United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EDGAR CENTARICZKI,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Selya and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Charles W. Rankin and Rankin & Sultan on brief for appellant. Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, and Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 15, 2024 SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Edgar
Centariczki challenges the upwardly variant sentence that followed
the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
lacked a sufficiently plausible rationale for imposing an
above-guidelines sentence. Concluding that the appellant's
eighteen-month sentence was adequately explained and supported by
the record, we affirm.
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. In February of 2021, the appellant pleaded guilty in the
District of New Hampshire to aiding and abetting the distribution
of methamphetamine and fentanyl. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). He received a sentence of time served
(two days) followed by three years of supervised release, which
commenced in June of 2021. Jurisdiction over his case was
subsequently transferred to the District of Maine, where the
appellant was residing.
Between June and October of 2021, the appellant tested
positive several times for marijuana and cocaine. He also missed
several appointments at the U.S. probation office in Portland,
Maine. He attributed these absences variously to conflicts with
his work schedule, forgetfulness, sleeping in, and not having money
for gas to travel to Portland. During this interval, he
- 2 - participated in a substance abuse evaluation and enrolled in an
intensive outpatient treatment program.
To address the myriad violations of the appellant's
supervised release conditions, the probation officer requested a
compliance hearing, which the district court held on October 19,
2021. At the compliance hearing, the court warned the appellant
that he would likely face revocation if he continued to violate
the terms of his supervised release.
Later that month, the appellant again tested positive
for marijuana and cocaine and admitted to using those substances.
The probation office subsequently filed a petition for a warrant,
alleging that the appellant abridged his conditions of supervised
release. The appellant was arrested on November 3.
On January 10, 2022, the district court held a revocation
hearing premised on multiple violations to which the appellant
admitted. These included violations for drug and alcohol use and
failures to report to probation office appointments. Because the
appellant was in the process of being evaluated for admission into
an in-patient substance use disorder treatment facility, the
parties agreed to continue the sentencing portion of the revocation
hearing.
At the time of the continued hearing on May 24, the
appellant had completed in-patient treatment and was living in a
sober house (Enso). The district court adopted the government's
- 3 - recommendation of a time-served sentence (ninety-nine days)
followed by thirty-two months of supervised release.
During the next few months, the appellant continued
receiving treatment for substance abuse as well as mental health
counseling. During this interim, he consistently tested negative
for illicit substances. He also began working with at-risk youth
at a nonprofit organization in Maine, where his supervisor reported
that he was performing well.
At the beginning of September, Enso staff discovered
that the appellant was involved in an unauthorized romantic
relationship with another Enso client, Candida Dephilippo — a
practice that was against the program's rules. The appellant was
informed that he would be discharged from the program if he
continued the relationship. A few days later, he was discharged
from the program for continuing the relationship.
Near the end of September, the appellant's probation
officer referred him for a substance use disorder assessment at
the counseling center from which the appellant previously had
received mental health treatment. The appellant also tested
positive for cocaine, which he later admitted to using. He
completed the substance use disorder assessment and was
recommended as a candidate for weekly treatment, but he missed his
first appointment and never rescheduled it.
- 4 - After his discharge from Enso, the appellant reported to
his probation officer that he would temporarily reside at his place
of employment, which had a residential facility. In October,
however, the probation officer learned that the appellant was
actually residing with Dephilippo in Augusta, Maine. According to
the terms of the appellant's supervised release, he was required
to seek permission to have contact with Dephilippo because she was
a known felon. He never sought such permission, and his probation
officer instructed him to cease contact with her.
Later that month, though, the appellant admitted to his
probation officer that he was still living with Dephilippo, who
was pregnant with his child. Due to Dephilippo's pregnancy, the
probation officer granted the appellant permission to reside with
Dephilippo, with the caveat that permission to have contact with
her would be retracted if he resumed using illicit substances.
In November and December, the appellant tested positive
for cocaine twice. Due to the appellant's continued use of
cocaine, his probation officer instructed him to stop living with
Dephilippo. Toward the end of December, the appellant tested
positive again for cocaine, which he admitted to using, and
informed his probation officer that he had not yet found
alternative housing. The probation officer advised him that a
petition for a summons would be filed to address these violations
- 5 - and that continued use of illicit substances would result in a
petition for a warrant being filed instead of a summons.
On January 15, 2023, the Augusta Police Department
informed the appellant's probation officer that he had been
arrested on charges of domestic violence and obstructing reporting
of a crime. The arrest report alleged that after Dephilippo
confronted the appellant about spending their household money on
drugs, he repeatedly struck her in the face, stuck his fingers in
her mouth, and pulled her hair when she tried to leave. According
to the report, Dephilippo then convinced the appellant to take her
to the hospital, where she passed a note to medical providers
stating that he had assaulted her. The appellant later admitted
to police that he had slapped her in the face.
Shortly thereafter, the probation office filed a
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EDGAR CENTARICZKI,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Selya and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Charles W. Rankin and Rankin & Sultan on brief for appellant. Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, and Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 15, 2024 SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Edgar
Centariczki challenges the upwardly variant sentence that followed
the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
lacked a sufficiently plausible rationale for imposing an
above-guidelines sentence. Concluding that the appellant's
eighteen-month sentence was adequately explained and supported by
the record, we affirm.
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. In February of 2021, the appellant pleaded guilty in the
District of New Hampshire to aiding and abetting the distribution
of methamphetamine and fentanyl. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). He received a sentence of time served
(two days) followed by three years of supervised release, which
commenced in June of 2021. Jurisdiction over his case was
subsequently transferred to the District of Maine, where the
appellant was residing.
Between June and October of 2021, the appellant tested
positive several times for marijuana and cocaine. He also missed
several appointments at the U.S. probation office in Portland,
Maine. He attributed these absences variously to conflicts with
his work schedule, forgetfulness, sleeping in, and not having money
for gas to travel to Portland. During this interval, he
- 2 - participated in a substance abuse evaluation and enrolled in an
intensive outpatient treatment program.
To address the myriad violations of the appellant's
supervised release conditions, the probation officer requested a
compliance hearing, which the district court held on October 19,
2021. At the compliance hearing, the court warned the appellant
that he would likely face revocation if he continued to violate
the terms of his supervised release.
Later that month, the appellant again tested positive
for marijuana and cocaine and admitted to using those substances.
The probation office subsequently filed a petition for a warrant,
alleging that the appellant abridged his conditions of supervised
release. The appellant was arrested on November 3.
On January 10, 2022, the district court held a revocation
hearing premised on multiple violations to which the appellant
admitted. These included violations for drug and alcohol use and
failures to report to probation office appointments. Because the
appellant was in the process of being evaluated for admission into
an in-patient substance use disorder treatment facility, the
parties agreed to continue the sentencing portion of the revocation
hearing.
At the time of the continued hearing on May 24, the
appellant had completed in-patient treatment and was living in a
sober house (Enso). The district court adopted the government's
- 3 - recommendation of a time-served sentence (ninety-nine days)
followed by thirty-two months of supervised release.
During the next few months, the appellant continued
receiving treatment for substance abuse as well as mental health
counseling. During this interim, he consistently tested negative
for illicit substances. He also began working with at-risk youth
at a nonprofit organization in Maine, where his supervisor reported
that he was performing well.
At the beginning of September, Enso staff discovered
that the appellant was involved in an unauthorized romantic
relationship with another Enso client, Candida Dephilippo — a
practice that was against the program's rules. The appellant was
informed that he would be discharged from the program if he
continued the relationship. A few days later, he was discharged
from the program for continuing the relationship.
Near the end of September, the appellant's probation
officer referred him for a substance use disorder assessment at
the counseling center from which the appellant previously had
received mental health treatment. The appellant also tested
positive for cocaine, which he later admitted to using. He
completed the substance use disorder assessment and was
recommended as a candidate for weekly treatment, but he missed his
first appointment and never rescheduled it.
- 4 - After his discharge from Enso, the appellant reported to
his probation officer that he would temporarily reside at his place
of employment, which had a residential facility. In October,
however, the probation officer learned that the appellant was
actually residing with Dephilippo in Augusta, Maine. According to
the terms of the appellant's supervised release, he was required
to seek permission to have contact with Dephilippo because she was
a known felon. He never sought such permission, and his probation
officer instructed him to cease contact with her.
Later that month, though, the appellant admitted to his
probation officer that he was still living with Dephilippo, who
was pregnant with his child. Due to Dephilippo's pregnancy, the
probation officer granted the appellant permission to reside with
Dephilippo, with the caveat that permission to have contact with
her would be retracted if he resumed using illicit substances.
In November and December, the appellant tested positive
for cocaine twice. Due to the appellant's continued use of
cocaine, his probation officer instructed him to stop living with
Dephilippo. Toward the end of December, the appellant tested
positive again for cocaine, which he admitted to using, and
informed his probation officer that he had not yet found
alternative housing. The probation officer advised him that a
petition for a summons would be filed to address these violations
- 5 - and that continued use of illicit substances would result in a
petition for a warrant being filed instead of a summons.
On January 15, 2023, the Augusta Police Department
informed the appellant's probation officer that he had been
arrested on charges of domestic violence and obstructing reporting
of a crime. The arrest report alleged that after Dephilippo
confronted the appellant about spending their household money on
drugs, he repeatedly struck her in the face, stuck his fingers in
her mouth, and pulled her hair when she tried to leave. According
to the report, Dephilippo then convinced the appellant to take her
to the hospital, where she passed a note to medical providers
stating that he had assaulted her. The appellant later admitted
to police that he had slapped her in the face.
Shortly thereafter, the probation office filed a
petition to revoke the appellant's term of supervised release,
alleging three violations of his supervised release terms: his
testing positive for cocaine four times between September and
December of 2022; his failure to relocate after his probation
officer instructed him to move out of Dephilippo's home; and his
assault on Dephilippo. On February 27, 2023, the district court
held a final revocation hearing. The appellant admitted to all
the charged violations, and the district court calculated a
guideline sentencing range (GSR) of four to ten months, with thirty
months of supervised release.
- 6 - The government advocated for an above-guidelines
sentence of eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised
release to follow. The government argued that an upwardly variant
sentence was appropriate because the appellant had received
multiple "breaks" in the form of time-served sentences and chances
to seek drug treatment, and yet he continued to use drugs and
violate the terms of his probation. An eighteen-month sentence,
the government argued, would serve the goal of specific deterrence.
The appellant urged a sentence of eight months. His
attorney explained that the appellant's low IQ and impulsivity
disorder made it unrealistic to "expect[] [from him] the kind of
normalcy and compliance" that would typically be expected from an
adult of his age (twenty-nine years old at the time of the
hearing). The appellant's attorney also alleged that the
appellant's assault on Dephilippo stemmed from the appellant's
dismay over her use of heroin while pregnant.
In handing down the sentence, the district court stated
that the probation office had exercised "Job-like patience" with
the appellant and that "one of the only tools . . . that has not
been tried, is prison for punishment's sake," which would
"hopefully deter [the appellant] from a lifetime of this
groundhog-day saga wherein [he] repeat[s] the same harmful conduct
on a loop unabated and in the face of generous opportunities that
many scores of federal defendants do not see." The district court
- 7 - acknowledged "the particular challenges" that the appellant faced
but "reject[ed] . . . any qualitative parsing of the nature of the
assault" on Dephilippo. The court stated that it had "considered
the 3553(a) factors, chief among them . . . the need to impose a
sentence that corresponds to the seriousness of the offense, to
provide just punishment for the offense, to protect the public
from further crimes . . . , and to hopefully afford some measure
of specific deterrence."
In the end, the district court sentenced the appellant
to eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised release to
follow. This timely appeal ensued.
II
The appellant contends that his sentence was
"substantively unreasonable because the district judge failed to
explain why an upward variant was necessary or appropriate."
Although the parties dispute whether the appellant's contention
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion or for plain error, we
leave that question unresolved because — under either standard of
review — the government prevails. Favorably to the appellant, we
review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bermúdez-
Meléndez, 827 F.3d 160, 166 (1st Cir. 2016).
The test for the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence is whether it "reflects 'a plausible sentencing rationale
and a defensible result.'" United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d
- 8 - 445, 450 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520
F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)). Where, as here, a sentence is
imposed following the revocation of a term of supervised release,
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) guides the district court's exercise of
discretion. See id.
Section 3583 counsels the court to consider sentencing
factors such as the nature of the offense, the offender's history
and characteristics, the need for deterrence, and the need to
protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (incorporating by
reference several of the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)). An upwardly variant sentence will generally be upheld
if it "is anchored in a plausible, albeit not inevitable, view of
the circumstances sufficient to distinguish th[e] case from the
mine-run of cases." United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761
F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014).
Because the appellant only attacks the district court's
explanation of its sentence and does not appear separately to argue
that the outcome would be unreasonable regardless of its rationale,
we focus on the "plausible sentencing rationale" element of the
test for substantive reasonableness.1 Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d at 450;
1As we have observed, "an adequate explanation for an upward variance and a plausible rationale for that variance are almost always two sides of the same coin." United States v. Valle-Colón, 21 F.4th 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2021); see United States v. Leach, 89 F.4th 189, 198 (1st Cir. 2023).
- 9 - see United States v. Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th 652, 656-57 (1st Cir.
2023). We hold that the district court's rationale was plausible
and its sentence was reasonable.
First, we disagree with the appellant's characterization
of the district court's rationale as "merely list[ing] a variety
of factors that it considered . . . without explaining its reason
for selecting an upward variant." The district court clearly
explained that, considering such things as the appellant's
repeated violations of his supervised release terms and the
multiple second chances afforded to him by the court and probation
officer, an above-guidelines sentence was needed to "hopefully
deter [him] from a lifetime of . . . repeat[ing] the same harmful
conduct." We upheld an upwardly variant sentence premised on a
similar rationale in Soto-Soto, another case in which an
appellant's supervised release was revoked after repeated
violations, including an incident in which he was charged with
domestic violence. See 855 F.3d at 446-47, 451.
There, the court calculated a guideline range of five to
eleven months and sentenced the appellant to two years'
imprisonment (the statutory maximum). See id. at 448. In response
to the appellant's claim of substantive unreasonableness, we
explained that "the appellant's actions gave the district court
ample reason to believe that only a substantial sentence would
deter him from his wayward practices" and noted that "a high-end
- 10 - guideline sentence would in all likelihood have carried with it a
new supervised release term . . . and the appellant had given the
court reason to believe that a new term of supervised release would
be fruitless." Id. at 450-51. Here, as in Soto-Soto, the
persistence of the appellant's previous supervised release
violations was sufficient to "distinguish this case from the
mine-run of cases." Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 177.
What is more, the appellant is incorrect in asserting
that the district court "failed to explain why a guideline
sentence . . . would not be adequate," as the district court
highlighted the prior opportunities and leniency the appellant had
received as well as his repeated supervised release violations and
its evaluation of the need for specific deterrence.
Furthermore, this case is distinguishable from the two
cases that the appellant primarily cites as instructive examples
of upwardly variant revocation sentences that were imposed without
sufficient rationale. United States v. Reyes-Correa, 81 F.4th 1,
11-12 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Serrano-Berríos, 38 F.4th
246, 250 (1st Cir. 2022). In Reyes-Correa, the district court
supplied only "boilerplate language" to explain its 400 percent
upwardly variant sentence and, when describing the factors
relevant to the appellant's sentence, gave "a 'mere listing of the
facts . . . , without emphasis on any particular circumstance,'"
making it "'impossible to tell' why the court landed on a sentence
- 11 - that quadrupled the guidelines sentencing range." 81 F.4th at
10-11 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Muñoz-
Fontanez, 61 F.4th 212, 214 (1st Cir. 2023)). Moreover, we were
unable to identify any circumstance that made the appellant's
situation more egregious than simply a "case . . . about a person
who is living with a substance use disorder." Id. at 13. In
Serrano-Berríos, we found the sentencing rationale insufficient in
part because the district court's explanation was unclear and
subject to multiple interpretations, one of which would have been
unsupported by the record. See 38 F.4th at 250.
Here, the district court's explanation of the
appellant's sentence was unambiguous and consistent with the
record. The district court emphasized the repetitiveness of the
appellant's previous violations, the multiple second chances
already provided to him, and the egregiousness of his latest
violation for domestic violence as the main bases for the upward
variance. Unlike Reyes-Correa, this is not a case in which it
could plausibly be argued that there was little basis for an upward
variance apart from conduct that could be considered par for the
course for a person with a substance use disorder. See 81 F.4th
at 13. Most notably, the appellant admitted to hitting Dephilippo,
who was pregnant. The variance imposed here was also significantly
less severe than the 400 percent increase at issue in Reyes-Correa.
See id. at 10; see also United States v. Guzman-Fernandez, 824
- 12 - F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 2016) ("[T]he greater the variance, 'the
more compelling the sentencing court's justification must be.'"
(quoting Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 177)). For a variance
of this extent, the district court's explanation was sufficient.
III
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the district court's sentence is
Affirmed.
- 13 -