F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 2, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 03-7100 v. Eastern District of Oklahoma WILLIAM JAMES CLARK, (D.C. No. CR-02-53-P)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
This case returns to us on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
The facts are recounted in our first opinion, United States v. Clark, 94 Fed. Appx.
769, 2004 WL 729289 (10th Cir. 2004) vacated by 125 S. Ct. 1020 (2005), and
are repeated only in relevant part. Defendant William James Clark pleaded guilty
to two charges: impersonating a federal officer, see 18 U.S.C. § 912, and
possessing a firearm after a previous felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The presentence report (PSR) recommended that the offense level
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. for the felon-in-possession charge be adjusted upward four levels because he
possessed the weapon in connection with another felony, the interstate
transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. See United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(5). The district court found by a “preponderance of the
evidence that [Defendant’s] possession of the firearm described in count two of
the indictment during a criminal act is more than coincidental. The four-level
adjustment given in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section
2K2.1(b)(5) is applicable.” R. Vol. IV at 47. According to the district court, “it
[was] highly probable that the firearm did embolden [Defendant] to maintain
possession of the vehicle.” Id. at 48.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in not granting him
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG § 3E1.1, and in
imposing the four-level upward adjustment for possessing the firearm in
connection with another felony. We affirmed. Defendant’s petition for a writ of
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, and it vacated our
judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Clark v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1020 (2005). Defendant’s sole argument on remand is that the district court erred
when it adjusted his sentence upward based on a judge-found fact—that he
possessed the gun in connection with another felony.
-2- Defendant concedes that his Booker claim is reviewed for plain error.
“Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects
substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines is error that is “clear or
obvious at the time of the appeal” and therefore satisfies the first two prongs of
the plain-error inquiry. Id. The issue is whether Defendant satisfies the third and
fourth prongs of the test. It is unnecessary, however, to determine whether the
error affects substantial rights if it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736. Because Defendant
cannot make the requisite showing on the fourth prong, we affirm his sentence
without needing to determine whether the error affects his substantial rights.
The district court relied on a judge-found fact to enhance Defendant’s
sentence under mandatory guidelines, so the error is “constitutional Booker
error.” Id. at 731. Plain-error review is conducted “‘less rigidly when reviewing
a potential constitutional error.’” United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 2005 WL
1499676, at *12 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147,
1174 (10th Cir. 2005)). We have identified several non-exclusive factors relevant
to determining whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion and reverse
-3- because of a constitutional Booker error. They include (1) whether the defendant
challenged the factual basis of the judicial finding that increased his sentence, id.
at *14; (2) the difference between the sentence based on judge-found facts and
one based on facts admitted or found by a jury, id.; (3) the strength or weakness
of the evidence supporting the sentence imposed, United States v. Lauder, 409
F.3d 1254, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); (4) whether “objective consideration” of the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) suggests that a departure from the
Guidelines is appropriate, id.; and (5) whether other evidence specific to the
defendant’s case “demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing process,”
id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But the key consideration in many of our
cases is “[w]hether the district court would simply reimpose the same sentence on
remand, or whether instead the sentence would likely change to a significant
degree if [the case] were returned to the district court for discretionary
resentencing.” United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
At least two of the factors cut in Defendant’s favor. Defendant challenged
the facts underlying the judicial finding that enhanced his sentence. He argued
that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the gun in connection with
the felony of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. There is also a
substantial difference between the sentence based on judge-found facts and one
-4- that would be imposed absent the judge’s findings. Defendant’s sentencing range
with the four-level enhancement was 63-78 months; without the enhancement, the
range would have been 41-51 months. The court sentenced Defendant to 70
months’ imprisonment, the middle of the guideline range. Assuming it would
impose a sentence in the middle of the lower range as well, Defendant would have
been sentenced to 46 months, 24 months less than the sentence he received.
The rest of the factors, however, are not in Defendant’s favor. We
considered the strength of the evidence underlying the district court’s factual
finding in the previous appeal. Defendant has offered nothing further on the
subject and we see no reason to revisit our conclusion that the district court did
not clearly err “in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the rifle had
the potential to facilitate the underlying felony.” Clark, 2004 WL 729289, at *4.
The “factual dispute” relates less to the historical evidence than to the inferences
to be drawn from that evidence. Moreover, we have held that post-Booker
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 2, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 03-7100 v. Eastern District of Oklahoma WILLIAM JAMES CLARK, (D.C. No. CR-02-53-P)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
This case returns to us on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
The facts are recounted in our first opinion, United States v. Clark, 94 Fed. Appx.
769, 2004 WL 729289 (10th Cir. 2004) vacated by 125 S. Ct. 1020 (2005), and
are repeated only in relevant part. Defendant William James Clark pleaded guilty
to two charges: impersonating a federal officer, see 18 U.S.C. § 912, and
possessing a firearm after a previous felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The presentence report (PSR) recommended that the offense level
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. for the felon-in-possession charge be adjusted upward four levels because he
possessed the weapon in connection with another felony, the interstate
transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. See United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(5). The district court found by a “preponderance of the
evidence that [Defendant’s] possession of the firearm described in count two of
the indictment during a criminal act is more than coincidental. The four-level
adjustment given in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section
2K2.1(b)(5) is applicable.” R. Vol. IV at 47. According to the district court, “it
[was] highly probable that the firearm did embolden [Defendant] to maintain
possession of the vehicle.” Id. at 48.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in not granting him
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG § 3E1.1, and in
imposing the four-level upward adjustment for possessing the firearm in
connection with another felony. We affirmed. Defendant’s petition for a writ of
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, and it vacated our
judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Clark v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1020 (2005). Defendant’s sole argument on remand is that the district court erred
when it adjusted his sentence upward based on a judge-found fact—that he
possessed the gun in connection with another felony.
-2- Defendant concedes that his Booker claim is reviewed for plain error.
“Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects
substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines is error that is “clear or
obvious at the time of the appeal” and therefore satisfies the first two prongs of
the plain-error inquiry. Id. The issue is whether Defendant satisfies the third and
fourth prongs of the test. It is unnecessary, however, to determine whether the
error affects substantial rights if it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736. Because Defendant
cannot make the requisite showing on the fourth prong, we affirm his sentence
without needing to determine whether the error affects his substantial rights.
The district court relied on a judge-found fact to enhance Defendant’s
sentence under mandatory guidelines, so the error is “constitutional Booker
error.” Id. at 731. Plain-error review is conducted “‘less rigidly when reviewing
a potential constitutional error.’” United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 2005 WL
1499676, at *12 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147,
1174 (10th Cir. 2005)). We have identified several non-exclusive factors relevant
to determining whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion and reverse
-3- because of a constitutional Booker error. They include (1) whether the defendant
challenged the factual basis of the judicial finding that increased his sentence, id.
at *14; (2) the difference between the sentence based on judge-found facts and
one based on facts admitted or found by a jury, id.; (3) the strength or weakness
of the evidence supporting the sentence imposed, United States v. Lauder, 409
F.3d 1254, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); (4) whether “objective consideration” of the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) suggests that a departure from the
Guidelines is appropriate, id.; and (5) whether other evidence specific to the
defendant’s case “demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing process,”
id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But the key consideration in many of our
cases is “[w]hether the district court would simply reimpose the same sentence on
remand, or whether instead the sentence would likely change to a significant
degree if [the case] were returned to the district court for discretionary
resentencing.” United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
At least two of the factors cut in Defendant’s favor. Defendant challenged
the facts underlying the judicial finding that enhanced his sentence. He argued
that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the gun in connection with
the felony of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. There is also a
substantial difference between the sentence based on judge-found facts and one
-4- that would be imposed absent the judge’s findings. Defendant’s sentencing range
with the four-level enhancement was 63-78 months; without the enhancement, the
range would have been 41-51 months. The court sentenced Defendant to 70
months’ imprisonment, the middle of the guideline range. Assuming it would
impose a sentence in the middle of the lower range as well, Defendant would have
been sentenced to 46 months, 24 months less than the sentence he received.
The rest of the factors, however, are not in Defendant’s favor. We
considered the strength of the evidence underlying the district court’s factual
finding in the previous appeal. Defendant has offered nothing further on the
subject and we see no reason to revisit our conclusion that the district court did
not clearly err “in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the rifle had
the potential to facilitate the underlying felony.” Clark, 2004 WL 729289, at *4.
The “factual dispute” relates less to the historical evidence than to the inferences
to be drawn from that evidence. Moreover, we have held that post-Booker
“district courts are still required to consider Guideline ranges, which are
determined through application of the preponderance standard, just as they were
before.” United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal citation omitted). If the record indicates that the district court,
exercising discretion, would impose the same sentence that it imposed under the
mandatory guidelines, the mandatory application did not seriously affect the
-5- fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. See Lawrence,
405 F.3d at 907.
Defendant was sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment, the middle of the
applicable guidelines range. The district court had discretion to sentence him to
63 months, the bottom of the range, and chose not to. Furthermore, Defendant
does not offer, and our independent review of the record did not reveal, any
statements by the court indicating that it was inclined to impose a lesser sentence.
Indeed, the district court agreed with the government that the one downward
departure requested by Defendant was inapplicable. R. Vol. IV at 50 (denying
downward departure for acceptance of responsibility; Clark, 2004 WL 729289, at
*3 (affirming the denial). Finally, Defendant offers no arguments that either
objective consideration of § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors or a breakdown of the
sentencing process warrants remand.
Thus, Defendant has not met his burden under the fourth prong of plain-
error review. Defendant’s sentence “is within the national norm and there is no
record evidence to support a lower sentence.” Magallanez, 408 F.3d at 686. See
also Lawrence, 405 F.3d at 908 (affirming a sentence when the district court
denied downward departures and sentenced above the guidelines minimum).
We REINSTATE our previous Order and Judgment in this case and
-6- AFFIRM Defendant’s sentence after our reconsideration in light of Booker.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge
-7-