United States v. Ceballos

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2025
• Docket: 23-1610
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1610

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JOSÉ M. CEBALLOS, t/n José M. Guzmán-Ceballos,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Silvia L. Carreño-Coll, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

MariaCarolina Gomez Gonzalez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appellate Unit, were on brief, for appellant.

Maarja Tiganik Luhtaru, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

June 18, 2025 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant José Miguel

Guzmán-Ceballos ("Guzmán-Ceballos")1 was sentenced to ninety

months' imprisonment for his role in transporting 385 kilograms of

cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico.

Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea

agreement but argued for a mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "the

Guidelines"), which the district court denied. Before us,

Guzmán-Ceballos challenges the procedural reasonableness of his

sentence, arguing that the district court failed to engage in the

appropriate legal analysis in denying him a mitigating role

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. We agree and, accordingly,

remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Because Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded guilty to all counts, we

draw the relevant facts from the undisputed sections of the

presentence report ("PSR"), the transcripts from the

change-of-plea and sentencing hearings, and the sentencing record.

See United States v. De La Cruz, 91 F.4th 550, 551 (1st Cir. 2024).

As we have done in the past, "[w]e confine our discussion of the

facts to those necessary to frame the issues on appeal," which

1 During the change-of-plea hearing held on March 21, 2023, Defendant-Appellant stated his full name as José Miguel Guzmán-Ceballos. We refer to him by his stated last name.

- 2 - stem from Guzmán-Ceballos's participation in a drug-smuggling

venture from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. United States

v. Hernandez-Maldonado, 793 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 2015).

A. The Voyage

On April 17, 2021, a United States reconnaissance plane

detected an unidentified boat approximately eighty-eight nautical

miles off the coast of Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. The U.S. Coast

Guard ("Coast Guard"), in due course, deployed a ship and a

helicopter to intercept the vessel. The Coast Guard's helicopter

opened fire after the boat failed to stop, causing it to halt. As

the Coast Guard engaged the crew, an unidentified occupant

jettisoned numerous "bales" from the boat, which the Coast Guard

later recovered from the ocean.

The Coast Guard then approached and boarded the boat.

Coast Guard officers identified three people onboard:

Guzmán-Ceballos, Juan José Lantigua ("Lantigua"), and Dominga

Tavera ("Tavera"). Guzmán-Ceballos and Tavera made verbal claims

of Dominican Republic nationality for themselves and the boat. In

total, the vessel was carrying eighteen bales containing 385

kilograms (net weight) of cocaine. After securing the narcotics,

the Coast Guard arrested the individuals before transferring them

to the custody of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Guzmán-Ceballos later revealed the circumstances that

led him to participate in the voyage. According to

- 3 - Guzmán-Ceballos, he worked as a fisherman until the COVID-19

pandemic disrupted the Dominican economy. Without consistent

income from fishing, Guzmán-Ceballos struggled to provide for this

family. Around that time, Lantigua recruited Guzmán-Ceballos to

help smuggle drugs into Puerto Rico. Guzmán-Ceballos claims that

he did not have any relationship with the buyer or seller of the

drugs, did not know the source or destination of the same, and did

not plan nor organize the voyage. Rather, he was provided a vessel

with the drugs already loaded and told approximately when to leave

and where to go. In addition to the three people on the boat,

Guzmán-Ceballos claimed that there were "at least six others at

the beach" from where the boat departed.

B. Pre-Sentencing Proceedings

All three boat occupants were indicted in the District

of Puerto Rico. Guzmán-Ceballos, specifically, was charged with

five counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

five kilograms or more of cocaine aboard a vessel in violation of

46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (Count I); (2) possession

with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine aboard

a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2

(Count II); (3) conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of

cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a),

960(a) and (b)(1)(B), and 963 (Count III); (4) jettisoning cocaine

from a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C.

- 4 - § 2 (Count IV); and (5) failure to heave in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2237 (Count V).

The district court held a change-of-plea hearing on

March 21, 2023. During that hearing, Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded

guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The district court

then scheduled sentencing for June 20, 2023.

Before sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office

("Probation") filed the PSR. Probation did not consider whether

Guzmán-Ceballos warranted any sentencing adjustments for his role

in the offense. However, Probation recommended that

Guzmán-Ceballos's base offense level be decreased by three points

for accepting responsibility for the offense and assisting

authorities with the investigation. Taking that adjustment into

account, Probation calculated a total offense level of 33.

Guzmán-Ceballos objected to the PSR, arguing that Probation failed

to apply the mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

C. Sentencing Hearing

At his sentencing hearing, Guzmán-Ceballos highlighted

his objections to the PSR and argued for application of the

mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. After

considering arguments from the parties, the district court

rejected Guzmán-Ceballos's objections and adopted Probation's

recommendations in the PSR. While the district court did not offer

any additional reasons for denying Guzmán-Ceballos's objections to

- 5 - the PSR, it stated that it would vary below the Guidelines range

based on "the [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) factors, [his] special

characteristics, [his] role in the offense, the nature of the

offense and all that." Accordingly, the district court determined

a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of I.

That calculation yielded a sentencing range of 108 to 135 months'

imprisonment. The district court ultimately sentenced

Guzmán-Ceballos to ninety months' imprisonment for Counts I

through IV and sixty months' imprisonment for Count V to be served

concurrently. Guzmán-Ceballos objected to the sentence before the

conclusion of the hearing, arguing once again that the district

court should have granted his objection to the PSR and, for that

reason, the sentence imposed was "unreasonably high." The district

court "[d]uly noted" his objection before concluding the

sentencing hearing.

Guzmán-Ceballos timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Guzmán-Ceballos argues on appeal that the district court

erred in denying him a mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2. In particular, Guzmán-Ceballos asserts that the district

court failed to conduct the necessary analysis before denying his

request -- namely, that it did not identify the universe of

participants in the offense and, subsequently, did not determine

Guzmán-Ceballos's culpability relative to the other participants.

- 6 - Failure to do so, Guzmán-Ceballos contends, constitutes reversible

legal error.2

A. Standard of Review

We begin by determining the proper standard of appellate

review. This court reviews preserved procedural sentencing

challenges for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bishoff, 58

F.4th 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2023). Under the multilayered abuse of

discretion standard, we review the district court's findings of

fact for clear error and afford de novo review to claims regarding

the district court's interpretation and application of the

Guidelines. See United States v. Sierra-Jiménez, 93 F.4th 565,

569 (1st Cir. 2024).

The government argues that Guzmán-Ceballos failed to

preserve his procedural argument because his objections below were

too general. Not so. "To preserve a claim of procedural

sentencing error for appellate review, a defendant's objection

need not be framed with exquisite precision." United States v.

Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2020). Instead, "[i]t

2 Guzmán-Ceballos further asks us to remand for plenary resentencing

consistent with Amendment 821, Part B to the Guidelines, noting that such amendment could reduce his advisory Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amend. 821, pt. B (2023). We decline to consider this request, opting to leave it to the district court to decide on remand whether the amendment applies to Guzmán-Ceballos. See United States v. Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611, 616 n.3 (1st Cir. 2025) (declining to consider an identical request and, instead, leaving it to the district court to consider whether the amendment applies on remand).

- 7 - is enough if the objection is 'sufficiently specific to call the

district court's attention to the asserted error.'" Id. (quoting

United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017)).

During the sentencing hearing, Guzmán-Ceballos argued

for the application of the mitigating role adjustment under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. He renewed his objection after the district

court rendered its sentence and stated his belief that his sentence

was "unreasonably high" and that the district court should have

granted his objection to the PSR requesting a mitigating role

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. With these statements,

Guzmán-Ceballos alerted the district court of his procedural

challenge to his sentence, which the district court acknowledged

before concluding the sentencing hearing. Because Guzmán-Ceballos

adequately preserved his procedural challenge, we review his claim

accordingly.

B. Minor Role Adjustment

We now consider the merits of Guzmán-Ceballos's

procedural challenge to his sentence. District courts "should

begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the

applicable Guidelines range." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

49 (2007). Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines allows the district

court to decrease a defendant's offense level for being somewhere

between a "minimal" or a "minor" participant in the offense. See

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. A defendant requesting "a mitigating role

- 8 - adjustment bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he is entitled to the downward adjustment." United

States v. Pérez, 819 F.3d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 2016).

The sentencing court must conduct a "four-part analysis"

to determine whether the defendant has met his burden and, thus,

qualifies for an adjustment under § 3B1.2. United States v.

Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611, 617 (1st Cir. 2025). First, the

district court "must identify the universe of participants

involved in the relevant criminal activity." Id. Second, after

identifying the universe of participants, the district court "must

order each participant along a continuum based on the degree of

culpability in the criminal activity." Id. "Those who are

primarily responsible stand on one end, while the least culpable

participants . . . stand at the opposite end." United States v.

Walker, 89 F.4th 173, 185 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted).

Third, the district court then "must identify the average

participant across all likely participants in the criminal

scheme." Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th at 617.

At the last step, the district court must "compare the

defendant's role in the criminal activity to the average

participant's role." Id. "To measure a defendant's culpability

against that of the average participant, the sentencing court must

consider five non-exhaustive factors" outlined in the Guidelines

- 9 - (henceforth, "the § 3B1.2 factors").3 Id. at 618; see also

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). Along with the § 3B1.2 factors, the

court must also consider "the totality of the circumstances

and . . . the facts of the particular case." Id. (quoting U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)).

Because determining a defendant's role in an offense is

a fact-specific exercise, "we rarely reverse a district court's

decision regarding whether to apply a minor role adjustment."

Walker, 89 F.4th at 185 (quoting United States v. Andino-Rodríguez,

79 F.4th 7, 31 (1st Cir. 2023)). Notwithstanding this deferential

standard, "[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion

when it makes an error of law." United States v. Quirós-Morales,

83 F.4th 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Koon v. United States,

518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)). The district court commits reversible

3 The § 3B1.2 factors are as follows: 1) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity; 2) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity; 3) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority; 4) the nature and extent of the defendant's participation in the commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in performing those acts; 5) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).

- 10 - legal error when it fails to perform the correct mitigating role

analysis. See Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th at 623.

Applying the law to this case, we agree with

Guzmán-Ceballos that the district court did not engage in the

necessary four-part analysis before rejecting his objection to the

PSR. The district court did not identify the universe of

participants, nor did it order the participants along a continuum

of culpability to identify the average participant in the

trafficking scheme. Neither did the district court compare

Guzmán-Ceballos's role in the trafficking operation to that of the

average participant, which includes considering the § 3B1.2

factors. Rather, the district court stated its belief that the

Guidelines calculations in the PSR "satisfactorily reflect the

components of this offense by considering its nature and

circumstances." In reaching that conclusion, the district court

mentioned that it had considered "other sentencing factors" under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Guzmán-Ceballos's "participation" in the

offense. Since it is not apparent from the record that the

district court performed the necessary inquiry into

Guzmán-Ceballos's role in the drug trafficking scheme, we must

vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

The government argues that the district court adequately

identified the universe of participants by limiting its inquiry to

the three people on the boat. Again, we disagree. As we have

- 11 - explained, when determining the universe of participants,

sentencing courts must first make a legal determination to

ascertain the scope of the relevant conduct for which the defendant

is being held accountable and then must perform an "invariably

fact-specific" inquiry to identify the discernable participants

involved in the particular conduct. See Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th

at 622 (quoting United States v. Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d 1, 7

(1st Cir. 2018)). In drug trafficking operations such as the one

described in this case, "[l]imiting the universe of participants

to only those aboard 'the hazardous voyage' when performing a

mitigating role analysis, as the district court did here, is

inconsistent with the Guidelines' intent for courts to consider a

defendant's role based on all relevant conduct under U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3." Id. at 620. Instead, the Guidelines call on the

district court to "compare the defendant against all likely

participants involved with the shipment, including those involved

with the shipment's preparation and efforts to avoid detection."

Id. In his objections to the PSR, Guzmán-Ceballos noted that there

were "at least six others at the beach" when the boat departed

from the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the district court did

not consider the record evidence to determine whether there were

other discernible participants in the drug shipment outside of the

- 12 - "three people on th[e] boat." That was error under our § 3B1.2

precedent.

The government also posits that the district court did

not err in failing to expressly mention the § 3B1.2 factors,

insisting that the record shows that "the district court clearly

had [the § 3B1.2] factors" and Guzmán-Ceballos's "relative

culpability in mind" when it considered his objections to the PSR.

While the district court's analysis of the § 3B1.2 factors need

not be "extensive," it must include "both a judgment about the

defendant's own conduct and a comparison to the other

participants." Walker, 89 F.4th at 187. The district court's

decision here lacks any mention or reference to the § 3B1.2

factors, let alone, any meaningful analysis of them. But, even if

we assumed that the district court's mention that Guzmán-Ceballos

did not "really benefit from the venture" means that it had in

mind one of the § 3B1.2 factors, we still cannot affirm on that

basis alone. See Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th at 624 n.5 (explaining

that although "courts need not list expressly the factors

enumerated in Application Note 3(C) . . . courts must address all

§ 3B1.2 factors that are pertinent to the inquiry" (citation

omitted)); see also United States v. Wynn, 37 F.4th 63, 68 (2d

- 13 - Cir. 2022) (vacating sentence because the district court failed to

consider all relevant mitigating role factors).

Our conclusion here is bolstered by the district court's

lack of explanation for rejecting Guzmán-Ceballos's objection.

The district court simply stated it could not "grant those

objections." That is insufficient. As we have repeatedly held,

"sentencing courts must give sufficient explanation to 'allow for

meaningful appellate review.'" Walker, 89 F.4th at 187 (quoting

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Guzmán-Ceballos's

sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this

opinion.

So ordered.

- 14 -