PER CURIAM:
Appellant Clarence Martin appeals his conviction and sentence on 133 counts of various financial crimes, including 97 counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Appellant raises several issues on appeal,
but only one merits discussion: whether the district court properly calculated the “value of the funds” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 (1998) in determining Appellant’s offense level at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Appellant’s convictions arise out of two stolen checks which were deposited into bank accounts controlled by Appellant. The first of these checks was in the amount of $380,050.08 and was deposited into an attorney trust account maintained by Appellant at Wachovia Bank. Within six days of the funds becoming available for withdrawal, Appellant wrote a total of nine checks from this account in the amount of $380,003.21. Appellant then used those nine checks to obtain cash or to purchase cashier’s checks and certificates of deposit for his wife, his children, his secretary, International Rimstrance Diversified Group (a holding company in which Appellant was CEO), himself, and others. For example, Appellant would obtain checks at one branch of Wachovia and cash those checks on the same day at other branches.
The indictment identified 97 separate monetary transactions flowing from the $380,050.08 check. These transactions constituted the 97 counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Since proceeds from the check went through more than one transaction, the 97 money laundering transactions totaled $1,055,068.21, even though the original amount of the stolen check was $380,050.08.
In calculating the “value of the funds” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 (1998), the court added each money laundering transaction together for a total of $1,055,068.21 and correspondingly increased Appellant’s offense level by 5 levels. Appellant argues this was error and the maximum amount he could have laundered was the $380,050.08 from the first stolen check.
II.
Although a determination of the facts concerning the amount of money involved in a laundering scheme is reviewed for clear error, the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to
de novo
review.
United States v. Barrios,
993 F.2d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir.1993).
Section 2Sl.l(a) of the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines
provides a base offense level of 20 for money laundering convictions under § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Section 2Sl.l(b) provides for increases in the base
offense level for specific offense characteristics, including the amount of money laundered. Under § 2Sl.l(b)(2)(F), if the “value of the funds” is more than $1,000,000, but less than $2,000,000, the defendant’s offense level is increased 5 points. The commentary to § 2S1.1 states, “The amount of money involved is included as a factor because it is an indicator of the magnitude of the criminal enterprise, and the extent to which the defendant aided the enterprise.”
In this case, the district court calculated the “value of the funds” by adding together the 97 different monetary transactions for which Appellant was convicted. Since all of these transactions flowed from the $380,050.08 check, Appellant argues the total amount of money laundered could not exceed $380,050.08. Under Appellant’s theory the “value of the funds” necessarily means the amount of money originally injected or infused into the money laundering scheme. We disagree.
Although we have not directly addressed this issue, our previous decisions have not strictly limited the “value of the funds” to the money originally infused into the money laundering scheme. In
Barrios,
we addressed whether a district court could include legitimate interest earned on illegitimate drug proceeds in determining the “value of the funds” under § 2Sl.l(b)(2). 993 F.2d at 1523-24. Barrios laundered $595,000 of drug proceeds by sending the money to a co-conspirator, who deposited the money in a number of bank accounts and subsequently issued ten checks to Barrios totaling $674,416.33, the difference representing earned interest.
Id.
We held the district court properly included the earned interest in calculating the “value of the funds” under § 2S1.1(b)(2).
Id.
at 1524. “While the Guidelines do not define the term funds as used in § 2Sl.l(b)(2), this Court previously has stated that in sentencing under this section, the district court is ‘required to consider the total amount of funds that it believed was involved in the course of criminal conduct.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. De La Rosa,
922 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir.1991)). “[T]his term ‘obviously refer[s] to funds that are used by the defendant in an unlawful monetary transaction.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. Johnson,
971 F.2d 562, 575 (10th Cir.1992)).
Like Appellant, the defendant in
United States v. Li,
973 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.Va.1997), argued the court should consider only the money injected or infused into the money laundering conspiracy, and not the total amount of funds involved in each unlawful monetary transaction. The Eastern District of Virginia rejected this argument, stating defendant’s “method of calculating the value of funds is unsound and does not accurately measure the ‘magnitude of the criminal enterprise.’ ”
Id.
at 574.
According to [defendant’s] theory, co-conspirators unlawfully transferring $100 a hundred times through a hundred different accounts should be treated the same as coconspirators unlawfully transferring $100 once through one account. Similarly, under his theory, a criminal enterprise that unlawfully transferred $100 once has a greater “magnitude” than a criminal enterprise that unlawfully transferred $99 a hundred times through a hundred different accounts. It does not make sense to look only at the amount of capital injected or infused into the money laundering scheme, as [defendant] suggests, and ignore what happens to that capital. Clearly, the “magnitude of the criminal enterprise” is larger for a conspiracy involving a hundred unlawful transfers of $100 or $99
compared to a conspiracy involving one unlawful transfer of $100.
Id.
The
Li
court’s reasoning is consistent with the purpose of the concealment or design provision of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Clarence Martin appeals his conviction and sentence on 133 counts of various financial crimes, including 97 counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Appellant raises several issues on appeal,
but only one merits discussion: whether the district court properly calculated the “value of the funds” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 (1998) in determining Appellant’s offense level at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Appellant’s convictions arise out of two stolen checks which were deposited into bank accounts controlled by Appellant. The first of these checks was in the amount of $380,050.08 and was deposited into an attorney trust account maintained by Appellant at Wachovia Bank. Within six days of the funds becoming available for withdrawal, Appellant wrote a total of nine checks from this account in the amount of $380,003.21. Appellant then used those nine checks to obtain cash or to purchase cashier’s checks and certificates of deposit for his wife, his children, his secretary, International Rimstrance Diversified Group (a holding company in which Appellant was CEO), himself, and others. For example, Appellant would obtain checks at one branch of Wachovia and cash those checks on the same day at other branches.
The indictment identified 97 separate monetary transactions flowing from the $380,050.08 check. These transactions constituted the 97 counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Since proceeds from the check went through more than one transaction, the 97 money laundering transactions totaled $1,055,068.21, even though the original amount of the stolen check was $380,050.08.
In calculating the “value of the funds” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 (1998), the court added each money laundering transaction together for a total of $1,055,068.21 and correspondingly increased Appellant’s offense level by 5 levels. Appellant argues this was error and the maximum amount he could have laundered was the $380,050.08 from the first stolen check.
II.
Although a determination of the facts concerning the amount of money involved in a laundering scheme is reviewed for clear error, the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to
de novo
review.
United States v. Barrios,
993 F.2d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir.1993).
Section 2Sl.l(a) of the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines
provides a base offense level of 20 for money laundering convictions under § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. Section 2Sl.l(b) provides for increases in the base
offense level for specific offense characteristics, including the amount of money laundered. Under § 2Sl.l(b)(2)(F), if the “value of the funds” is more than $1,000,000, but less than $2,000,000, the defendant’s offense level is increased 5 points. The commentary to § 2S1.1 states, “The amount of money involved is included as a factor because it is an indicator of the magnitude of the criminal enterprise, and the extent to which the defendant aided the enterprise.”
In this case, the district court calculated the “value of the funds” by adding together the 97 different monetary transactions for which Appellant was convicted. Since all of these transactions flowed from the $380,050.08 check, Appellant argues the total amount of money laundered could not exceed $380,050.08. Under Appellant’s theory the “value of the funds” necessarily means the amount of money originally injected or infused into the money laundering scheme. We disagree.
Although we have not directly addressed this issue, our previous decisions have not strictly limited the “value of the funds” to the money originally infused into the money laundering scheme. In
Barrios,
we addressed whether a district court could include legitimate interest earned on illegitimate drug proceeds in determining the “value of the funds” under § 2Sl.l(b)(2). 993 F.2d at 1523-24. Barrios laundered $595,000 of drug proceeds by sending the money to a co-conspirator, who deposited the money in a number of bank accounts and subsequently issued ten checks to Barrios totaling $674,416.33, the difference representing earned interest.
Id.
We held the district court properly included the earned interest in calculating the “value of the funds” under § 2S1.1(b)(2).
Id.
at 1524. “While the Guidelines do not define the term funds as used in § 2Sl.l(b)(2), this Court previously has stated that in sentencing under this section, the district court is ‘required to consider the total amount of funds that it believed was involved in the course of criminal conduct.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. De La Rosa,
922 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir.1991)). “[T]his term ‘obviously refer[s] to funds that are used by the defendant in an unlawful monetary transaction.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. Johnson,
971 F.2d 562, 575 (10th Cir.1992)).
Like Appellant, the defendant in
United States v. Li,
973 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.Va.1997), argued the court should consider only the money injected or infused into the money laundering conspiracy, and not the total amount of funds involved in each unlawful monetary transaction. The Eastern District of Virginia rejected this argument, stating defendant’s “method of calculating the value of funds is unsound and does not accurately measure the ‘magnitude of the criminal enterprise.’ ”
Id.
at 574.
According to [defendant’s] theory, co-conspirators unlawfully transferring $100 a hundred times through a hundred different accounts should be treated the same as coconspirators unlawfully transferring $100 once through one account. Similarly, under his theory, a criminal enterprise that unlawfully transferred $100 once has a greater “magnitude” than a criminal enterprise that unlawfully transferred $99 a hundred times through a hundred different accounts. It does not make sense to look only at the amount of capital injected or infused into the money laundering scheme, as [defendant] suggests, and ignore what happens to that capital. Clearly, the “magnitude of the criminal enterprise” is larger for a conspiracy involving a hundred unlawful transfers of $100 or $99
compared to a conspiracy involving one unlawful transfer of $100.
Id.
The
Li
court’s reasoning is consistent with the purpose of the concealment or design provision of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. This section was designed to punish defendants who, after the completion of the underlying specified unlawful activity, “take the additional step of attempting to legitimize their proceeds so that observers think their money is derived from legal enterprises.”
United States v. Majors,
196 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1999). “The activity that Section 1956(a)(1)(B)® seeks to prevent is the injection of illegal proceeds into the stream of commerce while obfuscating their source.”
Id.
at 1212 n. 12. Significantly, money laundering is not a continuing offense—“each transaction or. transfer of money constitutes a separate offense.”
Id.
at 1212 n. 14 (citing
United States v. Kramer,
73 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir.1996)).
Unlike the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines for theft or fraud, which compute the offense level according to the “loss” incurred by the victim,
see
U.S.S.G. §§ 2Bl.l(b)(l), 2Fl.l(b)(l), the 1998 Sen-fencing Guidelines for money laundering compute the base offense level according to the “value of the funds,” U.S.S.G. § 2Sl.l(b)(2). “This is so because ‘[t]he harm from such a transaction does not generally fall upon an individual, but falls upon society in general.’ ”
United States v. Thompson,
40 F.3d 48, 51 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). Each unlawful monetary transaction harms society by impeding law enforcement’s efforts to track ill-gotten gains.
See United States v. Allen,
76 F.3d 1348, 1369 (5th Cir.1996).
By adding together the individual transactions for which Appellant was convicted, the district court’s calculation accurately reflected the scope of the criminal enterprise because each of the 97 money laundering counts constituted a separate harm to society by further impeding law enforcement’s efforts to track the ill-gotten gains. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not misinterpret “the value of the funds” under § 2S1.1 of the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines.
AFFIRMED.