United States v. Christian

86 F. App'x 272

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

Footnotes

•

*

Appellant Rickey D. Christian appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

The district court properly excluded time from the running of the Speedy Trial Act limitation period,¹ both with respect to pending motions and the “ends of justice” provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) and (8)(A).

II

The district court did not abuse its discretion² in denying Appellant a fourth new lawyer. The court’s inquiry was adequate.³ Further, there was no showing that the degree of conflict between Appellant and his lawyer was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.⁴

III

We decline to consider Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance “are generally inappropriate on direct appeal” due to the lack of a sufficient evidentiary record.⁵ The record here is not sufficiently developed to permit review. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel was not so inadequate as to obviously deny him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.⁶

IV

The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept Appellant’s guilty plea. Appellant refused to engage in a plea colloquy. Therefore, the district court could not determine whether there was a factual basis for the plea.⁷

V

Sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction. Several witnesses identified the Appellant as the individual who pulled a firearm out of his pocket and pointed it at a man in the tavern. In addition, Appellant’s ex-wife identified the weapon as belonging to Appellant. No error, much less plain error,⁸ has been shown to exist.

VI

We decline to consider Appellant’s argument that his statements to a transporting agent were involuntary and should have been suppressed. His failure to raise the argument before the trial court constitutes a waiver of the issue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) “requires that motions to suppress evidence be raised prior to trial,” and “failure to bring a timely suppression motion constitutes a waiver of the issue.”⁹

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir.2002).

2

. See United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 359, 157 L.Ed.2d 254 (2003) (setting forth standard of review).

3

. See United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1986).

4

. Id.

5

. United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.2000).

6

. Id.

7

. See Fed. R.Crim. P. 11(f) (2002).

8

. United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2000) (setting forth standard of review).

9

. United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 931, 123 S.Ct. 333, 154 L.Ed.2d 228 (2002) (citation omitted).