United States v. Cedric Easter

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Cedric Easter

689 F. App'x 465

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJune 2, 2017

Docket16-3605

StatusUnpublished

This text of 689 F. App'x 465 (United States v. Cedric Easter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Cedric Easter, 689 F. App'x 465 (8th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Cedric Easter pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, and now appeals the district court’s 1 sentence of 240 months in prison. Easter’s counsel moved to withdraw and submitted a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), argü- *466 ing that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to support the sentence; the district court erred in relying on inconsistent testimony and unsubstantiated facts; and the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Easter filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction .to accept his plea and impose sentence because the sentencing penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), is ambiguous.

The issue raised in Easter’s pro se brief was not raised in the district court and is foreclosed by his guilty plea. A guilty plea forecloses all claims, even those labeled “jurisdictional,” except claims that, “on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Here, the district court obviously had power to accept the guilty plea and enter the conviction. Any challenge to application of the federal sentencing statutes then had to be raised at sentencing.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Easter entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, see Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997); the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Perison v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal' outside the scope of the waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

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PER CURIAM.

Cedric Easter pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, and now appeals the district court’s 1 sentence of 240 months in prison. Easter’s counsel moved to withdraw and submitted a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), argü- *466 ing that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to support the sentence; the district court erred in relying on inconsistent testimony and unsubstantiated facts; and the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Easter filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction .to accept his plea and impose sentence because the sentencing penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), is ambiguous.

The issue raised in Easter’s pro se brief was not raised in the district court and is foreclosed by his guilty plea. A guilty plea forecloses all claims, even those labeled “jurisdictional,” except claims that, “on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Here, the district court obviously had power to accept the guilty plea and enter the conviction. Any challenge to application of the federal sentencing statutes then had to be raised at sentencing.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Easter entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, see Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997); the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Perison v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal' outside the scope of the waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

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689 F. App'x 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cedric-easter-ca8-2017.

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