USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4740
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00221-TDS-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2025 Decided: October 9, 2025
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Lewis Tucker pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to receipt of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The district court
sentenced Tucker to time served, followed by a 25-year term of supervised release. On
appeal, Tucker argues that his term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. 1
We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” 2 United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 500, 505 (4th Cir. 2021).
“Substantive-reasonableness review requires us to consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the [applicable] standards set forth in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “This review is highly deferential” and “should not be overly
searching, because it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that
of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.” United States v.
Smith, 75 F.4th 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a]
Tucker concedes that his sentence is procedurally reasonable. We agree. See, e.g., 1
United States v. Kokinda, 146 F.4th 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Only if the sentence is procedurally reasonable can we evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”). 2 The parties dispute the standard of review: the Government contends that our review is for plain error, while Tucker argues that the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applies. But we need not resolve this issue because Tucker cannot prevail even under the more lenient standard.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable,” and “we must affirm unless [the
defendant] raises any arguments that would rebut the presumption.” United States v. Perry,
92 F.4th 500, 518 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2643 (2024). “[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [applicable] § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Everett, 91 F.4th 698, 714 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 242 (2024).
Here, the statutory and Sentencing Guidelines range for Tucker’s term of supervised
release is five years to life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5D1.2(b)(2) (2023). Accordingly, Tucker’s 25-year term is presumptively reasonable,
and he can rebut the presumption only by showing that the term is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release.
“In deciding the length of a term of supervised release, district courts must consider
many of the same § 3553(a) factors they consider in deciding a term of imprisonment.”
United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 177 (4th Cir. 2020). Specifically, courts must
consider: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the defendant’s history and
characteristics; (3) the need to deter criminal conduct; (4) the need to protect the
community from future crimes; and (5) the pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 423 (4th Cir.
2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)).
When imposing Tucker’s sentence of time served, followed by a 25-year term of
supervised release, the district court carefully considered those factors. See id. at 425 (“A
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court’s sentencing rationale . . . can support both imprisonment and supervised release.”).
The court’s primary concern throughout the sentencing hearing was the management of
Tucker’s mental health while on supervision. And the court made it clear that the goals of
supervision would only be satisfied if Tucker remained compliant with his treatment plan,
including taking his medication. The court was particularly concerned about deterring
additional criminal conduct and protecting the public from Tucker, who had a history of
violence. As the court observed, Tucker also had a history of medication resistance—
indeed, the length of Tucker’s pretrial detention was due in part to his refusal to take his
prescribed medication. Moreover, the court was not entirely convinced by Tucker’s and
counsel’s assurances that Tucker would be compliant during supervision, as Tucker had
indicated previously that he did not want to take his medication while on supervised
release.
But the district court was not unsympathetic to the ordeal Tucker went through to
gain competency. In fact, the aggravated nature of Tucker’s pretrial detention was the
primary factor the court considered when deciding to vary downward so significantly to a
sentence of time served. The court was clear, however, that Tucker’s offense was serious,
and the court was particularly troubled by the online conversations during which Tucker
encouraged the undercover agent to abuse a nine-year-old girl and asked a 15-year-old girl
to expose herself. The court’s consideration of Tucker’s possession of child pornography:
while the court recognized that victims of child pornography offenses are revictimized
every time someone views images of them and suffer from long-lasting trauma, it credited
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4740
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00221-TDS-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2025 Decided: October 9, 2025
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Lewis Tucker pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to receipt of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The district court
sentenced Tucker to time served, followed by a 25-year term of supervised release. On
appeal, Tucker argues that his term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. 1
We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” 2 United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 500, 505 (4th Cir. 2021).
“Substantive-reasonableness review requires us to consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the [applicable] standards set forth in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “This review is highly deferential” and “should not be overly
searching, because it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that
of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.” United States v.
Smith, 75 F.4th 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a]
Tucker concedes that his sentence is procedurally reasonable. We agree. See, e.g., 1
United States v. Kokinda, 146 F.4th 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Only if the sentence is procedurally reasonable can we evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”). 2 The parties dispute the standard of review: the Government contends that our review is for plain error, while Tucker argues that the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applies. But we need not resolve this issue because Tucker cannot prevail even under the more lenient standard.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable,” and “we must affirm unless [the
defendant] raises any arguments that would rebut the presumption.” United States v. Perry,
92 F.4th 500, 518 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2643 (2024). “[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [applicable] § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Everett, 91 F.4th 698, 714 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 242 (2024).
Here, the statutory and Sentencing Guidelines range for Tucker’s term of supervised
release is five years to life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5D1.2(b)(2) (2023). Accordingly, Tucker’s 25-year term is presumptively reasonable,
and he can rebut the presumption only by showing that the term is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release.
“In deciding the length of a term of supervised release, district courts must consider
many of the same § 3553(a) factors they consider in deciding a term of imprisonment.”
United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 177 (4th Cir. 2020). Specifically, courts must
consider: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the defendant’s history and
characteristics; (3) the need to deter criminal conduct; (4) the need to protect the
community from future crimes; and (5) the pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 423 (4th Cir.
2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)).
When imposing Tucker’s sentence of time served, followed by a 25-year term of
supervised release, the district court carefully considered those factors. See id. at 425 (“A
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
court’s sentencing rationale . . . can support both imprisonment and supervised release.”).
The court’s primary concern throughout the sentencing hearing was the management of
Tucker’s mental health while on supervision. And the court made it clear that the goals of
supervision would only be satisfied if Tucker remained compliant with his treatment plan,
including taking his medication. The court was particularly concerned about deterring
additional criminal conduct and protecting the public from Tucker, who had a history of
violence. As the court observed, Tucker also had a history of medication resistance—
indeed, the length of Tucker’s pretrial detention was due in part to his refusal to take his
prescribed medication. Moreover, the court was not entirely convinced by Tucker’s and
counsel’s assurances that Tucker would be compliant during supervision, as Tucker had
indicated previously that he did not want to take his medication while on supervised
release.
But the district court was not unsympathetic to the ordeal Tucker went through to
gain competency. In fact, the aggravated nature of Tucker’s pretrial detention was the
primary factor the court considered when deciding to vary downward so significantly to a
sentence of time served. The court was clear, however, that Tucker’s offense was serious,
and the court was particularly troubled by the online conversations during which Tucker
encouraged the undercover agent to abuse a nine-year-old girl and asked a 15-year-old girl
to expose herself. The court’s consideration of Tucker’s possession of child pornography:
while the court recognized that victims of child pornography offenses are revictimized
every time someone views images of them and suffer from long-lasting trauma, it credited
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4740 Doc: 23 Filed: 10/09/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
Tucker with the fact that he collected the images over a short period of time, unlike most
offenders.
Overall, the district court believed that a lengthy term of supervised release was
necessary to ensure that Tucker truly understood the wrongfulness of his actions and would
do everything he needed to do to avoid revocation. And because Tucker’s compliance with
taking his medication regimen was so crucial to his success on supervised release and he
had a history of noncompliance, the court reasonably required Tucker to take his prescribed
medications as a special condition of supervised release. Finally, the court believed that
Tucker possessed the character to abide by the conditions and suggested that Tucker might
be eligible for termination of his supervised release if he complied with the conditions for
a sufficient period of time. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
While complying with strict conditions of supervised release for 25 years is a
daunting task, we conclude that this burden is not enough to rebut the presumption that
Tucker’s term of supervised release is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED