United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 09-1835
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
VINCENT CHANEY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Ripple,* and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Robert Herrick for appellant. Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom John P. Kacavas, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
July 27, 2011
* Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Vincent Chaney
appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized from him
in the raid of a motel room in which Chaney was a guest. Placed on
the floor and handcuffed in the wake of his host's arrest on drug
charges, Chaney consented to a search of his pants pocket to locate
identification; the search turned up seven small bags of crack
cocaine. A dozen rounds of .38-caliber ammunition were later
discovered in the pocket of his jacket.
After unsuccessfully moving to suppress this evidence,
Chaney entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of simple
possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm after a prior
felony conviction. On appeal, Chaney argues that the police
exceeded the scope of his consent by removing cocaine, rather than
identification, from his pocket; that his consent was the product
of a coercive atmosphere and hence not voluntary; and that all
evidence seized was the fruit of an unlawful de facto arrest.
Finding no reversible error in the district court's rulings, we
affirm.
I.
The events giving rise to this appeal took place in the
course of a police raid on a Manchester, New Hampshire motel room
in late 2005. In reciting the facts, we draw on the district
court's oral findings of fact at Chaney's suppression hearings as
well as testimony taken at those hearings.
-2- On November 30, 2005, state and federal law enforcement
officials in possession of a federal arrest warrant for a man named
Peter Boyd, suspected of distributing crack cocaine, went to the
Queen City Inn in Manchester, New Hampshire. Past experience
flagged the motel as a likely choice for local drug dealers looking
for temporary lodging. Shown a picture of Boyd, a clerk at the
Queen City Inn confirmed to an investigating United States Marshal
that a man of Boyd's appearance was staying in a room at the motel.
The marshal summoned four additional federal and local law
enforcement officers to the motel to aid in executing the warrant.
The motel room in which Boyd was staying was registered
in the name of Brigit Hebert, a woman familiar to the authorities
as the subject of several past drug-related arrest warrants.
Unbeknownst to the officers, also present in Hebert's motel room
was Vincent Chaney. According to his testimony at the suppression
hearings, Chaney had come the previous night from Virginia, hoping
to visit two of his daughters who were living with their mother in
Manchester. Arriving too late to visit with his daughters, Chaney
went to a bar and happened upon Boyd, an old acquaintance. Boyd
offered to put Chaney up for the night in the room he was sharing
with Hebert at the Queen City Inn. Boyd, Hebert, and Chaney were
thus all present in Hebert's motel room when the officers arrived
early in the afternoon of the next day to execute Boyd's arrest
warrant.
-3- Two local detectives were dispatched to cover the rear
door to Hebert's motel room while three marshals approached from
the front, knocking on the door and announcing their presence. The
door opened to reveal Boyd, wearing pajama pants but shirtless and
without shoes. Boyd was taken into custody, and the marshals
entered the room with their weapons drawn to perform a protective
sweep. They found the room darkened and clothing scattered across
the floor, with Hebert lying in bed and Chaney, whom the officers
did not recognize, standing next to it. The marshals told Hebert
to get out of bed and put her hands up, which she did. Chaney was
less compliant, edging toward the corner of the bed despite
repeated commands to stop moving and lie on the ground. After six
or more warnings, Chaney acquiesced and was handcuffed on the
floor. The marshals completed their sweep of the main room, the
space underneath the bed, and the bathroom, finding in plain view
two bags of what appeared to be marijuana (sitting on a
windowsill), three crack pipes (on the windowsill and on a chair),
and a number of rounds of .22-caliber ammunition (located in a
clear bag in the closet).1
1 A further search of the premises, conducted later in the day with Hebert's consent, unearthed two firearms (a .22-caliber, pump- action rifle with ammunition in it and a .38-caliber Derringer pistol), a bowl containing a white powdery substance that field- tested positive for cocaine, and various items associated with drug manufacture (baking soda, lighter fluid, and glassine bags). Notably, the Derringer pistol was found under the corner of the bed's mattress, the point toward which Chaney had been edging when the police first entered the motel room.
-4- As the protective sweep was being conducted, the marshals
opened the rear door of the motel to admit the local detectives.
Detective Brian Newcomb approached Chaney, patted him down for
weapons, and then attempted to learn his identity. Chaney was not
immediately forthright, telling Detective Newcomb only that his
name was Vincent and providing him with several false dates of
birth. After the local dispatch reported that it was unable to
find a match for the dates of birth in their database, Newcomb
asked Chaney if he had any identification. Chaney indicated that
he did, and that it could be found in his back pocket. Detective
Newcomb asked for and was granted consent to retrieve the
identification from Chaney's back pocket, but the pocket turned out
to be empty. Asked if the identification might be located
elsewhere, Chaney suggested that it might be in his left front
pocket. Chaney again consented to have Newcomb search his pocket
for the identification.
Detective Newcomb placed his hand in Chaney's left front
pocket and removed first a plastic bag that held seven individual
plastic bags, each of which contained a "chunky off-white
substance"; he then reentered Chaney's pocket and removed a social
security card.2 Newcomb believed the off-white substance in the
2 Chaney disputed the sequence of events in his testimony at the suppression hearing. According to Chaney, he responded to Newcomb's request for identification by removing the social security card from his back pocket and turning it over to Newcomb. Detective Newcomb then allegedly asked Chaney if he had any sharp
-5- bags to be crack cocaine, having seen the substance in his prior
law enforcement experience some fifty to one hundred times (a field
test later confirmed his suspicions). Newcomb informed Chaney that
he was under arrest for possession of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute. After learning from dispatch that the social security
card found in Chaney's pocket, which bore the name "Vincent Earold
Chaney," belonged to a four-year-old boy,3 Newcomb again asked
Chaney for his date of birth. Chaney provided the correct date
this time, and a search of police records confirmed his identity
and revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Massachusetts
for a probation violation.
As Detective Newcomb was escorting Chaney to a police car
outside the motel, Chaney asked Newcomb to retrieve a backpack and
jacket Chaney had left in the room. Newcomb retrieved a backpack
and jacket matching the description provided by Chaney. After
Chaney confirmed that they belonged to him, Newcomb searched both
items, locating in the jacket pocket a plastic bag containing
twelve rounds of .38-caliber ammunition.
objects in his pockets, Chaney told Newcomb that he did not, and Newcomb proceeded to search Chaney's other pockets and remove items (including the plastic bags containing cocaine) without consent. In his oral findings of fact, Judge DiClerico adopted Detective Newcomb's version of the consensual search, implicitly discrediting Chaney's account. 3 The card belonged to Chaney's deceased son, Vincent Chaney, Jr. Chaney stated that he had mistakenly grabbed the wrong identification card when he left his home in Virginia.
-6- Chaney was eventually indicted in the district court on
two counts arising out of the incident: one count of simple
possession of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and
one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after a prior felony
conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924(a)(2).4
Chaney moved to suppress all of the evidence seized in the course
of his detention and arrest.
The district court held two evidentiary hearings to
evaluate possible grounds for suppression. The first, held by
Judge DiClerico on September 4, 2008, addressed Chaney's argument
that the search of Hebert's motel room was unlawful due to the
absence of a valid search warrant. After testimony from Chaney and
three of the police officers who conducted the search and arrest,
Judge DiClerico ruled that Chaney lacked standing to challenge the
search of the motel room. The judge also found that Chaney had
consented to a search of his pockets, and that the search of
Chaney's jacket before turning it over to him had been reasonable
in light of officer safety concerns.
4 Chaney's indictment charged one additional felon-in- possession count related to a 2007 incident where an officer noticed a handgun in Chaney's pocket during a routine traffic stop. Chaney successfully moved to sever trial on the 2007 charge from the 2005 charges. Though the district court initially suppressed all evidence seized in the 2007 traffic stop, we reversed in an earlier appeal filed by the government. See United States v. Chaney, 584 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009).
-7- A second hearing was held before Judge Barbadoro on
September 17, 2008.5 After brief supplemental testimony from two
of the officers, Chaney's counsel presented arguments that the
search of Chaney's pockets occurred during an unlawful de facto
arrest and that Chaney's consent to the search was invalid because
it was the product of coercion. Judge Barbadoro rejected the
arguments, ruling that Chaney's detention was not a de facto
arrest, being limited in duration and reasonable in scope, and that
Chaney's consent was voluntary. At the close of the hearing, the
judge confirmed that all of the issues concerning Chaney's
detention and consent were preserved for appeal:
It's preserved for purposes of appeal that the entry was illegal. It's preserved for purposes of appeal that the scope of the detention after the entry was improper, and it's preserved for purposes of appeal that any consent given was not valid and does not justify and make lawful the seizure that followed. I think you've presented every possible suppression argument that can be presented.
Chaney subsequently entered into a conditional plea
agreement by which he reserved his right to appeal the district
court's suppression rulings. Subject to that agreement, Chaney
pled guilty to one count of simple possession and one count of
5 Following the first suppression hearing, the case was reassigned to Judge Barbadoro due to Judge DiClerico's unavailability for trial. Judge Barbadoro set the additional suppression hearing in response to concerns from Chaney that certain arguments had not been addressed in the first hearing.
-8- possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. Judgment was
entered against Chaney in April 2009, and this timely appeal
followed.
II.
In evaluating the district court's denial of Chaney's
suppression motion, we review the court's findings of fact for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2010). Chaney raises three
challenges to the district court's ruling. First, he argues that
the removal from his pocket of plastic bags containing cocaine
exceeded the scope of his consent, which, he asserts, was limited
to a search of his pocket to locate identification. Second, he
argues that, even if he consented to a general search of his pants
pocket, the consent was involuntary because of an unduly coercive
atmosphere. Third, he argues that the consent was the fruit of an
unlawful, de facto arrest, and thus any evidence found in the
course of the search must be excluded. We address each of Chaney's
contentions in turn.
A. Scope of Consent
It is a fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment law
that a warrantless search may be conducted with the voluntary
consent of a person authorized to give such consent. See United
States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)). A
-9- warrantless search may not, however, exceed the scope of the
consent granted. United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 286 (1st
Cir. 2003). The scope of the consented-to search is generally
defined by the expressed object of the search, which is "measured
by a test of objective reasonableness: 'what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and subject?'" Id. at 286-87 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
The United States raises a threshold objection to our
consideration of Chaney's scope-of-consent argument, contending
that the issue is forfeited due to Chaney's failure to squarely
raise it in the suppression hearings.6 There may be some force to
the government's argument, as the scope-of-consent argument Chaney
presses on appeal does not appear to have been made below. See
United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (forfeiture
"applies not only when a defendant has failed altogether to make a
suppression motion but also when, having made one, he has neglected
to include the particular ground that he later seeks to argue").
On the other hand, Chaney raised generally the issue of the
6 The government identifies this argument as a claim of waiver, but it is actually one of forfeiture. As we have often explained, an argument or right is waived only when it is intentionally abandoned; mere failure to raise an argument or right due to inattention or neglect constitutes forfeiture. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002). The distinction is a substantive one. Waiver generally bars an issue from being raised on appeal, whereas forfeiture allows the issue to be reviewed for plain error. Id.
-10- adequacy of his consent before the district court, and the court
assured him that it was "preserved for purposes of appeal that any
consent given . . . does not justify and make lawful the seizure
that followed." Because we may readily dispose of Chaney's
argument on the merits, we sidestep the government's claim of
forfeiture and address the scope-of-consent issue head-on. See
Stierhoff, 549 F.3d at 23.
According to testimony from Detective Newcomb, who
performed the search of Chaney's pocket, Chaney "stated that [the
detective] could go through his left front pocket and find
[Chaney's] identification." Chaney argues that the "expressed
object" of this consented-to search was retrieval of
identification, and thus the removal of the plastic bags from his
pocket fell outside of the scope of his consent. We disagree.
The tight confines of a pants pocket leave a searching
hand little room for maneuvering and distinguishing between various
objects that may be contained therein. Given consent to retrieve
an object from such a cramped space, it is objectively reasonable
to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that
either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be
immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other
items in the pocket. Nothing in Chaney's exchange with Detective
Newcomb suggests that he intended to withhold consent for these
sorts of practical measures that are reasonable incidents to the
-11- search of a pocket. Chaney's argument appears to be that, absent
explicit permission to remove items other than evidence of
identification, the detective was required to fish around in the
pocket until he located an item that he could positively identify
to be some form of identification and that could be removed without
dislodging other items. The "typical reasonable person" would not
so interpret Chaney's exchange with the officer.7
Because it was objectively reasonable for Detective
Newcomb to believe that the scope of consent extended to the
removal of plastic bags from Chaney's pocket in the course of
searching for identification, we find no unconstitutional excursion
beyond the boundaries of Chaney's consent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
249 ("The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to
believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted [the
challenged search].").8
7 This is not to say that Chaney's consent should be read as a generalized authorization to search his entire pocket, however. If the detective had immediately located identification, turning out the rest of Chaney's pocket would surely exceed the scope of consent. But the record does not suggest that such was the case: Detective Newcomb testified at the second suppression hearing that he removed the plastic bag from Chaney's pocket before the identification card. 8 Both parties discuss the possible application of the "plain feel" doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) to the present case. That rule, an extension of the familiar "plain view" doctrine, allows the seizure of contraband readily identified by feel during a Terry frisk. While we agree with Chaney that the doctrine would have no application where testimony suggests that
-12- B. Voluntariness of Consent
Chaney next raises a more fundamental challenge to the
consent search of his pocket, arguing that the coercive atmosphere
of the police raid rendered his consent involuntary. Whether a
suspect's consent to a warrantless search was truly voluntary or,
instead, the product of coercion "is a question of fact to be
determined from an examination of the totality of circumstances."
Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286. Among the factors we will consider in
making that determination are the suspect's "age, education,
experience, knowledge of the right to withhold consent, and
evidence of coercive tactics." Id. Upon close review of the
record, we can find no clear error in the district court's finding
that Chaney freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his
pants pocket.
Chaney draws on a number of factors in trying to paint a
picture of coercion. First, Chaney highlights the officers' "show
of force" in entering the motel room with guns drawn. Setting
aside the fact that his consent was given after all occupants of
the room were handcuffed and the excitement of the initial entry
had passed, neither the number of officers who entered the room
(five) nor the readiness of their weapons suggests an overwhelming
the contraband was not identified by feel but instead by visual inspection after removal from his pocket, we need not directly address these arguments given our holding that the removal of cocaine from Chaney's pocket fell within the scope of the consent granted.
-13- show of force. See United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 31, 38 (1st
Cir. 2008) (finding the fact that ten to fifteen officers entered
hotel room with guns drawn insufficient to void voluntariness of
consent). Chaney notes as well that the occupants of the room were
asleep when law enforcement arrived at the motel room. The
evidence is mixed as to whether Chaney, who was standing and fully
clothed when the officers entered the room, was actually awakened
by the officers' arrival. Regardless, the mere fact of having been
recently asleep does not necessarily affect one's capacity to
voluntarily grant consent. Although Chaney cites the officers'
failure to advise him of his right to refuse consent to the search,
a factor that is certainly relevant to voluntariness of consent,
"[w]e have repeatedly held that the failure to advise a defendant
of his right to refuse consent does not automatically render such
consent invalid." Id.
Importantly, this was not Chaney's first encounter with
law enforcement. He had been arrested on more than a dozen prior
occasions and convicted of a comparable number of criminal
offenses. It is reasonable to infer that a veteran of the criminal
justice system will be "less likely than most to be intimidated by
the agents' show of force." United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d
546, 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cepulonis, 530
F.2d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 1976)). Moreover, Chaney's conduct during
the police raid betrayed no evidence of intimidation; to the
-14- contrary, he ignored repeated commands from the police to stop
moving when they first entered the motel room.
In short, on this record, we can discern no clear error
in the district court's finding that Chaney voluntarily consented
to the search of his pocket.9
C. De Facto Arrest
Chaney alternatively contends that the evidence seized
from him was the fruit of an unlawful de facto arrest.10 While the
period of detention leading to the discovery of crack cocaine in
Chaney's pocket certainly bore some typical indicia of an arrest,
we concur with the district court's conclusion that the
circumstances did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest.
Any detention of an individual by a police officer
constitutes a seizure and, to be lawful, must be adequately
justified under the Fourth Amendment. Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d
9 We note as well that we have been reluctant to find coercion in the commonplace context of a request for identification. See United States v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the "mundaneness of identification makes it unlikely that agents would bother to use coercive methods to obtain it"). 10 There appear to be two aspects to his "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963): first, that the purported de facto arrest caused Chaney to consent to the search of his pocket, cf. United States v. Navedo-Colón, 996 F.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1st Cir. 1993) (examining whether consent to search was fruit of illegal search), and second, that the search of Chaney's jacket pocket incident to his being taken into custody was a product of the de facto arrest. Because we find no de facto arrest, we do not reach the question of whether such a finding would require suppression of the evidence located during those two searches.
-15- 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2009). The contours of the showing necessary to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment depend on the nature of the detention:
arrests, whether formal or de facto, require that the detaining
officer have grounds for probable cause, whereas temporary
detentions (including investigatory or Terry stops, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)) "may be grounded on a lesser showing
equivalent to reasonable suspicion." Id.
Chaney does not contest that the police had reasonable
grounds to temporarily detain him and ascertain his identity in the
course of securing the motel room. Instead, he argues that the
conduct of the detention -- in particular, that the officers
entered with guns drawn, ordered him to the ground, and handcuffed
him -- transformed it from investigatory stop into de facto arrest.
The distinction is critical. Chaney argues, correctly, that no
probable cause existed at the time of his detention,11 and thus the
detention can survive constitutional scrutiny only if it was in the
nature of a temporary investigative stop.
There exist "no scientifically precise benchmarks for
distinguishing between temporary detentions and de facto arrests."
Id. at 20. Instead, we inquire, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, whether a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would have understood her position "to be tantamount to
11 The officers had no knowledge of who Chaney was or why he was present in the motel room, and thus plainly could have no probable cause for arrest.
-16- being under arrest." United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975
(1st Cir. 1994) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984)). This objective, suspect-focused inquiry is informed by
our assessment of the reasonableness of the detaining officer or
officers' actions in response to developing conditions. Where an
investigatory stop is justified at its inception, it will generally
not morph into a de facto arrest as long as "the actions undertaken
by the officer[s] following the stop were reasonably responsive to
the circumstances justifying the stop in the first place as
augmented by information gleaned by the officer[s] during the
stop." United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 748 (1st Cir. 1999)
(alterations in original)).
The crux of the issue before us is whether the officers'
entry into the motel room with drawn guns and their handcuffing of
Chaney were reasonable. The use of drawn guns and handcuffs, being
some "of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest,"
will generally tilt the scale to some significant degree toward a
finding of de facto arrest. See United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157
F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998). However, we have repeatedly noted that
neither factor is alone determinative. See United States v.
Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[N]either the
use of handcuffs nor the drawing of a weapon necessarily transforms
-17- a valid Terry stop into a de facto arrest.").12 In Acosta-Colon,
we explained that "when the government seeks to prove that an
investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not
exceed the limits of a Terry stop, it must be able to point to some
specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a
reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to
carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law
enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an
undue risk of harm." Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18-19 (emphasis
omitted). We think this inquiry applies with equal force in
assessing whether the use of drawn handguns was reasonable in
initiating a stop.
We can locate no error in the district court's finding
that the specific circumstances of the November 30, 2005 raid gave
rise to a reasonable concern for officer security that justified
the use of handcuffs and drawn handguns. The unanticipated
presence, in a darkened motel room inhabited by two suspected drug
dealers, of an unfamiliar man who ignored repeated orders from the
police to stop moving and drop to the ground might alone be enough
to justify more intrusive measures for briefly securing him during
12 See also Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18 ("[T]he use of handcuffs in the course of an investigatory stop does not automatically convert the encounter into a de facto arrest."); United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2003) (fact that officers drew guns and blocked defendant's vehicle from leaving did not convert investigative stop into de facto arrest); United States v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
-18- an investigative stop. See United States v. Andrade, 551 F.3d 103,
113 (1st Cir. 2008) (more physically intrusive Terry stop justified
where suspect refused officer's order to stop); United States v.
Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that no de facto
arrest had occurred where police approached the suspect with guns
drawn and handcuffed him after he twice refused to raise his hands
and "ma[de] furtive movements inside the truck where his hands
could not be seen"). There were, however, still other factors here
that counseled particular caution. The officers knew that Boyd,
the subject of the arrest warrant, had an extensive criminal
history, and a preliminary protective sweep of the motel room
located not just drug paraphernalia but also ammunition. Moreover,
the motel room was littered with clothing, which easily could --
and, as was later discovered, did -- conceal a weapon within close
reach of the occupants.
Under circumstances such as these, especially in the
close quarters of a motel room, we are mindful of the need for
officers to safely secure the scene. "[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), and "[p]olice officers engaged in an
otherwise lawful stop must be permitted to take measures . . . they
believe reasonably necessary to protect themselves from harm, or to
safeguard the security of others," Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18.
-19- We find the use of handcuffs and entry into the motel room with
drawn guns to have been a reasonable precaution here.13
Nor do the other relevant aspects of Chaney's detention
support a finding of de facto arrest. Chaney was detained for
fewer than five minutes before being arrested for possession of
cocaine. We have held significantly longer periods of detention to
fall short of de facto arrest. See, e.g., Owens, 167 F.3d at 749
(noting that there is no talismanic time beyond which a Terry stop
becomes unreasonable and holding that detention of fifty minutes
was not de facto arrest); United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522,
531 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that seventy-five-minute detention in
locked rear passenger compartment of police car was not de facto
arrest). Moreover, during the short period for which Chaney was
detained, the police officers worked diligently towards the
investigative purpose for which he was being held -- namely,
determining Chaney's identity. See Trueber, 238 F.3d at 94
(finding no de facto arrest where defendant was detained for
fifteen minutes of questions that were "brief and to the point[,]
. . . targeted at ascertaining [the defendant's] identity, his
reasons for being in the country, and whether he was involved in
the suspected illegal activity"). Finally, it should have been
reasonably clear to Chaney that Boyd, not Chaney, was the intended
13 We emphasize, however, that such forceful and intrusive measures have no place in routine investigatory detentions. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18.
-20- target of the raid: Boyd was immediately seized and handcuffed by
the police upon their entry and was quickly led out of the motel
room. The fact that Chaney and Hebert were not similarly seized,
but instead held in the room for follow-up questioning, should have
suggested that their detention was merely incidental to Boyd's
arrest.
In light of these circumstances, we do not think that a
reasonable person standing in Chaney's shoes would understand that
he was subject to anything other than "a brief period of detention
at the scene while the police sought by means of a moderate number
of questions to determine his identity and to obtain information
confirming or dispelling their suspicions." Id., 238 F.3d at 93
(quoting United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 962 (1st Cir.
1986)). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's
conclusion that Chaney's detention did not constitute a de facto
arrest warranting the suppression of evidence.
III.
Having closely reviewed the record, we are persuaded that
the district court did not err in declining to suppress evidence
seized from Chaney during the November 30, 2005 raid. The district
court's judgment is therefore affirmed.
So ordered.
-21-