JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
This case reminds us of the tension in federal criminal law between two competing but overlapping systems for imposing a sentence. In most cases, a sentencing court computes the relevant range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, now advisory under the teaching of
United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), before making its own determination of an appropriate punishment after considering the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a), including the “parsimony” provision that a sentence must not be “greater than necessary” to serve appropriate sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For certain criminal offenses, however, Congress has created a “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment — a blunt directive that may require judges to give sentences that they consider unduly punitive.
See Dorsey v. United States,
— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2326-29, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (describing the development of and relationship between these two sentencing regimes).
The question presented in this appeal is whether a statutory mandatory minimum provision binds a federal sentencing court when the relevant statute does not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision in § 3553(a). For the reasons stated below, we hold that a statutory mandatory minimum binds a sentencing court by explicitly providing a sentencing floor. The relevant statute need not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision or other general sentencing considerations in § 3553(a). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Ronald Carter pleaded guilty in 2011 to conspiracy to distribute, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 851.
Based on
the drug amount and Carter’s prior felony drug convictions, the government recommended a prison term of ten years — the minimum required under § 841(b)(1)(B).
Although Carter recognized at the time of his guilty plea that he was subject to a ten-year statutory mandatory minimum prison term, he argued at sentencing that a ten-year term “punishes him a second time for the prior offense conduct” and “serves none of the purposes of sentencing found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” App. 12. Considering the statutory mandatory minimum as binding, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr.,
Judge)
sentenced Carter to ten years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Carter argues that the District Court erred by applying the ten-year statutory mandatory minimum. In particular, he argues that his sentence violated the so-called “parsimony” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides that a sentencing court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with [appropriate sentencing objectives].”
Carter acknowledges that § 841(b)(1)(B) purports to create a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
See
note 2,
ante.
He also acknowledges that Congress may override the general sentencing requirements in § 3553(a), see
Dorsey,
132 S.Ct. at 2327 (“[0]rdinarily no matter what range the Guidelines set forth, a sentencing judge must sentence an offender to at least the minimum prison term set forth in a statutory mandatory minimum.”), but to do so, Carter argues, the statutory mandatory minimum provision must
specifically provide
that other sentencing provisions are not controlling.
In support of this argument, Carter points to § 3551(a), which states that
“[except as otherwise specifically provided,
a defendant ... shall be sentenced in accor
dance with the provisions of this chapter so as to achieve” the sentencing objectives listed in § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (emphasis supplied). Carter also cites other statutes that include the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law,”
see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b) (aggravated identity theft statute providing for certain punishments “[notwithstanding any other provision of law”), and he notes that Congress even used that phrase in § 841(b)(1)(B) when discussing the availability of parole,
see
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person sentenced under this sub-paragraph.”).
DISCUSSION
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
see United States v. David,
681 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir.2012), keeping in mind that “[a] district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,”
In re Sims,
534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review
de novo
the legal aspects of a district court’s decision to apply a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
See United States v. Jackson,
504 F.3d 250, 252 (2d Cir.2007).
We reject Carter’s argument. Sentencing courts must impose a sentence consistent with the factors listed in § 3553(a) “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided.”
See
18 U.S.C. 3551(a). Thus, the
general
sentencing provisions in § 3553(a) give way to
specific
mandatory sentencing provisions elsewhere in the criminal code.
See, e.g., United States v. Samas,
561 F.3d 108, 110-11 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “the parsimony clause in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) conflicts with the mandatory sentencing provisions in § 841(b)”);
cf. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct.
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JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
This case reminds us of the tension in federal criminal law between two competing but overlapping systems for imposing a sentence. In most cases, a sentencing court computes the relevant range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, now advisory under the teaching of
United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), before making its own determination of an appropriate punishment after considering the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a), including the “parsimony” provision that a sentence must not be “greater than necessary” to serve appropriate sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For certain criminal offenses, however, Congress has created a “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment — a blunt directive that may require judges to give sentences that they consider unduly punitive.
See Dorsey v. United States,
— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2326-29, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (describing the development of and relationship between these two sentencing regimes).
The question presented in this appeal is whether a statutory mandatory minimum provision binds a federal sentencing court when the relevant statute does not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision in § 3553(a). For the reasons stated below, we hold that a statutory mandatory minimum binds a sentencing court by explicitly providing a sentencing floor. The relevant statute need not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision or other general sentencing considerations in § 3553(a). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Ronald Carter pleaded guilty in 2011 to conspiracy to distribute, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 851.
Based on
the drug amount and Carter’s prior felony drug convictions, the government recommended a prison term of ten years — the minimum required under § 841(b)(1)(B).
Although Carter recognized at the time of his guilty plea that he was subject to a ten-year statutory mandatory minimum prison term, he argued at sentencing that a ten-year term “punishes him a second time for the prior offense conduct” and “serves none of the purposes of sentencing found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” App. 12. Considering the statutory mandatory minimum as binding, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr.,
Judge)
sentenced Carter to ten years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Carter argues that the District Court erred by applying the ten-year statutory mandatory minimum. In particular, he argues that his sentence violated the so-called “parsimony” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides that a sentencing court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with [appropriate sentencing objectives].”
Carter acknowledges that § 841(b)(1)(B) purports to create a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
See
note 2,
ante.
He also acknowledges that Congress may override the general sentencing requirements in § 3553(a), see
Dorsey,
132 S.Ct. at 2327 (“[0]rdinarily no matter what range the Guidelines set forth, a sentencing judge must sentence an offender to at least the minimum prison term set forth in a statutory mandatory minimum.”), but to do so, Carter argues, the statutory mandatory minimum provision must
specifically provide
that other sentencing provisions are not controlling.
In support of this argument, Carter points to § 3551(a), which states that
“[except as otherwise specifically provided,
a defendant ... shall be sentenced in accor
dance with the provisions of this chapter so as to achieve” the sentencing objectives listed in § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (emphasis supplied). Carter also cites other statutes that include the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law,”
see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b) (aggravated identity theft statute providing for certain punishments “[notwithstanding any other provision of law”), and he notes that Congress even used that phrase in § 841(b)(1)(B) when discussing the availability of parole,
see
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person sentenced under this sub-paragraph.”).
DISCUSSION
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
see United States v. David,
681 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir.2012), keeping in mind that “[a] district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,”
In re Sims,
534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review
de novo
the legal aspects of a district court’s decision to apply a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
See United States v. Jackson,
504 F.3d 250, 252 (2d Cir.2007).
We reject Carter’s argument. Sentencing courts must impose a sentence consistent with the factors listed in § 3553(a) “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided.”
See
18 U.S.C. 3551(a). Thus, the
general
sentencing provisions in § 3553(a) give way to
specific
mandatory sentencing provisions elsewhere in the criminal code.
See, e.g., United States v. Samas,
561 F.3d 108, 110-11 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “the parsimony clause in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) conflicts with the mandatory sentencing provisions in § 841(b)”);
cf. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 2071, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) (“It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)). Section 841(b)(1)(B) “provides” for a mandatory minimum, and it does so “specifically,” stating that when an offense involves “28 grams or more of a mixture or substance ... containing] cocaine base” and occurs “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final,” the defendant
“shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years
and not more than life imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied). Thus, as we have already held, the considerations in § 3553(a) cannot override the mandatory mínimums in § 841(b)(1).
See Samas,
561 F.3d at 110-11.
Carter’s argument does not cast doubt on this conclusion. Carter reads § 3551(a) as requiring mandatory minimum provisions to
disclaim
the applicability of § 3553(a). But that is not what § 3551(a) provides. According to § 3551(a), a defen
dant “shall be sentenced in accordance with” the parsimony provision in § 3553(a) “(ejxcept as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). Thus, a statutory provision that “specifically provide[s]” how a defendant “shall be sentenced” trumps the general sentencing considerations in § 3553(a). In the context of mandatory mínimums, this means that a statutory mandatory minimum need only “specifically provide! ]” a sentencing floor; it need not specifically
disclaim
the general rule that a sentence must not be “greater than necessary” to satisfy appropriate sentencing objectives.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Adopting Carter’s argument would depart from the plain text of § 3551(a) and make superfluous a host of mandatory minimum provisions that do not include a specific disclaimer.
See Rad-LAX,
132 S.Ct. at 2070-71 (“[T]he [general/specific] canon avoids ... the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the general one, ‘violating] the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute.’ ” (quoting
D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin,
285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 76 L.Ed. 704 (1932))).
This straightforward conclusion accords with decisions from our sister circuits.
See, e.g., United States v. Senter,
424 Fed. Appx. 443, 446-47 (6th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that § 841(b)(l)(A)’s mandatory minimum provision does not trump § 3553(a) because it lacks a phrase such as “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law”);
United States v. DeCoteau,
630 F.3d 1091, 1098 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “§ 3553(a)’s parsimony provision must be followed even if there is a statutory mandatory minimum unless the statute under consideration contains an ‘except as otherwise specifically provided by law’ clause”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a statutory mandatory minimum provision constrains a district court’s discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it “specifically provide[s]” a minimum sentence, and such a provision need not “specifically provide! ]” that it trumps the general sentencing considerations in § 3553(a).
Id.
§ 3551(a). The District Court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.