Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10235 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00122-PGB-TBS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER GERARD DICKERSON, a.k.a. Casual,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(June 13, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Christopher Dickerson appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), (2); and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, he argues
that the district court should have suppressed an incriminating statement that he
made because he was being interrogated by law enforcement when he made the
statement, he had not yet been read his Miranda 1 rights, and he had previously
requested an attorney.
A district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress is reviewed
under a mixed standard of review, where we review the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo.
United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s
factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we may review the entire
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 3 of 7
record, including trial testimony. United States v. Morales, 893 F.3d 1360, 1367
(11th Cir. 2018).
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As
part of the procedure to safeguard a defendant’s right against self-incrimination,
the government must inform the defendant that he has the right to remain silent,
anything he says may be used against him in court, and he can consult with a
lawyer and have a lawyer present with him during interrogation. Id. at 467-73.
Once the accused invokes his right to counsel, authorities may not subject him to
further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication with the police. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However, if the suspect’s reference to an
attorney is “ambiguous or equivocal” from the perspective of a reasonable officer,
law enforcement is not required to stop questioning. Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
3 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Interrogation occurs “whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent,” which refers to words or actions
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). “Voluntary
incriminating statements, however, not made in response to an officer’s
questioning are freely admissible” even after Miranda rights are asserted. United
States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”).
The admission of statements in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless
error analysis. United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1435 (11th Cir. 1991). This
determination requires: (1) a two-fold inquiry into the effect of (A) the erroneously
admitted statement upon the other evidence introduced, and (B) the conduct of the
defense; and (2) whether, absent the illegal statement, the remaining evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
First, as to the issue of whether Dickerson actually requested a lawyer at the
scene of his arrest and invoked his Miranda rights—based on Officer Detitto’s
testimony that Dickerson said that he wanted to “think about it”—Dickerson’s
reference to having an attorney was ambiguous. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Because
Dickerson did not affirmatively request an attorney, law enforcement was not
4 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 5 of 7
required to refrain from questioning him. Id. Regardless, the issue of whether
Dickerson requested an attorney is not dispositive because, as discussed more
below, the district court did not err in concluding that Dickerson was not being
interrogated and his statement was voluntary.
Based on the testimony given both at the suppression hearing and trial and a
review of the recorded interview, Officer Middleton was reading Dickerson his
charges and explaining the associated penalties immediately before Dickerson
made an incriminating statement, not unlike the officers in Suggs showing the
suspect the indictment right before the suspect incriminated himself. Suggs, 755
F.2d at 1541-42. Although Middleton did warn Dickerson that he could get a
longer sentence if he did not cooperate, those statements were made after
Dickerson had incriminated himself and thus could not have been said to elicit his
incriminating statement. Therefore, the district court reasonably concluded that
Middleton’s statements were not the “functional equivalent of interrogation.”
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Moreover, even if Dickerson was being interrogated, his
incriminating statement was not responsive to Middleton’s statement that he would
be considered an armed career criminal. Id. at 1542. Dickerson interrupted
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Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10235 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00122-PGB-TBS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER GERARD DICKERSON, a.k.a. Casual,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(June 13, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Christopher Dickerson appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), (2); and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, he argues
that the district court should have suppressed an incriminating statement that he
made because he was being interrogated by law enforcement when he made the
statement, he had not yet been read his Miranda 1 rights, and he had previously
requested an attorney.
A district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress is reviewed
under a mixed standard of review, where we review the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo.
United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s
factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we may review the entire
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 3 of 7
record, including trial testimony. United States v. Morales, 893 F.3d 1360, 1367
(11th Cir. 2018).
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As
part of the procedure to safeguard a defendant’s right against self-incrimination,
the government must inform the defendant that he has the right to remain silent,
anything he says may be used against him in court, and he can consult with a
lawyer and have a lawyer present with him during interrogation. Id. at 467-73.
Once the accused invokes his right to counsel, authorities may not subject him to
further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication with the police. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However, if the suspect’s reference to an
attorney is “ambiguous or equivocal” from the perspective of a reasonable officer,
law enforcement is not required to stop questioning. Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
3 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Interrogation occurs “whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent,” which refers to words or actions
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). “Voluntary
incriminating statements, however, not made in response to an officer’s
questioning are freely admissible” even after Miranda rights are asserted. United
States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”).
The admission of statements in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless
error analysis. United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1435 (11th Cir. 1991). This
determination requires: (1) a two-fold inquiry into the effect of (A) the erroneously
admitted statement upon the other evidence introduced, and (B) the conduct of the
defense; and (2) whether, absent the illegal statement, the remaining evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
First, as to the issue of whether Dickerson actually requested a lawyer at the
scene of his arrest and invoked his Miranda rights—based on Officer Detitto’s
testimony that Dickerson said that he wanted to “think about it”—Dickerson’s
reference to having an attorney was ambiguous. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Because
Dickerson did not affirmatively request an attorney, law enforcement was not
4 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 5 of 7
required to refrain from questioning him. Id. Regardless, the issue of whether
Dickerson requested an attorney is not dispositive because, as discussed more
below, the district court did not err in concluding that Dickerson was not being
interrogated and his statement was voluntary.
Based on the testimony given both at the suppression hearing and trial and a
review of the recorded interview, Officer Middleton was reading Dickerson his
charges and explaining the associated penalties immediately before Dickerson
made an incriminating statement, not unlike the officers in Suggs showing the
suspect the indictment right before the suspect incriminated himself. Suggs, 755
F.2d at 1541-42. Although Middleton did warn Dickerson that he could get a
longer sentence if he did not cooperate, those statements were made after
Dickerson had incriminated himself and thus could not have been said to elicit his
incriminating statement. Therefore, the district court reasonably concluded that
Middleton’s statements were not the “functional equivalent of interrogation.”
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Moreover, even if Dickerson was being interrogated, his
incriminating statement was not responsive to Middleton’s statement that he would
be considered an armed career criminal. Id. at 1542. Dickerson interrupted
Middleton’s explanation of the penalties to make his incriminating statement.
Therefore, his voluntary incriminating statement was properly admissible. Suggs,
755 F.2d at 1541.
5 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 6 of 7
To the extent that Dickerson relies on Officer Roman’s question about
whether he could remove his mask, Officer Roman’s question was not the
functional equivalent of interrogation under Miranda because a reasonable officer
would not have thought that the question was likely to elicit an incriminating
response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (1980). Moreover, Dickerson did not make
his statement until a few minutes after Officer Roman asked him about removing
the mask, and Dickerson’s statement was unresponsive to Officer Roman’s
statements about his mask. Suggs, 755 F.2d at 1542. Though Dickerson argues
that Roman’s actions created a coercive environment, the focus of the inquiry is on
the officer’s reasonable expectation of the suspect’s response. Innis, 446 U.S. at
300-01 (1980).
Even if the incriminating statement did violate Miranda, the error was
harmless. Beale, 921 F.2d at 1435. Though Dickerson argues that the statement
had a spillover effect on the drug charges by making the jury believe he was a “bad
guy,” this argument is rebutted by the fact that the jury acquitted him of several of
the drug charges, showing that the jury considered the evidence against each of the
drug charges and was not improperly influenced by Dickerson’s incriminating
statement. Further, both Officer Roman and Officer Gwizdala testified at length
about the sale of firearms that underlaid the charge, and both were directly
involved in and witnesses to that transaction. Both were also able to identify the
6 Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 7 of 7
firearms that were purchased from Dickerson. Therefore, even without
Dickerson’s incriminating statement, the remaining evidence established his guilt
as to the firearms charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Beale, 921 F.2d at 1435.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.