United States v. City of Bellevue, Nebraska

334 F. Supp. 881, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10981
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedNovember 2, 1971
DocketCiv. 03267
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 334 F. Supp. 881 (United States v. City of Bellevue, Nebraska) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. City of Bellevue, Nebraska, 334 F. Supp. 881, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10981 (D. Neb. 1971).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RICHARD E. ROBINSON, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court after hearing upon plaintiff’s application for a permanent injunction against the defendants.

The defendant, City of Bellevue, Nebraska, has duly enacted an ordinance 1 *883 purporting to annex approximately 1898 acres of real estate officially designated as Offutt Air Force Base, and approximately 721 acres of real estate known as “the Capehart Housing Area.” All of the said real estate is located in Sarpy County, Nebraska, and the plaintiff United States of America, is the owner in fee of said real estate, which totals approximately 2619 acres. There are approximately twelve thousand military personnel and their dependents living in Government quarters, this total being equally divided between these two main areas of real estate.

The plaintiff exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction over that portion of real estate known as Offutt Air Force Base. This is clear from the case of Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U.S. 253, 256, 76 S.Ct. 814, 817, 100 L. Ed. 1151 [1956], wherein Justice Frankfurter writing the majority opinion stated that: “Offutt Air Force Base falls within the scope of Article I, § 8, cl. 17 of The United States Constitution * * 2

However, as to that portion known as the Capehart Housing area, all parties are agreed that although owned by the plaintiff, it remains subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the State of Nebraska.

After the enactment of the annexation ordinance, the plaintiff, United States, filed its complaint in the present action, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 17, 1969 [Filing #3] enjoining the defendants herein from effectuating the ordinance, a preliminary injunction to the same effect was issued by this Court April 25, 1969 [Filing #7], The Court must now decide whether said injunction should be made permanent.

In resolving this controversy, the Court must first determine whether the defendant, City of Bellevue, Nebraska, has the power and authority to annex the realty in question. And, this Court has concluded that the United States Supreme Court decision in Howard v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S.Ct. 465, 97 L.Ed. 617 [1953], requires that the question be answered in the affirmative.

In Howard an area encompassing a Naval Ordinance Plant within the State of Kentucky had been acquired by a United States condemnation proceeding. The State consented to the acquisition and the United States accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the area. The Supreme *884 Court held that the fact that the land was under the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the United States did not ban its subsequent annexation by the City of Louisville.

In so holding the Court said, as follows:

“The appellants first contend that the City could not annex this federal area because it had ceased to be a part of Kentucky when the United States assumed exclusive jurisdiction over it. With this we do not agree. When the United States, with the consent of Kentucky, acquired the property upon which the Ordinance Plant is located, the property did not cease to be a part of Kentucky. The geographical structure of Kentucky remained the same. In rearranging the structural divisions of the Commonwealth, in accordance with state law, the area became a part of the City of Louisville, just as it remained a part of the County of Jefferson and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A state may conform its municipal structures to its own plan, so long as the state does not interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction within the federal area, by the United States. Kentucky’s consent to this acquisition gave the United States power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within the area. A change of municipal boundaries did not interfere in the least with the jurisdiction of the United States within the area or with its use or disposition of the property. The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government. The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction, not fiction, to which we must give heed. “This question has been before other state courts, and the right to annex has been upheld. Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 52, 132 S.W.2d 695, 699; County of Norfolk v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1047, 45 S.E.2d 136, 142-143. We agree with these cases and hold that Louisville was free to annex the Ordinance Plant area.” 344 U.S. at 626-627, 73 S.Ct. at 466-467.

The Court then held in Howard that the city could tax income paid to employees of the United States who worked at the Ordinance Plant, pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110, known as the Buck Act, by which Congress had specifically given states and state subdivisions the right to levy and collect income taxes in any federal area.

However, the Court made it clear that cities, even after an annexation of a federal area, could neither tax nor regulate such an area, except when such taxation or regulation is clearly granted to the cities by an Act of Congress. The Court said:

“Even though the Ordinance Plant is within the boundaries of the City of Louisville pursuant to the annexation, exclusive jurisdiction over the area still remains with the United States, except as modified by statute. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, [50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091.]" 344 U.S. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467.

Thus, it is the conclusion of this Court that under federal laws, the City of Bellevue has the power and authority to annex both Offutt Air Force Base and the Capehart Housing area, and may tax and regulate in those areas to the extent permitted by the Congress of the United States. 3

However, the aforesaid determination does not resolve the question regarding the propriety and legality of the an *885 nexation under the State law of annexation. The Howard case does not offer any guidance in this regard, for one can only infer from a reading of the case that the Court decided, without stating its reasons, that the annexation involved therein otherwise complied with Kentucky’s law governing annexation.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sanitary & Improvement District 57 v. City of Elkhorn
536 N.W.2d 56 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1995)
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 95 v. City of Omaha
376 N.W.2d 767 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1985)
In re the Ordinance of Annexation No. 1977-4
249 S.E.2d 698 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1978)
Matter of Ordinance of Annexation No. 1977-4
249 S.E.2d 698 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1978)
Kansas City v. Querry
511 S.W.2d 790 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1974)
United States v. City of Bellevue, Nebraska
474 F.2d 473 (Eighth Circuit, 1973)
Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe
353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
334 F. Supp. 881, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10981, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-city-of-bellevue-nebraska-ned-1971.