United States v. Cassidy

67 F. 698
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 2, 1895
DocketNo. 3059
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 67 F. 698 (United States v. Cassidy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1895).

Opinion

MORROW, District Judge

(charging jury). Gentlemen of the Jury: I congratulate you on the approaching termination of this case. For five months you have been required to give your constant, and, I might say, exclusive, attention to the daily proceedings in this court. The trial of the case has been protracted, but I am not prepared to say that any greater time has been occupied than was necessary, under the circumstances, to secure the testimony of the 216 witnesses who have appeared before you upon the stand. The nature of the charges against the defendants now on trial, covering, as they do, the whole field of the railroad strike of last summer in this district, necessarily involves the closest scrutiny into every feature of that affair. In this examination you have displayed a patient interest of such a commendable character as to call for the special acknowledgment of the court. You are, indeed, entitled to the gratitude of every good citizen of the community for the sacrifices you are making, and for the service you are rendering in the faithful performance of a public duty.

In submitting the case to your consideration, it becomes my duty to call your attention to the character of the charges against the defendants, and the provisions of law under which the prosecution is being conducted. It is the duty of the court to declare the law; it is your exclusive province and responsibility to apply the law so declared to the facts as you, upon your conscience, believe them to be established.

[702]*702The indictment contains two counts, which, in general terms, charge that the defendants conspired, combined, and agreed together, and with divers other persons, to obstruct and retard the passage of the United States mails, and the carrier carrying the same, and also that they engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States, and with foreign countries. The crime of conspiracy is based upon section 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides as follows:

“If two or more persons conspire eitlier to commit any offense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two years or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court”

To make this statute as clear to you as possible, I will call your attention to its three essential provisions. The first element is the act of two or more persons conspiring together; the second is to commit any offense against the United States; and the third is what is termed the “overt act,” or the element of one or more of such parties doing any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. With respect to the first element, we find that a conspiracy has been described as a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself unlawful or criminal, by criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S. 203, 13 Sup. Ct. 542. The common design is the essence of' the charge, and while it is necessary, in order to establish a conspiracy, to prove a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish the criminal or unlawful purpose, it is not necessary to constitute a conspiracy that two or more persons should meet together, and enter into an explicit or formal agreement for an unlawful scheme, or that they should directly, by words or in writing, state what the unlawful scheme was to be, and the details of the plan or means by which the unlawful combination was to be made effective. It is sufficient if two j or more persons, in any manner, or through any contrivance, posii tively or tacitly come to a mutual understanding to accomplish a j common and unlawful design. In other words, where an unlawful lend is sought to be effected, and two or more persons, actuated by 'the common purpose of accomplishing that end, work together, in i; any way, in furtherance of the unlawful scheme, every one of said !' jjersons becomes a member of the conspiracy, although the part he was to take therein was a subordinate one, or was to be executed at a remote distance from the other conspirators. A combination formed by two or more persons, to effect an unlawful end, is a conspiracy, said persons acting under a common purpose to accomplish the end designed. Any one who, after a conspiracy is formed, and who knows of its existence, joins therein, becomes as much a party thereto, from that time, as if he had originally conspired. U. S. v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 586, Fed. Cas. No. 14,487. Furthermore, where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same [703]*703illegal purpose, any act done by one of the parties in pursuance of ihe original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of the law, the act of the whole party, and therefore the proof of such act will be evidence against any of the others who were engaged in the same conspiracy. It is also rue that any declaration made by one of the parties during the pendency of the illegal enterprise is not only evidence against himself, but is evidence against tbe other parties, who, when the combination is proved, are as much responsible for such declarations and the acts to which they relate as if made and committed by themselves. This rule, you will understand, applies to the declaration of a co-conspirator, although he may not be under prosecution, Ms declaration being equally admissible with those of one under indictment and prosecution.

The confederacy to commit an offense is the gist of the criminality under the law. The law regards the act of unlawful combination and confederacy as dangerous to the peace of society, and declares that such combination and confederacy of two or more persons, to commit crime, requires an additional restraint io those provided for the commission of the crime, and makes criminal the conspiracy, with penalties and punishments distinctive from those prescribed for the crime which may be the object of the conspiracy. You will readily understand why this is true. A conspiracy becomes powerful and effective in the accomplishment of its illegal purpose in proportion to the numbers, power, and strength of the combination to <-fieri it. It is also true that, as it involves a number in a lawless enterprise, it is proportionately demoralizing to the well-being and character of the men engaged in it, and, as a consequence, to the safety of the community to which they belong.

The second essential element in the offense described by the statute is the purpose of the conspirators to commit an offense against íl¡e United States. The indictment charges that the defendants conspired with others to commit two offenses against the United States,-—one to obstruct and retard the passage of the United States mail and the carrier carrying the same; and the other, that they engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States and with foreign countries. The first charge is based upon tbe provisions of section 3995 of the Revised Statutes, which provides as follows:

“Any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct and retard the passage of the mail, or any carriage, horse, driver, or carrier carrying the same, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.”

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Bluebook (online)
67 F. 698, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cassidy-cand-1895.