United States v. Christopher Hill

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-1307
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 23-1307 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER HILL, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division. No. 4:20-cr-00017 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED MAY 28, 2025 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2025 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, ST. EVE, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Christopher Hill appeals from his conviction for dealing methamphetamine on the basis that the jury who decided his case was not impartial. At the end of voir dire, two prospective jurors were questioned, both of whom had familial connections to law enforcement. Hill’s motion to strike one—Juror 53—was granted but his motion to strike the other—Juror 55—was denied. Given the 2 No. 23-1307

difference in answers from the prospective jurors, the une- quivocal statement from Juror 55 that she would listen to the evidence and be impartial, and the deference we give to a dis- trict judge making credibility determinations, we affirm Hill’s conviction. I. Facts Christopher Hill was facing charges for dealing metham- phetamine. In October 2020, the FBI received information from the Jeffersonville, Indiana Police Department that Hill was selling drugs in the Clark County area and the two law enforcement agencies used a confidential informant to buy drugs from Hill. Hill agreed to sell four ounces of metham- phetamine for $1,500. As Hill drove from his residence to the agreed-upon meeting place, Jeffersonville officers stopped and arrested him. During the arrest, two baggies containing about 100 grams (or about three and a half ounces) of meth- amphetamine fell out of Hill’s pocket. Hill stated that he used methamphetamine, and the drugs were for his personal use. Law enforcement recovered a handgun, other drugs, and cash from Hill’s car and residence. Hill was charged four days later with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Hill’s case proceeded to a jury trial. The district court con- ducted voir dire by questioning potential jurors in groups and had moved through two groups before reaching the prospec- tive jurors at issue in this appeal. Other prospective jurors had been struck for cause and the parties had also exercised per- emptory strikes. When Jurors 53 and 55 were questioned, only one juror was still needed and an alternate juror could have been impaneled. No. 23-1307 3

Both Jurors 53 and 55 had family connections to law en- forcement. Juror 53 was previously married to a Clark County Sheriff’s officer for 15 years, and Juror 55 had one son who was a state trooper and another son who was training to be- come a police officer. Juror 55 said initially that she thought having two sons in law enforcement would affect her ability to be a fair and im- partial juror because she “worr[ied] about [her] son every sin- gle night he goes to work. The majority of [his] arrests are drugs and alcohol.” The district court acknowledged Juror 55’s concern for her children’s safety but noted “that doesn’t have anything to do with your ability to be a fair and impar- tial juror.” The judge instructed both prospective jurors that a juror’s responsibility was to listen to the testimony of a wit- ness, determine whether the testimony was credible, and then make a decision based on the evidence and the law. When the judge asked whether the two prospective jurors could decide solely based on the testimony and evidence that came from the witness stand, Juror 55 said, “I could try.” The questioning did not end there. The judge asked if Ju- ror 55 could give law enforcement officers’ testimony the same weight as the testimony of any other witness. Juror 55 answered affirmatively, saying “I think so, yes.” Upon ques- tioning from the defense counsel, she acknowledged that she “somewhat” shared a concern about whether she could give Hill a “fair shake” but said, “I don’t think I would favor with the police officer. I mean, I would have to listen to the evi- dence[.]” And when asked whether she would “discount” the questioning of a police officer by the defense, she replied, “Not necessarily, no.” 4 No. 23-1307

As we will discuss in more detail below, the questioning of Juror 55 stood in contrast to the questioning of Juror 53, the other prospective juror. Juror 53 stated that she felt she “would side with the police officers” and had concerns that she “might ... feel as though the police officer was doing their job and possibly be impartial [sic] because of that.” Juror 53 only repeated that she “would try” to follow an instruction not to give a law enforcement officer’s testimony greater weight. She admitted that she was hesitant about whether she could be fair and impartial to Hill. Juror 53 did not make any statements about listening to the evidence before she made a decision about a law enforcement officer’s credibility as a wit- ness. The defense moved to strike Jurors 53 and 55, and the dis- trict court responded with a split decision: Lawyers, I’m going to grant the motion to strike num- ber 53 for cause, and I’m going to deny the motion to strike number 55. Number 55 did tell me that, when I asked her, “Do you feel you could give—might give more or less weight to the testimony of a law enforce- ment witness as opposed to a civilian witness,” and I asked her specifically would she be able to judge the credibility of a law enforcement officer the same as any other witness, and she said, “I think so, yes.” She also said that she would have to hear the testi- mony—again, which is the correct answer—before she could determine the credibility of a witness. So I’m go- ing to deny your motion for cause on 55. Juror 53 was excused and Juror 55 sat. After the presentation of evidence, the jury found Hill guilty of possession with No. 23-1307 5

intent to distribute. Hill was sentenced to 188 months of im- prisonment, or about 15 and a half years. Hill appealed his conviction. The sole issue on appeal is whether Hill’s constitutional right to an impartial jury was vi- olated. II. Discussion A person standing trial for criminal charges is entitled to an impartial jury by both the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s promise of due process. United States v. Torres- Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 997 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of dis- cretion the district court’s denial of a motion to disqualify a juror for cause. United States v. Sheffler, 125 F.4th 814, 828 (7th Cir. 2025). We give this deference because the district judge can see and hear the prospective jurors as they are questioned and pick up on non-verbal cues that are lost when reading a transcript. United States v. Granger, 70 F.4th 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2023). Our focus is on whether the jury that actually sat and deliberated was impartial. United States v. Lott, 442 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2006). “The requirement of an impartial jury is met when ‘the prospective juror has given final, unequivocal assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for purposes of deciding the case, she can set aside any opinion she might hold, relin- quish her prior beliefs, or lay aside her biases or her prejudi- cial personal experiences.’” United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Allen, 605 F.3d at 464–65). The entirety of the prospective juror’s questioning is relevant to determining whether she made sufficient assurances that she could act impartially. Granger, 70 F.4th at 411–12. The district 6 No. 23-1307

court, and we on review, are both interpreting the prospective juror’s statements—does she evince a bias, does she say she can put that bias aside—as well as judging the credibility of her statements—is she telling the truth? See Thompson v. Al- theimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (drawing a distinction between credibility finding and interpreting whether a juror’s statement “manifest[s] a degree of bias such that the judge abused his discretion in failing to strike her for cause”). Juror 55 acknowledged that her sons’ careers might affect her partiality during the trial. Particularly relevant here, Juror 55 was concerned about the danger posed to her sons by ar- resting people for drug and alcohol-related offenses, which likely made her extra sensitive to the allegations of drug-deal- ing in this case. That is potential bias—Juror 55’s concerns may have resulted in a preference for the police officers who were making the arrest or an antagonism toward someone who was accused of dealing drugs. But the relevant inquiry is not just whether Juror 55 had a prior, material belief or preju- dice, but also whether she could “lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences and render a fair and impar- tial verdict.” Thompson, 248 F.3d at 627 (internal quotation omitted). Juror 55 made affirmative statements that she could de- cide the case based solely on the evidence at trial and that she would consider the testimony of a law enforcement officer the same as she would any other witness. The judge asked whether Juror 55 could “listen to the testimony and the evi- dence that comes from the witness stand and base a decision solely on that,” and Juror 55 responded, “I could try.” That statement standing alone might be insufficient, see Thompson, No. 23-1307 7

248 F.3d at 626, but Juror 55 also nodded in answer to the question of whether she could “render a verdict solely on the evidence presented at the trial” and “set aside any personal beliefs or opinions.” What’s more, Juror 55 responded, “I think so, yes,” to the question of whether she could give law enforcement witness testimony the same weight as any other witness. Prefacing an affirmative statement with “I think” or “I believe” does not automatically make it equivocal. See United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (juror’s response, “I believe so, yes” communicated “her ability to serve impartially”); see also United States v. Beasley, 48 F.3d 262, 267–68 (7th Cir. 1995) (accepting without discus- sion “I don’t think so” as unequivocal assurance of impartial- ity). And when pushed by defense counsel about how she would approach the testimony of a police officer, Juror 55 said, “I don’t think I would favor with the police officer. I mean, I would have to listen to the evidence and—[.]” This statement that she would listen to the evidence before coming to a decision on the credibility of a police officer, offered with- out prompting, is a strong indicator that Juror 55 would be able to set aside her personal biases and prejudices. See Allen, 605 F.3d at 465–66 (juror’s affirmative statement that she could give defendant “the benefit of the doubt” supports con- clusion she could be impartial). Looking at the entire interac- tion, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Juror 55 made credible unequivocal assurances that she could set aside her biases and serve as an impartial juror. Hill also points out that Juror 53 and Juror 55 both had fa- milial connections to law enforcement and expressed 8 No. 23-1307

reservations about their ability to be impartial, but only Juror 53 was excused for cause. He argues that there was no mean- ingful difference between the two prospective jurors, and it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to excuse one and not the other. We disagree. First, Juror 53 knew one of the officers who was involved in the case and who testified at trial. In the context of juror selection, we use the term “implied bias” to denote situations in which there is a close relationship between the prospective juror and someone or something in the case and so a court should “err[] on the side of caution” and excuse the prospec- tive juror. United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000). Juror 53’s direct connection to an officer testifying in the case is a classic example of implied bias. In addition, Juror 53 gave different answers than Juror 55. Juror 53’s initial statement of bias was specifically about wit- ness credibility and preference—she said she felt she would side with the police officers and would be more likely to be- lieve a police officer. In contrast, Juror 55’s initial statement about bias was couched in terms of her concern about her sons’ safety. And later, unlike Juror 55’s “I think so, yes” re- sponse, Juror 53 only answered, “I would try,” when asked if she could give equal weight to law enforcement testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Lastly, Juror 53 never affirmatively said that she would listen to the evidence before coming to a conclusion, as Juror 55 did in response to defense counsel’s questioning. Based on the “cold transcript” of the hearing, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010), we can identify significant differences that explain why Juror 53 would be excused when Juror 55 was not. And this is without access to intonation, physical gestures, and other cues No. 23-1307 9

essential to determining whether a prospective juror is mak- ing a credible assurance of impartiality. It was not an abuse of discretion to excuse Juror 53 for cause and deny the motion as to Juror 55. III. Conclusion We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s deci- sion to sit Juror 55 and therefore AFFIRM.