F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 99-4049 GINO CECALA, (D.C. No. 97-CR-52-K) (D. Utah) Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
The issue in this case is whether a police officer’s warrantless search of
Defendant’s suitcase, located in the open bed of his impounded pickup truck, three
hours after the initial stop of his truck, constituted a valid inventory search within the
inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. We
uphold the validity of the search.
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Around 11:45 p.m. on December 16, 1996,
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Officer Robert Howe of the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) stopped Defendant Gino
Cecala’s oversized pickup truck in West Valley City, an area near Salt Lake City, due to
apparent equipment violations. Officer Howe subsequently arrested Cecala for driving
under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. Meanwhile, two additional police officers,
Craig Gaines and John McMahon, arrived on the scene to assist Howe. Officer Howe
asked McMahon to inventory the pickup (as required by UHP General Order No. 83-09)
and fill out an inventory, or impound form.1 Officer McMahon inventoried the contents
of the truck’s cab, but inadvertently failed to inventory the contents of the truck’s bed.
Officer McMahon completed the inventory form and gave it to Officer Howe at
the scene. McMahon then left prior to the arrival of the tow truck. About two hours later,
as Howe reviewed the form with Officer Gaines, he noticed that the suitcase located in
the bed of Cecala’s pickup did not appear on the inventory. Officer Gaines phoned
Officer McMahon to inquire about the suitcase. Gaines expressed his belief that the
suitcase might contain contraband. McMahon informed him that he had forgotten to
inventory the suitcase. Gaines next phoned the privately-owned impound yard to secure
the pickup until he could inventory the suitcase. Officer Gaines arrived at the impound
yard and inventoried the suitcase approximately three hours after Officer Howe’s initial
1 UHP General Order No. 83-09 provides in relevant part that “[w]hen a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any open or closed package, container or compartment.”
2 stop of the pickup. Inside the suitcase, Officer Gaines found bundles of marijuana,
resulting in Cecala’s indictment.
Following a suppression hearing at which all three officers testified, a United
States Magistrate Judge, in a thorough report and recommendation, recommended
denial of Cecala’s motion to suppress. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation in its entirety. Cecala entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving his
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(a)(2). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the denial of a
motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous, but review de novo the court’s ultimate determination of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999).
Applying this standard, we affirm.
II.
Inventory searches of impounded vehicles are a well-defined exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107
F.3d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1997). An inventory search may be “reasonable” even though
conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause. Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371 (1987). When a vehicle is impounded, an inventory of its contents is
reasonable if undertaken in good faith pursuant to standard police procedures. South
3 Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). The reasonableness of such procedures
arises from three distinct needs: (1) protection of the owner’s property while in police
custody; (2) protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen
property; and (3) protection of the police and public from potential danger. Id. at 369.
An inventory search “must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). Rather, an
inventory search is an administrative procedure designed to produce an inventory. United
States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585, 592 (10th Cir. 1998). An inventory search “undertaken in
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation” cannot be sustained. Bertine, 479 U.S.
at 372 (emphasis added). Accord Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d at 772-73. As the district court
properly noted, however, an inventory search may be justified by a legitimate inventory
purpose despite an officer’s subjective desire to uncover criminal evidence. E.g., United
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1001 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d
1144, 1147 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lewis, 3 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Bowhay, 992 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Roberson,
897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.
On appeal, Cecala challenges the validity of the inventory search on two grounds,
namely, that the search (1) was not conducted in compliance with existing standard police
procedures and (2) was a subterfuge for an investigative purpose. As to Cecala’s first
4 contention, UHP General Order 83-09, see supra, note 1, plainly authorized the inventory
search of Cecala’s pickup at the private impound lot, including the suitcase located in the
bed of the truck. Officer McMahon initially searched the cab of the truck and prepared a
written inventory. Due to McMahon’s inadvertent failure to inventory the suitcase and
include it on the report, Officer Gaines proceeded to the lot to complete the inventory
while the pickup was still under seizure. Nothing in the mandated procedures prohibited
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 99-4049 GINO CECALA, (D.C. No. 97-CR-52-K) (D. Utah) Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
The issue in this case is whether a police officer’s warrantless search of
Defendant’s suitcase, located in the open bed of his impounded pickup truck, three
hours after the initial stop of his truck, constituted a valid inventory search within the
inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. We
uphold the validity of the search.
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Around 11:45 p.m. on December 16, 1996,
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Officer Robert Howe of the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) stopped Defendant Gino
Cecala’s oversized pickup truck in West Valley City, an area near Salt Lake City, due to
apparent equipment violations. Officer Howe subsequently arrested Cecala for driving
under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. Meanwhile, two additional police officers,
Craig Gaines and John McMahon, arrived on the scene to assist Howe. Officer Howe
asked McMahon to inventory the pickup (as required by UHP General Order No. 83-09)
and fill out an inventory, or impound form.1 Officer McMahon inventoried the contents
of the truck’s cab, but inadvertently failed to inventory the contents of the truck’s bed.
Officer McMahon completed the inventory form and gave it to Officer Howe at
the scene. McMahon then left prior to the arrival of the tow truck. About two hours later,
as Howe reviewed the form with Officer Gaines, he noticed that the suitcase located in
the bed of Cecala’s pickup did not appear on the inventory. Officer Gaines phoned
Officer McMahon to inquire about the suitcase. Gaines expressed his belief that the
suitcase might contain contraband. McMahon informed him that he had forgotten to
inventory the suitcase. Gaines next phoned the privately-owned impound yard to secure
the pickup until he could inventory the suitcase. Officer Gaines arrived at the impound
yard and inventoried the suitcase approximately three hours after Officer Howe’s initial
1 UHP General Order No. 83-09 provides in relevant part that “[w]hen a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any open or closed package, container or compartment.”
2 stop of the pickup. Inside the suitcase, Officer Gaines found bundles of marijuana,
resulting in Cecala’s indictment.
Following a suppression hearing at which all three officers testified, a United
States Magistrate Judge, in a thorough report and recommendation, recommended
denial of Cecala’s motion to suppress. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation in its entirety. Cecala entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving his
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(a)(2). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the denial of a
motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous, but review de novo the court’s ultimate determination of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999).
Applying this standard, we affirm.
II.
Inventory searches of impounded vehicles are a well-defined exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107
F.3d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1997). An inventory search may be “reasonable” even though
conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause. Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371 (1987). When a vehicle is impounded, an inventory of its contents is
reasonable if undertaken in good faith pursuant to standard police procedures. South
3 Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). The reasonableness of such procedures
arises from three distinct needs: (1) protection of the owner’s property while in police
custody; (2) protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen
property; and (3) protection of the police and public from potential danger. Id. at 369.
An inventory search “must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). Rather, an
inventory search is an administrative procedure designed to produce an inventory. United
States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585, 592 (10th Cir. 1998). An inventory search “undertaken in
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation” cannot be sustained. Bertine, 479 U.S.
at 372 (emphasis added). Accord Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d at 772-73. As the district court
properly noted, however, an inventory search may be justified by a legitimate inventory
purpose despite an officer’s subjective desire to uncover criminal evidence. E.g., United
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1001 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d
1144, 1147 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lewis, 3 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Bowhay, 992 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Roberson,
897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.
On appeal, Cecala challenges the validity of the inventory search on two grounds,
namely, that the search (1) was not conducted in compliance with existing standard police
procedures and (2) was a subterfuge for an investigative purpose. As to Cecala’s first
4 contention, UHP General Order 83-09, see supra, note 1, plainly authorized the inventory
search of Cecala’s pickup at the private impound lot, including the suitcase located in the
bed of the truck. Officer McMahon initially searched the cab of the truck and prepared a
written inventory. Due to McMahon’s inadvertent failure to inventory the suitcase and
include it on the report, Officer Gaines proceeded to the lot to complete the inventory
while the pickup was still under seizure. Nothing in the mandated procedures prohibited
Gaines from completing the inventory in this manner at the later time. Despite Cecala’s
contrary assertion, Officer Gaines’ subsequent failure to add the contents of the suitcase
to the inventory list did not affect the validity of the search, for at that stage Gaines had
conducted, pursuant to proper police procedures, a valid inventory search that uncovered
illegal contraband. Officer Gaines properly listed the suitcase and its illegal contents in
his police report.
Cecala’s second contention, that Officer Gaines undertook an unlawful
investigative search rather than a lawful inventory search, is likewise unavailing. The
district court found that Cecala’s pickup was transported to an unsecured private impound
lot in a high crime area. Because the police were responsible for the suitcase and its
contents at the lot, the need for an inventory existed to protect both the property and the
police from a claim of loss or theft. Moreover, Officer Gaines expressed belief that the
suitcase might contain contraband does not alter our conclusion that he properly
undertook an inventory search of the suitcase. While mixed motives or suspicions
5 undoubtedly exist in many inventory searches, such motives or suspicions alone will
not invalidate an otherwise proper inventory search. See supra at 4.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge