United States v. Castillo

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 20, 2024
• Docket: 23-272
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 20 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-272 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-00422-GPC-2 v. MEMORANDUM* GENE ANTHONY CASTILLO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Gene Castillo appeals from his convictions for importing methamphetamine,

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and attempted obstruction of justice.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We

review for abuse of discretion a district court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of a

motion for a new trial. United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 2011); United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002). We review

de novo a district court’s suppression rulings and review underlying factual

findings for clear error. United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 2015).

We also review de novo a district court’s Brady/Giglio determinations, Kohring,

637 F.3d at 901, and “review the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial

Act de novo” and its ends of justice analysis for clear error. United States v.

Orozco-Barron, 72 F.4th 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2023). We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err in concluding that the Riverside stop and

search were lawful. The record supports the district court’s credibility

determinations and the officers’ testimony about the car’s heavily tinted windows

provided reasonable suspicion to stop the car Castillo was driving. See United

States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2000). The officers did not

unreasonably prolong the stop by conducting “ordinary inquiries incident to” the

stop, Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (citation omitted), and

their concern about potential human trafficking given Cuevas’s young appearance

provided independent reasonable suspicion to prolong the encounter to identify

her, see United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2019).

The district court did not clearly err by ruling that Castillo consented to the

officers searching his car. The officers’ body cameras captured Castillo nodding

2 but not his verbal responses to the officers’ request to search for guns and drugs,

and the record does not show that the district court clearly erred by accepting the

officers’ testimony about Castillo’s responses. The district court’s finding that the

consent was voluntary is supported by the record, as Castillo was not in custody

and the officers did not draw their guns, threaten him, or tell him they could obtain

a warrant. See United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1988)

(laying out factors for evaluating voluntariness of consent). The district court did

not clearly err by concluding that Castillo’s consent extended to the trunk and

suitcase, which could have contained drugs or guns and were opened with

Castillo’s key. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); United States v.

Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803–04 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e must assess what

a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between him and the

trooper.”).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the

Riverside stop and search under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. We

use a four-part test to determine admissibility under Rule 404(b): “(1) the evidence

tends to prove a material point; (2) the prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the

evidence is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the other act;

and (4) (in cases where knowledge and intent are at issue) the act is similar to the

offense charged.” United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994).

3 The district court did not err by reasoning that Castillo’s knowledge of drugs in the

car in the Riverside stop increased the likelihood that he knew that there were

drugs in the car crossing the border. See United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1018

(9th Cir. 2005). The two stops were three months apart; Castillo admitted that the

Riverside drugs were his; and the stops shared the same mode of transporting

methamphetamine, method of packaging methamphetamine, and distribution-scale

drug quantities. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence

under Rule 403, as it was probative of Castillo’s knowledge and—while

undoubtedly prejudicial—had diminished prejudicial effect because the district

court gave two limiting instructions. See United States v. Flores-Blanco, 623 F.3d

912, 920 (9th Cir. 2010). The prejudicial effect of the evidence was also

minimized by Cuevas’s testimony, which contributed to the overwhelming

evidence of Castillo’s guilt.

3. The government did not violate Giglio by disclosing impeachment

evidence about one of the Riverside police officers the day before trial. The

government’s argument that it acted properly because the evidence was ruled

inadmissible impermissibly “collapses Brady’s three-part test into an examination

of materiality.” United States v. Bruce, 984 F.3d 884, 898 (9th Cir. 2021). The

threshold question is whether the government owed a duty to produce the evidence.

Although the district court ultimately ruled the evidence inadmissible under

4 Federal Rule of Evidence 609, we agree with the district court that the government

was unquestionably required to disclose the officer’s prior conviction, or at the

least submit it for in camera review and request the court’s permission to withhold

it. See United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2009). That said, there

is not “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion). The evidence was deemed

inadmissible and the facts of the Riverside stop were supported by other evidence.1

The officer’s testimony was not necessary for Castillo’s conviction given Cuevas’s

highly inculpatory testimony and other evidence connecting him to the drugs.

4. Castillo’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The two magistrate

judges who granted the government’s requests to extend the indictment deadline

found that the “ends of justice” were served by extending the deadline based on the

suspension of grand jury proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court

complied with the Speedy Trial Act’s requirements by setting forth “its reasons for

finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance

outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial,” 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Castillo also argues that he was brought to trial late, but

1 The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the officer’s conviction under Rule 609 because it was over ten years old and only minimally probative of the officer’s character for truthfulness.

5 the Speedy Trial Act states that “[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal

prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver

of the right to dismissal under this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Castillo did

not move to dismiss the indictment before trial and therefore waived his speedy

trial right.

5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Castillo’s

motion for a new trial. “To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct,

[the defendant] must establish both misconduct and prejudice.” United States v.

Wells, 879 F.3d 900, 934 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

While Cuevas’s testimony about domestic violence was prejudicial, the district

court struck most of the inadmissible testimony and instructed the jury to disregard

it. “A cautionary instruction from the judge is generally sufficient to cure any

prejudice from the introduction of inadmissible evidence . . . .” United States v.

Lemus, 847 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016). It was not clear that Cuevas’s

statement about getting stabbed implicated Castillo and counsel did not ask the

court to admonish the jury to disregard it. Moreover, “the independent evidence of

guilt overwhelmed the impact of the error,” so Castillo was not unfairly prejudiced.

See United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 1991).

6. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Castillo of the two

drug offenses. The court “determine[s] whether ‘after viewing the evidence in the

6 light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v.

Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The jury received substantial direct and

circumstantial evidence of Castillo’s knowledge of the methamphetamine in the

car at the border—the key contested element of both charges. This is not a case

where “the evidence of innocence, or lack of evidence of guilt, is such that all

rational fact finders would have to conclude that the evidence of guilt fails to

establish every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See id. at 1165.

AFFIRMED.