United States v. Cisneros

385 F. Supp. 2d 567, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24230, 2005 WL 2128319
District Court, E.D. Virginia·Decided August 24, 2005·No. CRIM.A. 04-283·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Ismael Juarez Cisneros’s Proposed Procedures for Determining Mental Retardation. The defendant moves the Court to adopt certain procedures to determine whether he is mentally retarded, and therefore, ineligible for a sentence of death. The issues presented are (1) what is the definition of “mentally retarded” under the Federal Death Penalty Act; and (2) what procedure the Court will observe *569 in determining Mr. Cisneros’s mental state to comply with the requirements of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The Court holds that it will use the definition of mental retardation proposed by Mr. Cisneros, based on the American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR)’s definition, as cited by the Supreme Court in Atkins. After the presentation of evidence during the penalty phase of this capital murder trial, the jury will be instructed to make a finding of whether the defendant has established that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence. If the jury unanimously finds that the defendant is mentally retarded, he will not be eligible for the death penalty under Atkins. If the finding is not unanimous, however, the jury will be instructed that any juror who finds that the defendant is mentally retarded should consider their finding as a mitigating factor.

I. BACKGROUND

The government alleged that Defendants Denis Rivera, Oscar Antonio Grande, Ismael Juarez Cisneros, and Oscar Alexander Garcia-Orellana conspired together to murder Brenda Paz, who was preparing to testify against Denis Rivera in his trial for the murder of Joaquin Diaz. All four defendants and the victim were members of the Mara Salvatrucha, also known as “MS-13.” The government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death against all four defendants on October 1, 2004.

On May 18, 2005, the jury found Defendants Denis Rivera and Oscar Alexander Garcia-Orellana not guilty of all counts. Defendants Oscar Antonio Grande and Ismael Juarez Cisneros were found guilty of all counts. Mr. Cisneros has previously notified the Court and the government that he may be mentally retarded and has moved the court to adopt certain procedures with respect to determine whether he is mentally retarded, and therefore, ineligible for a sentence of death.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA)

Since its reinstatement in 1988, the Federal Death Penalty Act prohibits the execution of mentally retarded defendants. Specifically, the FDPA provides:

A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded. A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person, who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the death penalty and why it was imposed on that person.

18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). The FDPA also identifies mental health as a possible mitigating factor in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (Impaired Capacity) and (a)(6) (Disturbance).

Atkins v. Virginia

In Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded individual is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335. The Court “left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (citations omitted). The Court’s decision in Atkins makes clear, however, that the prohibition on execution applies to all defendants that “fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus.” 536 U.S. at 317, 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Accordingly, when adopting a statutory definition of mental retardation, states cannot adopt a definition that fails to protect any individuals who have mental retardation under a *570 definition embraced by a natiqnal consensus.

B. Analysis

Definition of Mental Retardation

The Court holds that it will use the definition of mental retardation proposed by Mr. Cisneros that is based on the American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR)’s definition cited by the Supreme Court in Atkins. In Atkins, the Supreme Court cited the definition of mental retardation as promulgated by the AAMR:

The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (citations omitted).

While the Atkins Court in Atkins, allowed the states to adopt their own definitions of mental retardation, the definition must encompass all defendants that “fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus.” 536 U.S. at 317, 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. 2242.

In response to Atkins, Virginia enacted legislation setting forth a process to enforce the constitutional restriction on the execution of mentally retarded individuals and established a definition of mental retardation. Virginia defines mental retardation as:

a “disability, originating before the age of 18 years, characterized concurrently by (i) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as demonstrated by performance on a standardized measure of intellectual functioning administered in conformity with accepted professional practice, that is at least two standard deviations below the mean, and (ii) significant limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills”

Va.Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Michie 2005). The Court will use the following jury instruction defining mental retardation, as proposed by the defendant, for determining whether Mr. Cisneros is proven mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence:

Mental Retardation-Defined

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United States v. Cisneros, 385 F. Supp. 2d 567, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24230, 2005 WL 2128319 (E.D. Va. 2005).

385 F. Supp. 2d 567 (United States v. Cisneros) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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