Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10731 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00407-JPB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN WALTON,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(June 29, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Walton appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion
requesting that the Court either (a) terminate his supervised release, or (b) dismiss
the Government’s petition to revoke his supervised release because such Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 2 of 7
revocation is unconstitutional. The District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider Walton’s motion to the extent that it asked the Court to terminate
Walton’s original sentence of five years of supervised release. It also rejected,
based on our decision in United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.
2010), Walton’s argument that revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
On the issue of revocation, Walton admitted that he violated the conditions
of his supervised release by, inter alia, using an illicit substance, as indicated by
four positive drug tests, and failing to report as instructed for drug testing or
otherwise refusing to submit to drug testing on fourteen occasions. Based on these
violations, the District Court revoked Walton’s term of supervised release under
§ 3583(g) and sentenced him to three months in prison.1 Walton timely appealed.
Walton raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the District
Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion to terminate
his supervised release. Second, he asserts that § 3583(e)(3) and (g) violate the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. We reject both arguments,
and therefore affirm.
1 The Court noted that its sentence would have been the same under § 3583(e). 2 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 3 of 7
I.
We review whether a district court had jurisdiction as a question of law
subject to plenary review. United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir.
2003). The District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Walton’s
motion to terminate his supervised release because it amounted to an improper
collateral attack on his sentence. A sentence, including any term of supervised
release, is presumed valid until vacated in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. United
States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 317 (11th Cir. 1993). As such, “a defendant may
not challenge, for the first time on appeal from the revocation of supervised
release, his sentence for the underlying offense.” United States v. White, 416 F.3d
1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Almand, 992 F.2d at 317–18). A defendant
may, however, file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) for early termination of
his supervised release and, after the defendant has served one year of that term, a
court may grant early termination after weighing certain § 3553(a) factors and
finding that “such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and
the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see United States v. Johnson, 877
F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2017).
As the District Court noted, Walton did not seek early termination under
§ 3583(e)(1). Thus, to the extent that Walton asked the District Court to terminate
his term of supervised release imposed as part of the original sentence for his
3 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 4 of 7
underlying offense, his request amounts to a collateral attack on the validity of that
sentence. Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to terminate his supervised release in this revocation proceeding.
II.
We review the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) de novo. See
Cunningham, 607 F.3d at 1266. Under § 3583(e)(3), the district court may, after
considering the factors in § 3553(a), “revoke a term of supervised release, and
require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised
release,” if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district
court has discretion in deciding how long to imprison the defendant, provided it
does not exceed certain statutory maxima listed in § 3583(e)(3).
In United States v. Cunningham, we held that § 3583(e)(3) does not violate
the Fifth Amendment right to due process or the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. 607 F.3d at 1268. “[T]he violation of supervised release need only be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no right to trial by jury in a
supervised release revocation hearing.” Id. Under our prior precedent rule, we are
bound by this prior decision unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court
or this Court sitting en banc. United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th
4 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 5 of 7
Cir. 2003). Therefore, our precedent in Cunningham forecloses Walton’s
argument that § 3583(e)(3) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
To avoid application of the prior panel precedent rule, Walton argues that
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Haymond, 129 S. Ct. 2369
(2019), casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 3583(e), and thus our holding in
Cunningham. In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that § 3583(k) violates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments because it imposes a new mandatory minimum
sentence upon revocation of supervised release based on additional judge-found
facts. 139 S. Ct. at 2374, 2378, 2384–85; id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). But it clarified that its holding was “limited to § 3583(k),” id. at 2383
(plurality opinion), and it explicitly did not address the constitutionality of
§ 3583(e) or (g), id. at 2382 n.7. Haymond therefore does not overrule or abrogate
our precedent in Cunningham regarding the constitutionality of § 3583(e).
Moreover, the District Court found that § 3583(e)(3) did not control its
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Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10731 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00407-JPB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN WALTON,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(June 29, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Walton appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion
requesting that the Court either (a) terminate his supervised release, or (b) dismiss
the Government’s petition to revoke his supervised release because such Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 2 of 7
revocation is unconstitutional. The District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider Walton’s motion to the extent that it asked the Court to terminate
Walton’s original sentence of five years of supervised release. It also rejected,
based on our decision in United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.
2010), Walton’s argument that revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
On the issue of revocation, Walton admitted that he violated the conditions
of his supervised release by, inter alia, using an illicit substance, as indicated by
four positive drug tests, and failing to report as instructed for drug testing or
otherwise refusing to submit to drug testing on fourteen occasions. Based on these
violations, the District Court revoked Walton’s term of supervised release under
§ 3583(g) and sentenced him to three months in prison.1 Walton timely appealed.
Walton raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the District
Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion to terminate
his supervised release. Second, he asserts that § 3583(e)(3) and (g) violate the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. We reject both arguments,
and therefore affirm.
1 The Court noted that its sentence would have been the same under § 3583(e). 2 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 3 of 7
I.
We review whether a district court had jurisdiction as a question of law
subject to plenary review. United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir.
2003). The District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Walton’s
motion to terminate his supervised release because it amounted to an improper
collateral attack on his sentence. A sentence, including any term of supervised
release, is presumed valid until vacated in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. United
States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 317 (11th Cir. 1993). As such, “a defendant may
not challenge, for the first time on appeal from the revocation of supervised
release, his sentence for the underlying offense.” United States v. White, 416 F.3d
1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Almand, 992 F.2d at 317–18). A defendant
may, however, file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) for early termination of
his supervised release and, after the defendant has served one year of that term, a
court may grant early termination after weighing certain § 3553(a) factors and
finding that “such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and
the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see United States v. Johnson, 877
F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2017).
As the District Court noted, Walton did not seek early termination under
§ 3583(e)(1). Thus, to the extent that Walton asked the District Court to terminate
his term of supervised release imposed as part of the original sentence for his
3 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 4 of 7
underlying offense, his request amounts to a collateral attack on the validity of that
sentence. Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to terminate his supervised release in this revocation proceeding.
II.
We review the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) de novo. See
Cunningham, 607 F.3d at 1266. Under § 3583(e)(3), the district court may, after
considering the factors in § 3553(a), “revoke a term of supervised release, and
require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised
release,” if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district
court has discretion in deciding how long to imprison the defendant, provided it
does not exceed certain statutory maxima listed in § 3583(e)(3).
In United States v. Cunningham, we held that § 3583(e)(3) does not violate
the Fifth Amendment right to due process or the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. 607 F.3d at 1268. “[T]he violation of supervised release need only be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no right to trial by jury in a
supervised release revocation hearing.” Id. Under our prior precedent rule, we are
bound by this prior decision unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court
or this Court sitting en banc. United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th
4 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 5 of 7
Cir. 2003). Therefore, our precedent in Cunningham forecloses Walton’s
argument that § 3583(e)(3) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
To avoid application of the prior panel precedent rule, Walton argues that
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Haymond, 129 S. Ct. 2369
(2019), casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 3583(e), and thus our holding in
Cunningham. In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that § 3583(k) violates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments because it imposes a new mandatory minimum
sentence upon revocation of supervised release based on additional judge-found
facts. 139 S. Ct. at 2374, 2378, 2384–85; id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). But it clarified that its holding was “limited to § 3583(k),” id. at 2383
(plurality opinion), and it explicitly did not address the constitutionality of
§ 3583(e) or (g), id. at 2382 n.7. Haymond therefore does not overrule or abrogate
our precedent in Cunningham regarding the constitutionality of § 3583(e).
Moreover, the District Court found that § 3583(e)(3) did not control its
decision because § 3583(g) separately mandated revocation of Walton’s term of
supervised release. Under § 3583(g), revocation is mandatory if the defendant
possessed a controlled substance or a firearm in violation of the conditions of his
supervised release, refused to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of
supervised release, or, as part of that drug testing, tested positive for a controlled
substance more than three times in one year. Id. § 3583(g).
5 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 6 of 7
Walton did not challenge the constitutionality of § 3583(g) below. 2 We
therefore review only for plain error this new constitutional challenge raised for the
first time on appeal. See United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.
2005). Under plain error review, the defendant must show there is “(1) an error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 1271 (quotations
omitted). Even then, we will exercise our discretion to correct the error “only if it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). Where the explicit language of a statute
does not specifically resolve an issue, and there is no precedent from the Supreme
Court or this Court directly resolving it, there can be no plain error. United States
v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, Walton has not identified any binding precedent—nor have we found
any—indicating that § 3583(g) is unconstitutional. And, as explained above, the
Supreme Court in Haymond expressed no view on the constitutionality of
§ 3583(g). See 139 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7. As such, Walton cannot establish plain
error.3
* * *
2 Although he cited § 3583(g) in his motion, his argument focused only on the constitutionality of § 3583(e)(3). 3 See United States v. Badgett, 957 F.3d 536, 540–41 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the district court could not have plainly erred in applying § 3583(g) because there currently is no caselaw from either the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit extending Haymond to § 3583(g) revocations). 6 Case: 20-10731 Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Page: 7 of 7
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in finding that it
lacked jurisdiction to terminate Walton’s original term of supervised release, and
in rejecting Walton’s arguments that § 3583(e)(3) and (g) are unconstitutional. We
therefore affirm the revocation of Walton’s supervised release.
AFFIRMED.