USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 1 of 6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12494 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
CHARLES BAKER, III, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:98-cr-00044-TFM-2 ____________________
Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Charles Baker, III, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act after its imposition of a 60-month USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 25-12494
prison sentence following the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the court abused its discretion because it failed to consider his entire record of post-offense conduct and gave signifi- cant weight to improper or irrelevant factors. We review a district court’s denial of an eligible movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally con- strued.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (italics omitted). The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b) to reduce the sentencing disparity between of- fenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder co- caine. Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, §§ 2, 3. Section 404 of the First Step Act made retroactive provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act that increased the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger higher mandatory minimums. See First Step Act § 404(b). Section 404 of the First Step Act allows a court to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. Id. Under § 404, a pris- oner may file a motion for a sentence reduction with the sentenc- ing court. Id. A movant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursu- ant to § 404 if he was sentenced for a “covered offense;” that is, if he was convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine that trig- gered the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). United USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 3 of 6
25-12494 Opinion of the Court 3
States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.4th 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486, 492-93 (2021) (detailing the offenses trig- gering eligibility for sentence reductions under the First Step Act). However, “§ 404(b) of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants with covered offenses but does not require them to do so.” Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 885. When reviewing a district court’s decision regarding the reduction of a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act, we recognize that courts have “a range of choice as long as the choice does not con- stitute a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have held that, “[b]ecause a period of supervised release is simply a part of the sentence for the underlying conviction,” a revocation sentence “is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a cov- ered offense within the meaning of the Act.” Id. at 884-85 (quota- tion marks omitted). In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that “the First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 500 (2022). The Supreme Court noted in Concepcion “that when decid- ing a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obliga- tion to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they consid- ered the parties’ arguments.” Id. at 500-01. That said, “a district court is not required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, . . . . [n]or is a district court required to articulate anything USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 4 of 6
4 Opinion of the Court 25-12494
more than a brief statement of reasons.” Id. at 501. We do not take a court’s failure to discuss certain mitigating evidence to mean “that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider this evi- dence in determining” a sentence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Section 3553(a) lists the factors that a court must consider when fashioning a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Courts must con- sider the following factors: (1) the defendant’s characteristics and the nature and circumstances of his offense; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter future criminal con- duct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed training or care; (3) the types of sentences available; (4) the types and lengths of sentences established for the category of offense and, in the case of a violation of supervised release, the applicable guide- lines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (5) pertinent policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide victims of the offense with restitution. Id. District courts are “not statutorily required to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in exercising its discretion un- der . . . the First Step Act.” United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2021). However, courts “may consider the § 3553(a) factors, as well as the probation office’s submissions, post-sentence rehabilitation, post-imprisonment rehabilitation, or any other relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. Because a district USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 5 of 6
25-12494 Opinion of the Court 5
court is not required to address the § 3553(a) factors, its “alternative exercise of discretion in denying a First Step Act motion can suffice for affirmance,” so “long as it is not ambiguous.” Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 885. Here, because Baker’s original offense was a “covered of- fense,” he is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. See Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 884; Terry, 593 U.S. at 492-93. How- ever, the district court was authorized to use its discretion to decide whether to grant Baker’s motion, and, consequently, whether to shorten his revocation sentence. See Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 884-85.
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USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 1 of 6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12494 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
CHARLES BAKER, III, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:98-cr-00044-TFM-2 ____________________
Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Charles Baker, III, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act after its imposition of a 60-month USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 25-12494
prison sentence following the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the court abused its discretion because it failed to consider his entire record of post-offense conduct and gave signifi- cant weight to improper or irrelevant factors. We review a district court’s denial of an eligible movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally con- strued.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (italics omitted). The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b) to reduce the sentencing disparity between of- fenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder co- caine. Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, §§ 2, 3. Section 404 of the First Step Act made retroactive provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act that increased the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger higher mandatory minimums. See First Step Act § 404(b). Section 404 of the First Step Act allows a court to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. Id. Under § 404, a pris- oner may file a motion for a sentence reduction with the sentenc- ing court. Id. A movant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursu- ant to § 404 if he was sentenced for a “covered offense;” that is, if he was convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine that trig- gered the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). United USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 3 of 6
25-12494 Opinion of the Court 3
States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.4th 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486, 492-93 (2021) (detailing the offenses trig- gering eligibility for sentence reductions under the First Step Act). However, “§ 404(b) of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants with covered offenses but does not require them to do so.” Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 885. When reviewing a district court’s decision regarding the reduction of a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act, we recognize that courts have “a range of choice as long as the choice does not con- stitute a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have held that, “[b]ecause a period of supervised release is simply a part of the sentence for the underlying conviction,” a revocation sentence “is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a cov- ered offense within the meaning of the Act.” Id. at 884-85 (quota- tion marks omitted). In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that “the First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 500 (2022). The Supreme Court noted in Concepcion “that when decid- ing a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obliga- tion to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they consid- ered the parties’ arguments.” Id. at 500-01. That said, “a district court is not required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, . . . . [n]or is a district court required to articulate anything USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 4 of 6
4 Opinion of the Court 25-12494
more than a brief statement of reasons.” Id. at 501. We do not take a court’s failure to discuss certain mitigating evidence to mean “that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider this evi- dence in determining” a sentence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Section 3553(a) lists the factors that a court must consider when fashioning a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Courts must con- sider the following factors: (1) the defendant’s characteristics and the nature and circumstances of his offense; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter future criminal con- duct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed training or care; (3) the types of sentences available; (4) the types and lengths of sentences established for the category of offense and, in the case of a violation of supervised release, the applicable guide- lines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (5) pertinent policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide victims of the offense with restitution. Id. District courts are “not statutorily required to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in exercising its discretion un- der . . . the First Step Act.” United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2021). However, courts “may consider the § 3553(a) factors, as well as the probation office’s submissions, post-sentence rehabilitation, post-imprisonment rehabilitation, or any other relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. Because a district USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 5 of 6
25-12494 Opinion of the Court 5
court is not required to address the § 3553(a) factors, its “alternative exercise of discretion in denying a First Step Act motion can suffice for affirmance,” so “long as it is not ambiguous.” Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 885. Here, because Baker’s original offense was a “covered of- fense,” he is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. See Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 884; Terry, 593 U.S. at 492-93. How- ever, the district court was authorized to use its discretion to decide whether to grant Baker’s motion, and, consequently, whether to shorten his revocation sentence. See Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 884-85. In the denial order issued by the district court, the court explained its reasoning, explaining that the sentence served the purposes of sanctioning Baker for his breach of trust and criminal conduct while under supervision, and it explicitly stated that the § 3553(a) factors did not favor relief. It also noted that it would have imposed a 60-month prison term regardless of whether the revocation hear- ing had been held before or after Baker’s conviction in the District of Arizona. Though Baker argues that the district court’s order did not make clear that it had considered his arguments in mitigation, the court specifically noted that it had considered Baker’s motion, the government’s response in opposition, and Baker’s reply when deciding whether to grant the motion. The district court’s reason- ing satisfies Concepcion’s requirement that courts show that they considered the parties’ arguments and explain their reasoning, par- ticularly considering that courts are not “required to articulate an- ything more than a brief statement of reasons.” Concepcion, 597 USCA11 Case: 25-12494 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026 Page: 6 of 6
6 Opinion of the Court 25-12494
U.S. at 500-01. Further, a court’s failure to mention certain argu- ments in mitigation does not suggest that the court failed to address them. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833. The court considered his argu- ments and determined that the relevant factors did not support a sentence reduction, and it was within its discretion to do so. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1318; Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 500; Gonzalez, 71 F.4th at 885. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Baker’s motion for a sentence reduction because it was within its discretion to do so, and it articulated its reasons for its decision. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED.