United States v. Christopher Miles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 4, 2023
• Docket: 21-4187
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4187

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER RAEKWON ALLEN MILES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00229-WO-1)

Submitted: October 31, 2022 Decided: January 4, 2023

Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, Mary Ann Courtney, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Christopher Raekwon Allen Miles appeals the 66-month sentence imposed

following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). On appeal, Miles challenges the district court’s imposition

of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with

another felony offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018).

He also argues that his sentence, which is above the high end of the advisory Guidelines

range, is substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

Guidelines range,” for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first evaluate the sentence

for significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,

insufficiently considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or inadequately explaining the

chosen sentence. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). We then

consider whether the sentence is substantively reasonable; that is, we examine whether the

sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to “satisf[y] the standards set forth in

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

When considering a challenge to the district court’s application of the Guidelines,

we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear

error. United States v. Allen, 909 F.3d 671, 677 (4th Cir. 2018). If the district court’s

factual findings are “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we “may not

reverse” for clear error. Butts v. United States, 930 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal

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quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the clear error standard, we will only reverse

if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United

States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) directs a four-level enhancement if the defendant “used or

possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). A firearm is possessed “in connection with” another felony offense “if

the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony

offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A); see United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 162

(4th Cir. 2009). “[T]his standard is not especially burdensome: We will find it satisfied

when a firearm has some purpose or effect with respect to the other offense, including cases

where a firearm is present for protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v.

Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). To impose

the enhancement, a district court must find the underlying facts by a preponderance of the

evidence; that is, the court must “believe that the existence of [the] fact[s] is more probable

than [their] nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court found that Miles possessed a firearm in connection with the

drug trafficking offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Miles concedes

that the evidence supports that he engaged in a felony drug trafficking offense, but he

argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the firearm in

connection with that offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence from which the court could find that it was more likely than not that the

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firearm emboldened Miles or was present for the protection of his drug trafficking activity.

Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in imposing the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

sentencing enhancement.

Turning to Miles’ challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, * a

sentence is substantively reasonable only if it is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”

to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, in

reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Nance,

957 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a sentence outside the

Guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the

extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Miles’ sentence of 66 months’ imprisonment was 15 months above the high end of

the advisory Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment. However, the district

court thoroughly discussed how the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence imposed,

reasoning that this variance was necessary to serve the statutory purpose of deterrence

given Miles’ persistent recidivism, disregard for others’ safety, and overly lenient prior

* Although Miles does not dispute the procedural reasonableness of his sentence on grounds other than the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, we conclude that the sentence is otherwise procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that court must ensure sentence’s procedural reasonableness before addressing defendant’s challenge to substantive reasonableness).

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sentences. The court also emphasized that Miles had fired the illegal firearm into the air

eight times on one occasion, seriously endangering the public, and that this conduct was

not incorporated in the calculation of his advisory Guidelines range. In light of the court’s

thorough explanation, we conclude that Miles’ sentence is substantively reasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm Miles’ criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED