United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Manhattan

233 F. Supp. 899, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 21, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 233 F. Supp. 899 (United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Manhattan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Manhattan, 233 F. Supp. 899, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

Opinion

TENNEY, District Judge.

By orders to show cause, the owners and tenants of certain tracts of land and buildings thereon taken in the above-entitled proceeding, requested that the pro forma order, dated April 30, 1964, of the Honorable Charles M. Metzner, United States District Judge, vesting title to the lands in the Declaration of Taking filed herein, be amended to stay the United States of America and/or the General Services Administration from evicting the owners of said land pending the trial of the issues.

Although certain of the movants originally requested that the pro forma order of Judge Metzner be vacated and set aside, contentions made by them that the taking in this proceeding was not for a public purpose have since been withdrawn.

The said pro forma order did not fix any time within which the parties in possession were to surrender possession, but decreed that title to the lands described in the Declaration of Taking become vested in the United States of America on April 30, 1964, and that the Government was, on that date, “entitled to immediate possession thereof.” On May 2, 1964, the General Services Administration sent to the parties in possession, including certain of the movants herein, a request that they vacate by midnight, May 9, 1964, and that failing to do so, it would “be necessary for the United States of America to take appropriate action through the Court or otherwise to have the premises vacated.”

The basis for the request was stated to be that the “condition of the buildings presents a potential danger to persons [901]*901and property occupying the premises” and that the Government intended to demolish the buildings as soon as possible and proceed with work on the excavation and foundation work for the U. S. Customs Court and Federal Office Building on the adjacent property.

No proceedings have been instituted as yet under Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce the Government’s right of immediate possession.

Accordingly, the within applications are construed by the Court as constituting petitions for equitable relief by the amendment of the ex parte order “to fix the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession shall' be required to surrender possession.” 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1952).

It seems clear that the Court has such power under the above-cited statute and that this is true even though the time and terms may not have been fixed at the time of the issuance of the ex parte order. United States v. Certain Interests in Property, etc., 302 F.2d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 1962).

Furthermore, in the exercise of the power to “fix the date for possession” there is a duty imposed on the Court “to see that such date for possession * * * [is] in accordance with the equities.” United States v. 6576.27 Acres of Land, etc., 77 F.Supp. 244, 246 (D.N.D.1948).

However, “[0]nce it is administratively determined that a property is to be taken for a public use, a United States court ordinarily will not review the reasonableness of the government’s decision as to the time of taking or the period which must elapse before the property is utilized solely for a public activity.” United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Philadelphia, 215 F.2d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 1954).

Moreover, it is the opinion of the Court that its power to review is limited to those cases where there has been a clear abuse of administrative discretion and where the government officials in making an administrative decision have acted “in bad faith” or “so capriciously and arbitrarily” that their action was without adequate determining principle or was unreasoned. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243, 67 S.Ct. 252,. 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946). See also, United States v. State of New York, 160 F.2d. 479, 480 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832, 67 S.Ct. 1512, 91 L.Ed. 1846 (1947).

While the authorities cited for this proposition involved primarily the extent, amount or title of the property to be taken, the Court believes the same principle must be applied to a determination of the time of taking actual possession. Cf. United States v. 6576.27 Acres of Land, supra.

The Court has carefully examined the affidavits of the architects and engineers submitted by the Government and by movants relative to the condition of the buildings involved. There is no dispute that there has been settlement and lateral movement with respect to four of the buildings involved, and that there was a continuation of both lateral and vertical movement from April 22, 1964, when pile driving and construction work was stopped on the adjacent property, until May 3, 1964. The Government expert’s opinion, and that of his associates and consultants is “that the present condition of the buildings west of the con-' struction site presents a possible hazard of life, limb and property” and that “this is true even if no further construction work is undertaken.” The experts for movants do not dispute that there has. been lateral and vertical movement, but it is urged that only four buildings are affected, or- that no danger exists “while no further excavation and foundation, work goes on, on the adjoining property”,; or that the condition can be remedied by shoring and other methods.

The Court has the fullest sympathy for the tenants who have been directed to vacate these premises. For many of them, foi*ced to move out on such short notice, heavy financial loss, not to mention extreme inconvenience may well result. Various suggestions have been [902]*902made to the Court, both at the hearing which this Court conducted and in the moving' papers, which the Government may wish to consider so as to alleviate as far as possible the pecuniary loss and inconvenience to movants and others similarly situated. However, in a case such as this, where not only administrative action but the public safety is involved, the Court should not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the parties responsible. Clearly, on the evidence, there were and are substantial grounds to support the position of the Government herein.

Accordingly, the motions to amend the pro forma order of April 30, 1964, are denied.

So ordered.

On Remand.

The within proceeding is one for the acquisition of certain land for public use pursuant to the provisions of Title 40, Section 258a of the United States Code (1952). A complaint was filed by the Government on April 30, 1964. On that date, a Declaration of Taking was filed, pursuant to Section 258a, and there was deposited, in the Registry of this Court, the estimated just compensation of $3,-512,051.00 for the land and improvements to be acquired. Thereupon, and on April 30, 1964, a pro forma order was entered herein by the Honorable Charles M.

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233 F. Supp. 899, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-certain-land-in-borough-of-manhattan-nysd-1964.