United States v. Christensen

200 B.R. 869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14255, 1996 WL 551747
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedSeptember 19, 1996
DocketNo. CIV 95-4139
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 200 B.R. 869 (United States v. Christensen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Christensen, 200 B.R. 869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14255, 1996 WL 551747 (D.S.D. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PIERSOL, District Judge.

On August 21, 1996, pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, the government filed with the Clerk an “Application For Writ Of Continuing Garnishment” on the Default Judgment entered against the defendant, Clark V. Christensen, in the amount of $35,815.49, plus post-judgment interest, amounting to $37,887.86 due as of August 20, 1996. The Clerk issued the Clerk’s Notice of Post-Judgment Garnishment the same day. On August 23, 1996, the government served upon defendant Christensen and upon the garnishee, M & R Inc., d/b/a Gayville & Wakonda Grain & Milling, the government’s Application, the Writ of Continuing Garnishment, Instructions to the Garnishee, the Clerk’s Notice of Posh-Judgment Garnishment, and a Claim for Exemption Form. The garnishee answered, and defendant Christensen filed a claim of exemptions and requested a hearing. Prior to the hearing held on Monday, September 16, 1996, defendant Christensen amended his claim of exemptions.

The government challenges defendant Christensen’s attempt to claim the Bankruptcy Code exemptions as well as a federal law exemption for weekly net disposable wages. Section 3014(a) of Title 28 provides, “An individual debtor may, in an action or proceeding under this chapter, elect to exempt property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2)” of the statute. “Paragraph 1 exemptions” are those specified in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). “Paragraph 2 exemptions” are “any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than paragraph (1), or State or local law that is applicable on the date” the application for garnishment is filed. The Court agrees with the government that the express language of § 3014(a) requires the debtor to elect between the “paragraph 1” and the “paragraph 2” exemptions; the debt- or may not elect both.

The Bankruptcy Code exemptions listed in § 522(d) do not expressly mention wages. Under the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, however, an individual may shield from garnishment in any work week seventy-five percent of his disposable earnings or “the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage[,]” whichever is less. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a). The government correctly argues that the exemption for wages under the Consumer Credit Protection Act is a “paragraph 2 exemption” for purposes of applying § 3014(a) because the wage exemption is permitted under federal law and is not included in the “paragraph 1 exemptions” of § 3014(a). Therefore, defendant Christensen may not claim both the Bankruptcy Code exemptions specified in [871]*871§ 522(d) and weekly net disposable wages that may be exempted under federal law.

The Court finds that defendant Christensen clearly intended to claim Bankruptcy Code exemptions in his original and in his amended claims of exemption. In the original claim, he checked line 8 for “Bankruptcy Code” and thereafter checked lines 8a. through 8e., which set out the specific Bankruptcy Code exemptions. Defendant Christensen is entitled to claim $15,000 for a residence; he claims $1,000 equity in a mobile home at Wakonda. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). He may claim $2,400 in equity in a motor vehicle; he claims $350 in equity in a 1969 Ford pickup. See § 522(d)(2). While he claimed in his original petition $5,420 in equity in a growing crop and $52.31 for “wages not covered by Federal wage exemption statute” pursuant to § 522(d)(3), he now deletes the reference to these exemptions in his amended petition. The Court accepts this proposed amendment only as to deletion of the claim for wages; under § 522(d)(3), defendant Christensen is entitled to a $400 exemption for his growing crop. The remaining equity in the crop will be discussed below. Defendant Christensen may claim $1,000 in jewelry; he claims exemption for a ring and bracelet valued at $25.00. See § 522(d)(4). Defendant Christensen checked as well the line permitting him a $1,500 exemption for equity in implements, professional books, or tools used in his trade. The government does not dispute, and the Court finds, that defendant Christensen is entitled to each of these claimed Bankruptcy Code exemptions.

At issue is defendant’s proposed use of the personal property or “wild card” exemption permitted in § 522(d)(5), which provides for:

The debtor’s aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in value $800 plus up to $7,500 of any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection [the $15,000 homestead exemption].

In other words, a debtor like defendant Christensen, who has claimed only a small portion of his $15,000 homestead exemption, may claim an additional exemption of up to $8,300 for an aggregate interest in “any property.” In his original claim at line 8e., defendant Christensen sought exemption for $7,500 in “Excess Equity in growing crop, if any.” His amended claim of exemptions now reads:

a. All wages held by employer and due Defendant from date of garnishment to date of hearing on claim of exemption in the amount of approximately $209.25 (sic), net per week, or in the alternative, the excess wages not covered by item 9 of the Exemption form claimed exempt under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
b. Equity in growing crop in an amount equal to $7500.00 less wages claimed exempt under item 8e. pursuant to subpara-graph 3.(a) hereof.

The Court has held that defendant Christensen may not claim the Bankruptcy Code exemptions (“paragraph 1 exemptions”) as well as the wage exemption under federal law and any state exemptions (“paragraph 2 exemptions”). He has clearly elected the Bankruptcy Code exemptions, most likely because they are more favorable to him than state law exemptions. Consequently, defendant Christensen’s checkmark next' to line 9 of his original exemption claim form, seeking exemption for seventy-five percent of his weekly wages under federal law is without any effect. Furthermore, for the same reason, the Court rejects defendant Christensen’s alternative proposal in paragraph “a.” of his amended claim, quoted in the preceding paragraph, that he should be permitted to claim “the excess wages not covered by item 9 of the Exemption form claimed exempt under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.”

The question becomes whether defendant Christensen may claim under the “wild card” exemption of § 522(d)(5), the wages held by his employer from the date of garnishment to the date of the September 16 hearing, as well as equity in his growing crop over and above the $400 exemption permitted under § 522(d)(3), as he requests in his amended claim. To answer this question, the Court looks to bankruptcy law and other courts’ interpretation of § 522(d)(5). The Court is [872]*872aware that South Dakota is an “opt out” state for purposes of bankruptcy proceedings, see § 522(b)(1); that is, debtors in this state who file bankruptcy petitions may not claim the federal bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d), but are limited to state exemptions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
200 B.R. 869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14255, 1996 WL 551747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-christensen-sdd-1996.