United States v. Chelsey Aguirri
This text of United States v. Chelsey Aguirri (United States v. Chelsey Aguirri) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Case: 18-11531 Document: 00515002937 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2019
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
No. 18-11531 FILED Summary Calendar June 19, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
CHELSEY BROOK AGUIRRI,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:18-CR-54-1
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Chelsey Brook Aguirri pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. On appeal, she argues that her conviction is invalid because there was an insufficient factual basis for the plea. As grounds for her claim, Aguirri asserts that there is an insufficient factual basis for the interstate commerce element of § 922(g) because the statute requires more
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 18-11531 Document: 00515002937 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/19/2019
No. 18-11531
than a mere showing that the firearm passed from one state to another at some time in the past; that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce; and that there is an insufficient factual basis for the mens rea element of § 922(g) because there is no basis in the record to find that she knew of her felon status or knew that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. Aguirri concedes that these arguments are foreclosed and are raised only to preserve the issue for further review. The government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance because Aguirri’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s binding precedent. Aguirri’s interstate commerce element argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1996). Her argument challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g) is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2013). Her mens rea argument is foreclosed by United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705–06 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81–82 (5th Cir. 1988). Given the foregoing, summary affirmance is appropriate. See, e.g., Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment is AFFIRMED. The government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a response brief is DENIED as moot.
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