United States v. Cawthorne

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2000
• Docket: 99-30522
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________

m 99-30522 Summary Calendar _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS

MARIO CAWTHORNE, Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (95-CR-50046-ALL) _________________________ July 5, 2000

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1), and was sentenced to PARKER, Circuit Judges. imprisonment followed by supervised release. The supervised release included the condition JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* that he not possess a firearm. A few months into the period of release, the district court, at Mario Cawthorne appeals the revocation of the request of the probation office, issued an his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. order to show cause why Cawthorne’s super- § 3583(e). We vacate the sentence and re- vised release should not be revoked. mand. The probation office alleged that I. Cawthorne had violated several conditions of Cawthorne pleaded guilty to unlawful his supervised release by failing to report to a possession of a machine gun in violation of probation officer, by being unemployed, and by failing to report a change in his residence. Following a preliminary probable cause * hearing, the probation office filed a Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has supplemental-violation report alleging that determined that this opinion should not be pub- Cawthorne had violated the conditions of his lished and is not precedent except under the limited supervised release by possessing a firearm. circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. At that hearing, Cawthorne admitted failure On cross-examination, Cox testified that to report and unemployment but denied the Cawthorne’s mother, Lola Cawthorne, had change of residence and possession of a informed Cox that she believed the police firearm. Probation Officer Steven Cox officers planted the gun, because she had never testified regarding the firearm allegation. seen it before they “found” it. She also When Cox reviewed Cawthorne’s file in informed Cox that the room in which the gun preparation for the preliminary hearing, he was found was a “junk room.” noticed a “partial offense report” from the police department (“the Report”). Ms. Cawthorne also testified at the hearing, stating that she had not given police According to Cox, the Report indicates1 permission to search and that the gun was that when Cawthorne was arrested at his found in a “junk room,” not in Cawthorne’s mother’s home on a state warrant for bedroom. She admitted that some of attempted homicide, the officers found a Cawt horne’s belongings and family semiautomatic handgun in plain view on a bed. photographs were stored in the “junk room” According to Cox’s testimony, the Report but testified that there was another bedroom in states that (1) Cawthorne’s mother both which Cawthorne lived. She testified that consented to the search and told police that neither she nor her mother had told the police the room in which the gun was found belonged that the “junk room” was Cawthorne’s to Cawthorne; (2) the bedroom contained mail bedroom, and she denied telling the police that addressed to Cawthorne and numerous the gun belonged to Cawthorne. photographs of him and other family members; and (3) Cawthorne’s mother stated that the At the close of the evidence, the gun belonged to Cawthorne. government suggested a continuance to enable the court to hear the testimony of the officers Cawthorne did not object to Cox’s who made the Report: testimony regarding the contents of the Report. When the government attempted to Government: If Your Honor wishes I’d introduce the Report into evidence,2 however, ask for a continuance to bring the police Cawthorne objected on the ground that it was officers who made the SS not a self-authenticating document, that the persons who had prepared it were not present, The Court: No. and that the state charges it concerned had been dismissed.3 The court did not rule on the Government: If required, if needed. objection but instead stated, “Well, I don’t feel I need it,” to which the government replied The Court: No, I find that the “Very well, Your Honor.” defendant, Mr. Cawthorne, violated the terms of his probation by not reporting and failing to tell the probation office where he was, where he could be 1 reached, all class C. And more probably Because, as noted below, the Report was not than not possession of a MAC 11 admitted into evidence, all information regarding its handgun. Therefore, your client has content comes from Cox’s testimony. committed both grade A and grade C 2 violations, violations establishing an It is not evident whether the government had obtained a complete copy of the Report or was imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months, trying to introduce only the portion relied upon by so I’m going to order the three-year Cox. term of supervised release imposed back in ‘95 set aside and order Mr. 3 Cox testified that the underlying homicide Cawthorne committed to the custody of charge and a charge of being a felon in possession the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 18 were dismissed. months.

2 Cawthorne objected to the finding of a Grade 791.6 A violation.4 All state charges resulting from the police II. report were dismissed, for reasons we do not A court may revoke supervised release if it know. While hearsay is not prohibited in finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that revocation proceedings, we are not unmindful the releasee violated a condition of that of the reasons that we place restrictions on the release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United use of hearsay in criminal trials. Without some States v. Alaniz-Alaniz, 38 F.3d 788, 792 (5th corroboration, it is not reasonable to find a Cir. 1994). We review factual findings for third person’s testimony regarding the content clear error, and in a challenge to the of a portion of a police report that never led to sufficiency of the evidence we view the any trial or conviction more believable than the evidence and all reasonable inferences testimony of an in-court witness, where that therefrom in a light most favorable to the witness’s testimony is internally consistent and government. See id., at 790, 792. The conceivably correct (e.g., does not violate any evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of laws of nature). fact could reach the conclusion being challenged. See id. at 792. We do not hold that a third party’s recollection of the contents of a police report The only evidence of the Grade A firearm alone may never satisfy a preponderance violation, or lack thereof, consists of the burdenSSthat case is not before us. Rather, we testimony of Cox and Ms. Cawthorne. We conclude that where a live witness, based on first note that Cox’s testimony of what the personal knowledge, consistently and directly “partial police report” contained is hearsay, contradicted Cox’s testimony; Cox’s testimony but because revocation proceedings are not was based solely on his reading a portion of a criminal prosecutions and are not formal trials, police report; all charges based on that report the rules of evidence are not applied. See were dismissed; and neither Cox’s recollection United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 509 of, nor the content of, the report was (5th Cir. 1995), clarified by 77 F.3d 811 (5th corroborated in any manner or to any degree, Cir. 1996); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); FED. R. no trier of fact reasonably could reach the CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2) (advisory committee conclusion that the government had satisfied notes).5 We also recognize that the district its burden of proof by a preponderance of the court necessarily made a credibility evidence.7 Thus, the evidence is insufficient to determination regarding Ms. Cawthorne, and establish that Cawthorne more likely than not “[i]t is not this [c]ourt’s function to pass on a possessed a firearm.8 district court’s determination regarding the credibility of the witness.” Alaniz, 38 F.3d at 6 It would be illogical, however, to presume that the credibility of one who does testify is less than 4 Upon a finding that Cawthorne possessed a that of one who does not even appear before the firearm, revocation of his supervised release was court. mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) and 7 U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1), p.s. If the court had found Neither of the two cases cited by the only Grade C violations, it would have had government for the proposition that police reports discretion to revoke, extend, or modify the can be sufficiently reliable for sentencing purposes conditions of the supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. involved similar circumstances. See United States § 3583(e); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2), p.s. v. Tucker, 20 F.3d 242, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1514 5 The releasee’s due process rights can render (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc). some hearsay inadmissible, but Cawthorne did not 8 raise that issue in the district court or on appeal. We recognize that possession may be See Grandlund, 71 F.3d at 509-10; Alaniz, constructive, but the requisite elements of 38 F.3d at 791-92. (continued...)

3 VACATED and REMANDED.

(...continued) constructive possession are contained only in Cox’s double hearsay testimony. See United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1993).