal conviction regardless of the strength of the verdict.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clay was evidence against the defendant). Monger held that “the apprehended in an uninhabited apartment under suspicious district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser circumstances. When the officers entered, he ran to the back included offense of simple possession was an intrinsically of the apartment and threw a plastic bag containing cocaine harmful structural error which requires us to reverse.” Id. on the floor. A large sum of cash and a firearm were found No. 02-1362 United States v. Clay 7 8 United States v. Clay No. 02-1362

on his person. In light of this evidence, the district court’s governmental error. See United States v. Dodson, 288 F.3d error in mistakenly reading the nature of Clay’s prior drug 153, 162 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that, by failing to object, the conviction to the jury pool was harmless. defendant forfeited his right to complain of the government’s failure to inform him of its intent to seek an enhanced C. Sentencing enhancement sentence upon conviction of a § 844 offense). Clay’s final contention is that the district court erred when “[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised it enhanced his sentence pursuant to the Sentencing at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that Guidelines for possessing a firearm during the commission of affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an a felony drug offense. “[The] district court’s finding that a appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466- (internal quotation marks omitted). “A finding of fact will 67 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the only be clearly erroneous when, although there may be some government’s notice erroneously cited to § 841(b)(1)(A), it evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the did so immediately after indicating that the sentence entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction enhancement would be sought in connection with“the charge that a mistake has been committed. . . . Where there are two in Count Two of the Indictment in this case,” which specifies permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice a § 844(a) offense. Additionally, the superceding information between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal correctly identified the prior conviction upon which the quotation marks omitted). government would rely in seeking the enhancement in connection with the § 844(a) offense, and Clay stipulated to We first note that the government’s superceding the validity of that conviction. We conclude, therefore, that information mistakenly references 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the erroneous citation to § 841(b)(1)(A) did not seriously under which Clay was never charged. This calls into question affect the fairness of Clay’s trial, and we proceed to address the government’s compliance with the formal notice the merits of his argument concerning the sentencing requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 851, which states: enhancement. No person who stands convicted of an offense under this United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5) part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by provides that a defendant’s base offense level should be reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before increased by four levels “[i]f the defendant used or possessed trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony attorney files an information with the court (and serves offense.” “This section can only apply if the Government a copy of such information on the person or counsel for establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the such person) stating in writing the previous convictions defendant possessed or used a gun in connection with another to be relied upon . . . . felony.” United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2001). Clay, however, failed to raise this issue either in the district court or on appeal. He has therefore forfeited any claim of No. 02-1362 United States v. Clay 9 10 United States v. Clay No. 02-1362

Under the Controlled Substances Act, a drug-related or used a gun in connection with another felony. Although offense punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than the “possession of firearms that is merely coincidental to the one year under any federal law is a felony offense. 21 U.S.C. underlying felony offense is insufficient to support the § 802(44). Conviction for simple possession under § 844(a) application of § 2K2.1,” this court has expressly adopted the of the Controlled Substances Act that follows “a prior “fortress theory, which concludes that a sufficient connection conviction for any drug, narcotic, or chemical[] offense is established if it reasonably appears that the firearms found chargeable under the law of any State” is punishable by a . . . are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate maximum term of imprisonment of two years. Because Clay a drug transaction.” United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499, had a prior conviction for a narcotics offense under Michigan 503 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). law, his violation of § 844(a) qualified as a felony. Clay was apprehended in an uninhabited apartment late at The government maintains that the evidentiary burden night with a bag of cocaine and a large amount of cash on his shifts to the defendant once the government shows that the person. He testified that he was in the apartment to have his defendant possessed or used a gun in connection with another hair braided by a woman whom he had met “on the streets,” felony. Citing United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095 (6th although the alleged hairstylist was not in the building. Cir. 1989), the government contends that once it makes this Finally, Clay was carrying a firearm. See Hardin, 248 F.3d showing, the defendant must “prove that it was clearly at 499 (noting that firearms “are ‘tools of the trade’ in drug improbable that the firearm was connected to the other transactions”). Based upon this set of facts, the district court offense.” McGhee, however, involved a sentencing did not clearly err when it found that the government had enhancement pursuant to § 2D1.1(b) of the Sentencing proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Sentencing Guidelines, which makes it inapposite to the present case. Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5) was satisfied. Rather than seek the two-level enhancement provided for in § 2D1.1(b), the government sought to apply the four-level III. CONCLUSION enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5). This case is therefore controlled by Hardin, not McGhee. In Hardin, this court For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the stated that the “clearly improbable” requirement does not judgment of the district court. apply in a case where the defendant’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5), noting that “§ 2D1.1 applies a burden-shifting component that is not present in § 2K2.1(b)(5).” 248 F.3d at 496. The full burden of proof on the particular enhancement sought therefore remained with the government. Keeping in mind that “the presence of drugs in a home under a firearm conviction does not ipso facto support application of a § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement,” id. at 501, the district court must examine the specific facts of the case before it to determine if the government established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed